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 Abstract 
This dissertation analyzes state cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC, 
or the Court). State cooperation is the precondition for the Court to bring perpetrators of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity to justice. The Court does not have a police 
force of its own to enforce its arrest warrants and court requests. Consequently, the ICC depends 
on the cooperation and assistance of states and international organizations to arrest suspects and 
facilitate the Court’s work in various ways. Through qualitative methods, including case studies, 
content analysis, and process tracing, I investigate how states support or undermine the Court’s 
work through mandatory compliance as well as voluntary cooperation.  
 
Based on in-depth case studies of two African ICC states parties—South Africa and 
Kenya—I develop a new framework to classify states into four types of cooperators (model 
cooperators, pro forma cooperators, cheap talkers, and non-cooperators) based on whether they 
engaged in mandatory compliance and/or voluntary cooperation for institution weakening or 
institution strengthening. While mandatory engagement refers to specific compliance 
requirements governments take on when they join the Court as states parties, such as complying 
with court requests, voluntary cooperation refers to support behavior that goes beyond the Rome 
Statute, such as diplomacy and public statements.  
 
In the case study chapters, I trace South Africa and Kenya’s cooperation behavior 
longitudinally to describe their shifts from model cooperators to pro-forma and non-cooperators 
and explain these countries’ cooperation behavior in the al-Bashir and Kenyatta court cases. 
While South Africa failed to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir when he visited the 
country in June 2015, the Kenyan government cooperated to some extent with the ICC while also 
undermining the Court regionally and domestically. I complement these case studies with a 
content analysis of what states say about the Court at the UN to show how discourse about the 
ICC has developed over time and what states like and dislike about the Court’s work. I contrast 
this venue with the African Union’s (AU) position on the Court. While more critical of the ICC, 
the AU’s focus lies on the Court’s charges against sitting African heads of state rather than the 
overall portfolio of ICC situations. 
 
The dissertation’s findings relate to how states parties cooperate with the ICC and when 
and why they cooperate. First, I find that states can simultaneously cooperate with the Court 
while undermining it in other forums. Kenya engaged in a multifaceted strategy that included 
mandatory cooperation but also diplomacy and statements against the Court. Second, I find that 
the AU plays an important role as a mediator in the state-ICC relationship. The AU functioned as 
a forum for ICC-critical African leaders and contributed to the stalling of progress in the al-
Bashir case by passing a non-cooperation policy that provided countries with a legal ‘out’ if they 
did not want to arrest a fellow African leader. Moreover, the organization called repeatedly for 
the deferral of cases and that sitting heads of state should be immune from prosecution. Third, I 
find that domestic-level factors help explain cooperation behavior. Most importantly, I argue that 
governments cooperate with the ICC when their interests are aligned with the Court; cooperation 
is not forthcoming or is undermined when the interests are misaligned. Moreover, reputation 
concerns can help explain cooperation decisions.  
 
The dissertation contributes to ongoing debates in International Relations (IR) on global 
governance, transitional justice norms, and compliance with International Law. The cooperation 
 framework that I introduce expands on existing accounts of state cooperation with the ICC by 
including a wider array of state behaviors. While existing accounts either focus on mandatory 
cooperation or on political support for the ICC, I combine these behaviors into one framework. 
Beyond the ICC, this framework has the potential to travel to other international courts and 
organizations. Second, the crucial role of the AU in the state-ICC nexus challenges common 
accounts of Global South countries and the AU as weak actors in the international system. In the 
court cases against sitting heads of state, the AU’s involvement suggests that a regional 
organization can counteract a global institution’s work and purpose. Thus, when analyzing 
compliance, we need to expand our focus beyond domestic-level explanations to include regional 
actors that may impact compliance and create loyalty conflicts for states parties. The longitudinal 
analyses reveal that states can shift their cooperation behavior over time. This attests to the value 
added of in-depth case studies for our understanding of the temporal variation of compliance. It 
complicates existing compliance studies that analyze compliance through ratifications and 
domestic implementation of international treaties. These studies represent the compliance 
behavior of countries at a specific point in time but they cannot tell us about the degree to which 
a state will honor its legal commitment when called on to fulfill a specific task years or decades 
after the initial commitment. In addition, the empirical chapters add to the second image and 
second image reversed traditions in IR. On the one hand, the case studies show that these 
countries’ domestic politics can impact the functioning of an international organization. On the 
other hand, they contribute to our understanding of the ICC’s impact on domestic politics in 
South Africa and Kenya. Lastly, the dissertation attests to the formidable hurdles in prosecuting 
suspects of mass atrocities when those perpetrators are sitting heads of state. When equipped 
with the resources and powers of office, sitting leaders can easily circumvent international justice 
and might even be supported by important allies in their endeavors. This casts doubt on more 
optimistic accounts that posit an increasing trend toward accountability for all perpetrators.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Two episodes illustrate the importance of state cooperation for the functioning of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC, or the Court). On 24 November 2013, authorities of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) arrested Congolese legislator Fidèle Babala Wandu. 
Babala Wandu has been charged by the ICC for conspiring with others to coach and bribe 
witnesses in the ICC trial of former Congolese vice president Jean-Pierre Bemba. The Congolese 
authorities acted on the ICC’s arrest warrant and detained Babala Wandu. North of the DRC, in 
the Sudan, President Omar al-Bashir is still in power—eight years after the ICC issued two arrest 
warrants for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. Despite these high-profile 
charges, al-Bashir continues to travel around the globe, including to many ICC states parties (i.e. 
states that have ratified the Rome Statute) that have failed to follow up on their commitment 
despite their legal obligation to arrest him. 
The ICC lacks its own police force, and so it depends on the cooperation and assistance 
of states parties, non-member states, and international organizations (IOs) to put suspects on trial. 
State cooperation is the pre-condition for the achievement of the Court’s mission to end impunity. 
In contrast, the absence of cooperation leaves suspects at large, makes evidence unattainable, and 
obstructs the Office of the Prosecutor’s (OTP) efforts to build successful cases. An ICC official 
phrased the importance of state cooperation in the following way:  
Without the support of states, this court is basically just us in a building. We 
can issue any statement or decision or whatever we want but as soon as we step 
outside the doors of this building, we need the cooperation of states, the host 
state, the Netherlands, and to go anywhere else, every step of the way, even to 
enter a country, we need the consent of the state.1  
 
                                                
1 Interview 004. 
 2 
Critics posit that the high hopes that accompanied the Court’s creation—that it would 
deter mass atrocities and end impunity—have failed to materialize. They point to the limited 
number of cases and completed trials at the ICC. Since the Court’s formal establishment in 2002, 
ICC judges have issued arrest warrants and summons to appear against 40 suspects in 24 court 
cases. 12 of 40 have been detained in the ICC detention center and have appeared before the 
Court. 11 persons remain at large and are not in the Court’s custody. Charges have been dropped 
against five individuals due to their deaths. Charges were either not confirmed or were dropped 
or vacated against eight persons. ICC judges have issued five verdicts: four guilty verdicts (Jean-
Pierre Bemba, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Germain Katanga, and Ahmad al-Faqi) and one acquittal 
(Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui). For many observers, this record paints the picture of an ineffective 
institution that has achieved little in 15 years of operation. Table 1 presents the current situation 
countries, the number of issued arrest warrants and summons to appear (thus representing the 
total number of potential trials), and the number which have been executed and remain open. 
 
Table 1: Overview of Arrest Warrants (AW) and Summons to Appear (SA) 
Situation 
Country 
Number of 
AW and SA 
Executed AW and SA 
(accused in ICC 
custody or on trial) 
Open AW or SA (minus 
deaths, charges dismissed, 
vacated) 
Georgia 0 0 0 
Mali 1 1 0 
Côte d’Ivoire 3 2 1 
Kenya 9 6 3 
Libya 4 1 2 (1 died) 
Sudan 7 0 5 (1 died) 
DRC 6 5 1 
CAR (I and II) 5 5 0 
Uganda 5 1 1 (4 died) 
TOTAL 40 21 13 (6 died) 
 
 3 
In addition to the meager record of trial completion, the ICC has drawn criticism for its 
prosecution focus. Of currently ten situations (Court parlance for a time-bound event in a country, 
such as a conflict), only one is not in Africa. For 14 years, until January 2016 when the ICC’s 
OTP opened an investigation into Georgia, all ICC situations had been in Africa. Despite 
conducting preliminary examinations (a pre-investigation phase) in other continents that 
occasionally involved Western powers, the OTP has declined to open official investigations 
outside of Africa. In addition, the OTP has charged heads of state and leading state officials, 
which has prompted a stark backlash from some African countries, accusing the Court of bias 
against Africa and derailing fragile peace processes.  
This dissertation does not deny that the Court bears responsibility for its litigation 
mistakes, slow trials, and political backlash. Important research has highlighted the political 
underpinnings of ICC decision-making.2 However, this research contributes to an emerging topic 
in ICC research that takes the role of states’ support for the Court seriously.3 While much 
scholarship has studied the creation of the Court and its impact on justice and peace,4 compliance 
with the Rome Statute has only recently been examined more closely. Often it is not the Court 
that breeds its own bad record but actually the states in charge of enforcing arrest warrants and 
bearing the legal responsibility to comply with ICC decisions.5 Critics’ arguments about the lack 
of Court ineffectiveness are intimately tied to the lack of state cooperation in vital areas such as 
arrests and surrender. 
                                                
2 E.g. Bosco 2014; Tiemessen 2014. 
3 Bosco 2014; Hillebrecht and Straus 2017. 
4 To name a few: Schiff 2008; Deitelhoff 2009; Simmons and Danner 2010; Chapman and Chaudoin 2013. 
5 This point was also made by Meernik 2008. 
 4 
Compliance and cooperation with the ICC is an inherently political question. 6 Per the 
Court’s founding treaty, the Rome Statute, all ICC states parties are legally obliged to cooperate 
with the Court. However, while the Court has the legal power to demand a state’s cooperation, it 
is less powerful politically. The Court’s judicial chambers can make findings of non-compliance 
against states parties and can refer the matter to the Court’s legislative body, the Assembly of 
States Parties (ASP), and the UN Security Council (UNSC). The ICC can also persuade state 
leaders and other international actors of its effectiveness and work. But beyond, the Court cannot 
coerce states into action. The politics of compliance and cooperation lie at the heart of the state-
ICC nexus. My dissertation provides insight into this important topic by analyzing compliance 
and non-compliance with the Rome Statute and by examining how states support the Court 
through Court-supportive discourse and diplomacy. 
This research thus acknowledges the deeply political nature of international courts.7 On 
the one hand, international courts are IOs created through multilateral treaties. However, they 
can act more independently of member states, thus functioning less like agents of state but rather 
as trustees.8 Once created, the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor can initiate cases on her own will, a power 
which opens up the Court to more critique from states. International courts are created to be 
independent and neutral9 and this is sought to be ensured through their international makeup, 
legal professionalism,10 their location away from conflict area, all to “trump national 
                                                
6 I use the terms ‘cooperation’ and ‘compliance’ interchangeably here. While ‘cooperation’ can be defined more 
broadly politically, this dissertation is concerned with rhetoric as a form of cooperation as well as compliance 
with arrest warrants (Art. 89). This compliance is contained as ‘cooperation’ in the Rome Statute’s Part IX 
‘International cooperation and judicial assistance.’ 
7 Nouwen and Werner 2011. 
8 Alter 2008. 
9 This is the Court’s rational-legal authority, which make it an attractive organization to which states delegate: Alter 
2008; Barnett and Finnemore 2004.  
10 ICC officials point out the strictly legal reasoning that guides their decision-making: Interviews 002, 003, 004, 
006. 
 5 
sovereignty.”11 However, despite these efforts at insulation, other political actors may want to 
exert control over them and may want to “hamper investigations and block indictments by 
withholding valuable evidence in their possession.”12 The dissertation speaks to this debate as I 
chronicle states’ efforts at bypassing the Court’s decisions or hampering its work. 
This Introduction is divided into several sections: The next two sections present the two 
main research questions driving this dissertation. In them, I present my answers to the research 
questions on which I will further elaborate in the following chapters. Then, I sketch out the 
dissertation’s contributions to ongoing debates in International Relations (IR) about norm 
resistance and compliance with International Law (IL). Next, I describe the methodology used 
for answering the questions. The last sections provide some background on the importance of 
state cooperation for the Court, existing research on the Court, the legal controversies 
surrounding it, and an overview of upcoming empirical chapters.  
Main Questions and Arguments 
This dissertation is about the ICC and the institutional context in which it operates. I 
investigate ways in which states parties to the Court have lent support to the Court or not. The 
goal of the dissertation is two-fold. First, I engage in theory building by developing a 
cooperation framework that can help researchers categorize a country’s cooperation behavior 
toward the Court at a specific point in time as well as longitudinally. The framework has been 
created inductively based on the two case studies in this dissertation. In addition, I engage in 
theory testing of common compliance explanations. In charting two states’ cooperation behavior 
over time, I seek to explain why South Africa and Kenya cooperated the way they did.  
                                                
11 Peskin 2008: 6. 
12 Ibid. 
 6 
Going beyond existing accounts of state cooperation with the ICC and criminal 
tribunals,13 I combine legal and non-legal means of engagement with the Court in a new 
cooperation framework. While legal means refer to mandatory obligations states take on as states 
parties to the Rome Statute, including ratification, domestic implementation, and compliance 
with court requests, non-legal means are voluntary behaviors that occur outside of the Rome 
Statute framework but that can nonetheless have an important impact on the Court. States can 
encourage other states to join the ICC, thus enlarging the Court’s territorial jurisdiction, and 
attest to its important work, thereby strengthening the Court’s profile and legitimacy. But states 
can also undermine the Court by lobbying against, fostering counter-narratives, or advocating for 
withdrawal from the ICC. This range of behaviors reflects more accurately the multifaceted 
relationship between the ICC and its states parties.  
Depending on the extent to which states support the Court through diplomacy and 
statements (non-legal, voluntary means) and compliance with the Rome Statute’s legal 
obligations (legal, mandatory means), states can be separated into four categories: model 
cooperators (high legal and non-legal cooperation), cheap talkers (low legal cooperation but pro-
ICC statements), pro-forma cooperators (legal cooperation but low non-legal cooperation), and 
non-cooperators (low legal and non-legal cooperation). Table 2 displays these behaviors and 
types. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 Peskin 2008; Bosco 2014; Hillebrecht and Straus 2017. 
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Table 2: Overview of Cooperation Types 
 Compliance with the Rome 
Statute 
Non-Compliance with the 
Rome Statute 
Pro-Court diplomacy and 
statements 
Model Cooperators Cheap Talkers 
Anti-Court diplomacy 
and statements 
Pro-Forma Cooperators Non-Cooperators 
  
While I elaborate on how the case studies fit into the framework in the ‘methodology’ 
section below, three caveats are in order. First, the framework does not assume that states remain 
one type of cooperator over time. Rather states can shift from one cell to another as they come to 
differently assess their relationship with the Court. Second, the framework takes seriously that 
states can be simultaneously cooperating through one means but fail to cooperate in the other. 
The ‘pro-forma cooperators’ and ‘cheap talkers’ categories exemplify this reality. On the one 
hand, states may issue pro-Court statements but when it comes down to executing a court request, 
they may fail to comply. On the other hand, states may comply with court requests and signal a 
veneer of cooperation while at the same time undermining the Court through diplomacy or 
discourse. Third, while presented as distinct cells here, the borders between compliance and non-
compliance as well as between pro-Court and anti-Court diplomacy and statements are not as 
rigid as implied in the typology. Rather, they can be seen as ends of a spectrum as I present 
below. However, for analytical clarity, I introduce the types here in this table. 
 
Country Statements about the ICC 
In Chapter 3, I investigate the discursive aspect of non-legal engagement and how states 
have expressed loyalty and critique of the Court over the years. Using statements and rhetoric as 
one form of cooperation builds on the idea of concordance as one indicator for norm robustness. 
 8 
Concordance refers to the extent to which rules are accepted “in diplomatic discussions and 
treaties (that is, the degree of intersubjective agreement).”14 Concordance then seeks to capture 
the extent to which states agree that the norm and rules are acceptable. Thus, I include discourse 
and rhetoric here to achieve a fuller picture of state cooperation with the ICC since it has been 
used as an important indicator for norm acceptance and adoption.15 Moreover, it aligns with how 
ICC officials perceive state cooperation, namely to include broader political support for the 
Court such as public statements.16 
In the case of the ICC, we can gauge this support through analyzing what states say about 
the ICC in another forum, the UN. Here, many states affirm their approval or air critiques of the 
Court. Through public expression of support they tie their reputation to the Court. My analysis 
does not suggest that country statements about the ICC have concrete effects. Rather, I highlight 
that what countries say about the Court is one indicator of support for the Court. If ICC states 
parties widely criticize the Court for its actions, this points to serious institutional problems of 
legitimacy and effectiveness.  
The content analysis of country statements at the UN about the Court shows that states 
support the Court and the accountability norm for which it stands. Rhetoric from African states 
parties has been overwhelmingly positive, pointing repeatedly to the continent’s early support for 
and continued loyalty to the Court. Expressions of loyalty outnumber critical statements. 
Interestingly, the most frequently voiced critique is not of the Court itself but of the lack of 
cooperation by other states, mostly concerning the non-execution of arrest warrants. Rather than 
shaming peers by calling them out in public, states often used their statements to highlight the 
consequences of non-cooperation. This suggests that speech acts are seen as a vehicle to air 
                                                
14 Legro 1997: 35. 
15 Dixon 2017; see also the Chapter 2. 
16 Interviews 001, 002, and 004; see also Chapter 2.  
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grievances and maybe persuade other states that Court reform is necessary. This other-blaming 
defies common perceptions of the Court as the source of inefficiency and illegitimacy. However, 
states also raise critiques of the Court, most importantly its finances and its prosecution focus on 
Africa. Budgetary critiques are however also often calls for the UN to help fund those ICC cases 
that were initiated by UN Security Council (UNSC) referrals.  
This supportive environment at the UN contrasts starkly with the increasingly critical 
environment at the AU. An analysis of AU Assembly summit decisions shows that the AU 
Assembly only started passing ICC-critical decisions once al-Bashir was charged. As long as the 
Court charged rebel leaders, no AU decision had been devoted to the Court. Pre-2009 decisions 
on justice relate to the merger of the AU’s Court of Justice with the African Court on Human and 
People’s Rights. Starting with the AU’s two 2009 decisions expressing regret over the al-Bashir 
charges and calling on AU member states not to cooperate with the ICC’s arrest warrant for al-
Bashir, the organization has become more vocal on the Court’s record. From here on, the AU 
tried to delay the Sudan and Kenya cases for one year through the UN (deferral), directly 
criticized the first ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, and condemned the selective 
prosecution of Africans. These statements and actions by the AU laid the groundwork for a 
discourse in which non-compliance with the al-Bashir arrest warrant has become acceptable and 
common arguments about the detrimental impact of prosecuting sitting leaders on peace 
processes became widely circulated. 
The analyses at both venues present some noteworthy differences. While at the UN, 
states widely admonish the non-arrests of al-Bashir in some African states, these non-arrests are 
applauded at the AU as African countries were merely implementing prior AU decisions. Second, 
while states at the UN emphasize the mutual importance of peace and justice, AU decisions 
 10 
repeatedly prioritize peace over justice. Third, immunity of heads of state presents a particularly 
controversial issue at the AU. The analyses attest to the contrasting environments and ‘moods’ 
toward the ICC at these venues and they show that despite continuing African support for the 
ICC at the UN, this African support for the ICC fails to materialize in AU Assembly decisions. 	
Explaining Cooperation Behavior 
In addition to analyzing the grievances and praise states have levied at the ICC, this 
dissertation investigates the cooperation behaviors and the rationales of two states parties, South 
Africa and Kenya. In these two case studies, I trace the engagement between the respective 
governments with the Court and seek to explain why they behaved the way they did. Whereas 
the content analysis chapter provides a very positive picture of cooperation through a high level 
of public support for the Court at the UN, these cooperation incidents reveal a bleaker picture. 
Cooperation incidents are concrete state decisions about complying or not with a court request 
issued by the ICC, such a request for arrest and surrender. On the one hand, requests for arrest 
and surrender are arguably the most important court request a state can be called on to execute 
because they directly bring suspects into the courtroom. However, arrest and surrender are not 
the only court requests that states are obliged to execute, among them also providing access to 
witnesses, bank records, sites, etc. 
The case studies provide a bleaker picture of cooperation with the Court because both 
involve prosecutions against current leading state officials. In these court cases, the interests 
between the domestic elites and the ICC are not aligned, making cooperation less likely. In both 
court cases, ICC-critical governments, such as Sudan, Rwanda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda, 
have succeeded in fostering anti-ICC decisions at the AU. As Chapter 4 shows, the AU’s non-
cooperation policy has propelled African states into loyalty conflicts when al-Bashir has visited 
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their territory: They have to choose between staying loyal to the AU, thus bolstering their 
continental reputation, and the ICC and arrest al-Bashir, thus likely compromising their 
reputation in Africa. Chapter 5 highlights the Kenyan government’s behavior, which has 
included leveraging the AU to amplify its anti-Court message and delegitimizing the Court 
domestically. The AU has emerged as an important intermediary actor in the ICC-state 
cooperation context. Thus, two compliance factors situated at the domestic level (elite interest 
alignment and reputation concerns) are important but also the regional organization’s role in 
amplifying grievances against the Court. Figure 1 visualizes this cooperation context.  
 
Figure 1: Cooperation Context for South Africa and Kenya 
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has suspended further action and dropped charges, basing her office’s decisions on the lack of 
cooperation by the Sudan, the UNSC, and other countries who have failed to arrest al-Bashir and 
the selective lack of cooperation by the Kenyan government. As a result of AU action then, we 
can observe other ICC states parties, who have been in a position to arrest al Bashir, take 
advantage of an existing Court-critical discourse and AU decisions to not cooperate in his arrest, 
effectively providing justifications for non-arrest, sanctioned by the regional organization, in 
direct contrast to the ICC. 
While the case studies illustrate the explanatory power of compliance explanations 
focused on interest-alignment and reputation, several prominent explanations prove less useful in 
explaining South Africa and Kenya’s behavior. International-level compliance theories fail to 
convincingly explain compliance decisions with ICC arrest warrants as the enforcement 
mechanisms are notoriously weak in human rights treaties, and the ICC has no enforcement 
power itself. While there is some evidence that outside pressure by major trade partners had 
some effect on African leaders moving summits to avoid hosting an ICC suspect, no country or 
organization has tied the execution of ICC arrest warrants to substantial benefits to incentivize 
compliance as had been the case with arrest warrants for the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Moreover, some prominent domestic-level theories do not 
satisfactorily explain why South Africa, often seen as a poster child for compliance, failed to 
arrest al-Bashir and why Kenya partly cooperated with the ICC in the court case against Uhuru 
Kenyatta. For instance, lack of state capacity could be seen as a reason for non-compliance. 
However, while the cases represent Global South countries, compliance decisions were made at 
the highest level of government rather than by some ministries, as is the case in other 
 13 
international agreements. Here, we see the South African executive disregarding domestic pro-
compliance court decisions and the Kenyan executive mobilizing state resources against the ICC. 
Table 3 presents the explanations for cooperation and non-cooperation in each of the case 
studies. Bolded are the explanations that feature in both cases. What stands out as shared are 
interest misalignment and the importance of reputation. In both cases, the interests of the sitting 
government and the ICC differed: While the ICC wanted al-Bashir arrested and wanted to see 
Kenyatta on trial for the crimes he committed, the sitting governments had no interest in 
delivering al-Bashir to The Hague or to cooperate fully with the ICC, thus incriminating 
themselves more in the Kenyatta case. Moreover, both countries feature important regional 
outlooks. For South Africa, its foreign policy shifted since the 1990s toward a more Africa-
centered foreign policy. Thus, South Africa had much to lose in terms of its regional reputation 
had it arrested al-Bashir. Not arresting him allowed the country to act in line with AU policy and 
fellow African ICC states parties. In turn, Kenya’s actions against the Court also feature an 
important regional dimension as the Kenyan government led the continental movement against 
the Court and for mass withdrawal. In contrast to South Africa’s puzzling non-cooperation, the 
Kenyan government’s cooperation seems puzzling.17 Given that the interests between the 
government and the ICC were so diametrically opposed, why did the government cooperate at 
all? I argue that the Kenyan government cooperated to some degree because outright cooperation 
refusal would have hurt the government’s reputation for compliance with IL and because 
Kenyatta and Ruto promised during the 2013 election that they would continue their good faith 
cooperation with the Court.  
 
 
                                                
17 On the usefulness of puzzling cases, see Klotz 2008: 51. 
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Table 3: Overview of Compliance Explanations in the Case Studies 
 Compliance Non-Compliance Alternative 
Explanations 
South 
Africa 
Early: global reputation 
concerns 
Interest misalignment 
Regional reputation 
concerns and foreign 
policy priorities 
 
Lack of state capacity 
Domestic civil society 
Kenya Reputation concerns 
Dependence networks 
Domestic support for ICC 
Interest misalignment 
Absence of international 
accountability pressure 
Domestic mandate against 
ICC 
Lack of state capacity 
Domestic civil society 
Contributions of the Dissertation  
The project contributes to several scholarly debates on global governance, transitional 
justice norms, and compliance with IL. First, by introducing a new cooperation framework, I add 
to the conversation about how to properly classify state behavior toward the Court. I argue that 
states can openly seem to be supportive of the Court by engaging in pro-ICC discourse or 
complying with court requests while at the same time undermining the Court and its associated 
norms through other channels. In a departure from previous scholarship, I include discourse and 
statements as a distinct form of cooperation. These deserve attention as they can have serious 
implications for the Court’s legitimacy. Supportive Court discourse signals to other states that 
the Court is seen as a legitimate actor and is trusted by states parties. Statements of principled 
support for the Court help build and sustain an ‘enabling environment,’ which grants the Court 
legitimacy. In contrast, statements critical of the Court can undermine the Court’s legitimacy and 
thus harm cooperation further. The Court-discourse emanating from the AU and some African 
capitals has often been described as a ‘backlash’ against the Court, and trumps the Court-
supportive rhetoric from other African states in many media accounts. However, I find evidence 
of high support from most African ICC states parties—findings that cast doubts on frequent 
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media accounts of the troubled ‘ICC-Africa relationship.’ Moreover, African leaders’ decisions 
at the AU show that their criticism of the Court relates exclusively to charges against sitting 
heads of states and not overall ICC action. 
Second, the dissertation highlights the AU’s agency in global governance. In much 
research, Africa becomes the passive recipient of Western or Chinese actions and norm diffusion 
efforts. The dissertation contributes to research highlighting African agency by showing how 
individual African states and the AU in particular play powerful roles in shaping states’ 
interaction with the ICC. The AU can be said to function as a norm ‘antipreneur’ to the ICC’s 
accountability for heads of state norm by providing a stage for ICC-critical African leaders and a 
venue where ICC-critical decisions could be passed that provide legal justifications for non-
compliance with ICC arrest warrants. Through their regional organization, ICC-critical states 
were able to engage in institution weakening of the Court. All three empirical chapters attest to 
the AU’s important role by tracing its actions and positions on the ICC over time. These regional 
political dynamics are overlooked in the theories focusing on the domestic level, on bilateral and 
international pressure and legitimacy theories. This regional level—a meso-level between the 
domestic and international—does not feature prominently in existing compliance studies. 
With regard to compliance explanations, the chapters lend support to domestic-level 
explanations, especially rationalist arguments about interest alignment between state leaders and 
the ICC as well as reputation concerns. This means that compliance is strategic rather than 
caused by managerial problems as suggested by the management approach to compliance.18 
Cooperation is forthcoming when the interests of the ICC and the government in charge of 
making cooperation decisions are aligned. This has been the case in the early years of the Court’s 
existence when both South Africa and Kenya supported the Court through legal and non-legal 
                                                
18 Chayes and Chayes 1993. 
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means, thus placing them in the ‘model cooperators’ category. In these earlier court cases, rebel 
leaders and the domestic political opponents of incumbents were charged, hence posing little risk 
to sitting governments. However, this changed in 2009 when the Court started charging leading 
state officials in the Sudan and in Kenya. Cooperation with the Court by these two countries 
declined and we see increasing efforts to weaken the Court. In that sense, the charges against al-
Bashir represent an ‘exogenous shock’19 that changed the cooperation trajectory between several 
African countries and the ICC. 
Moreover, the dissertation’s case studies reveal the methodological utility of studying 
specific compliance incidents years after a state’s initial commitment, ratification, and domestic 
implementation. This unit of analysis provides purchase on two aspects compliance scholars are 
interested in: time and causal factors. Investigating cooperation incidents takes seriously that 
compliance does not end with ratification or the passage of domestic implementation legislation. 
The ICC represents a useful institution to study when we are interested in the temporal 
dimension of compliance as states are called on to perform specific compliance actions after 
years or decades have passed. Moreover, a longitudinal focus on concrete compliance behavior 
can shed light on whether other considerations by the current government might impact 
compliance as other leaders might calculate costs and benefits differently or might be differently 
influenced by international peers or regional organizations. These longitudinal analyses 
contribute to filling an existing gap in the literature on compliance that has not taken time into 
account sufficiently: “[T]he time dimension is crucial for compliance, and yet it is hardly 
addressed or incorporated in empirical studies of compliance.”20 
                                                
19 For the methodological usefulness of ‘exogenous shocks’ in longitudinal analyses, see Klotz 2008: 53. 
20 Lutmara, Carneirob, and McLaughlin Mitchell 2016: 560. 
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The largely negative compliance record that I seek to explain in the case study chapters 
adds to more skeptical studies about the ICC’s potential for justice and deterrence. In cases when 
leading state officials are charged, the ICC has faced serious obstacles. Some states, like Sudan, 
have openly refused to cooperate with the ICC. Others, many of them ICC states parties, have 
declined to arrest al-Bashir during his visits to their countries, justifying their non-arrests with 
the contradictory AU non-cooperation policy. Kenya, with its own leaders charged by the Court, 
has walked a middle path of selective cooperation in which some requests were complied with 
while others were not, all the while the government sought to discredit the Court’s Kenyan cases. 
The range of these behaviors shows that when charges are levied against powerful state officials, 
these are unlikely to go far at the Court. While the Court has an incentive to issue charges against 
sitting heads of state—after all it is supposed to charge those ‘most responsible’ regardless of 
official capacity—the reality of these cases has shown the formidable challenges they entail, 
especially when they go against the policy of the AU. 
Methodology 
To answer the research questions of when and why states cooperate with the ICC, I use a 
qualitative methodology that combines a comprehensive content analysis with two in-depth case 
studies. The content analysis of country statements analyzes how rhetorical support for the Court 
has developed temporally and regionally. The case studies allow me to assess the explanatory 
power of various compliance factors through process tracing. As data sources, I rely on UN and 
AU records, ICC documents, newspaper sources, and elite interviews with Court officials, 
researchers, and NGO officials. These interviews were conducted in The Hague in January and 
June 2015, in South Africa in July 2015, and in Kenya in October/November 2016. 
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I operationalize cooperation in two ways: 1. Voluntary non-legal means of engagement, 
and 2. mandatory compliance with Rome Statute obligations. First, to analyze how ICC support 
and critique have developed temporally and regionally, I completed a content analysis, coding 
countries’ expressions of public support for the Court at the UN. These statements represent the 
‘Court discourse’—the way state leaders and officials talk about the Court—and it tells us about 
the expectations that states have of the Court and the reasons for continued support for or critique 
of the Court. I created a dataset of ICC-related statements made at the UN General Assembly, 
coding a total of 605 statements by countries and regional groupings of states. I coded all 
countries’ statements from 2002 to 2016 with the qualitative data analysis software NVivo. The 
unit of analysis is references that either express support, critique, or threaten exit. Moreover, 
based on a textual analysis of AU Assembly decisions, I created a timeline of ICC-related 
decisions passed by the AU Assembly to chart when and why the regional organization became 
critical of the ICC. I explain the coding and analysis process in more detail in Chapter 3. 
In addition to a Court-supportive discourse, states can cooperate with the Court more 
tangibly through concrete compliance actions. This type of cooperation is codified in the Rome 
Statute and can be measured by looking at instances in which countries have complied with court 
requests, i.e. official letters demanding concrete state action, such as providing evidence or 
arresting charged persons. Data analysis of court requests is complicated by the confidentiality 
requirement. States are to keep court requests confidential and arrest warrants often remain 
sealed for years. However, arrest warrants are the most accessible requests to study because they 
are ultimately unsealed, and the outcome—transfer of a suspect to the Court—is clearly 
observable. In addition, non-compliance with arrest warrants and other court requests can be 
traced through ICC litigation. However, this litigation only serves as an indictor for non-
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compliance once the ICC starts legal proceedings against a state, suggesting that a certain 
threshold of delay in execution of that request has been crossed. 
Of this universe of 40 charged individuals, I chose two court cases that represent 
variation on the dependent variable (non-cooperation and selective cooperation): 1. the ICC 
arrest warrants for al-Bashir in June 2015 and South Africa’s non-compliance with them, 2. 
Kenya’s oscillation between non-compliance and compliance in the investigation against Kenyan 
President Kenyatta. I argue that the outcomes vary because when the governments of South 
Africa and Kenya were called on to execute a specific court order, their behaviors varied. The 
outcome I am interested in explaining in South Africa is the non-arrest of al-Bashir, which I label 
non-compliance because the South African executive’s actions ran counter to the ICC arrest 
warrant. Kenya’s assessment is based on the government’s multiple actions toward the Court in 
the investigation against Kenyatta. I argue that Kenya engaged in selective cooperation because 
it can be situated between the pro-forma and non-cooperators. 
While the outcomes differ, the two case studies also share important similarities. Most 
importantly, both cooperation incidents involve sitting heads of state. From a domestic cost-
benefit analysis of the leader, cooperating with the Court when it investigates state officials of 
the leader’s own circle or party or the leader him/herself, is very costly. In contrast, cooperating 
with the ICC in a court case against a domestic rival can yield important potential benefits, such 
as that person’s arrest and removal from domestic power struggles. In light of these 
considerations and since previous research has suggested the more forthcoming cooperation 
record of countries in which rebel leaders and domestic political are subject to ICC arrest 
warrants,21 this presents an important shared characteristic between the two countries. Thus, both 
cases studies are instances of state cooperation under ‘difficult’ conditions, i.e. when we would 
                                                
21 Interviews 001, 004; Hillebrecht and Straus 2017. 
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expect non-cooperation to be forthcoming. Moreover, both are states parties to the ICC as well as 
AU member states, hence both states are subject to similar regional and international pressures 
for compliance. Considering these aspects, they represent a ‘most similar design’ that were 
chosen to tease out relationship between domestic politics and compliance pressure and factors.22   
However, both countries differ in some important ways, which suggests that the 
explanations between the two will differ and they can yield insights into the explanatory leverage 
of common compliance theories. South Africa is not a situation country, hence its citizens do not 
face ICC charges. However, it plays an important role as a potential country to arrest ICC 
suspects should they enter South African territory. In terms of domestic-level factors, South 
Africa represents ‘likely’ case for compliance given its independent judiciary, active civil society, 
and high democracy scores. Moreover, South Africa can be called a model cooperator for the 
early years of the Court’s existence. This makes the non-compliance all the more puzzling at first 
sight. In Chapter 4, I explain the country’s shift. In the Kenya case study, leading state officials 
were charged in 2010 and two of those indictees then became head of state and Deputy President 
in 2013. In contrast to South Africa, Kenya has been rattled with several election violence 
episodes and ethnic tensions. Corruption runs high and the judiciary is less independent and thus 
provides less of a check on the executive than in South Africa. Both case studies thus explore 
puzzling cases: South Africa was a ‘likely’ case for compliance yet it failed to arrest al-Bashir; 
Kenya was a ‘likely’ case for non-compliance yet the government complied to some extent.   
While my focus lies on explaining concrete cooperation decisions, I trace each country’s 
cooperation record over time. This tracing highlights shifts in cooperation behavior. The explicit 
shift in behavior happens in South Africa with the non-arrest of al-Bashir despite rising 
dissatisfaction with the ICC in the African National Congress (ANC) in earlier years. In Kenya, 
                                                
22 Levy 2008. 
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the shift occurs with the charges against leading Kenyan officials in 2009 and 2010 when the 
government starts to lobby the UNSC and other African countries to delay the cases and then 
oppose the cases on various grounds. Rather than outright refusal to cooperate, Kenyatta 
repeatedly promised to keep cooperating with the Court and partially complied with some court 
requests, thus making the country a middle form between ‘pro-forma cooperators’ and ‘non-
cooperators.’ Figure 2 presents visually these shifts over time. Notice that this typology only 
refers to different cooperation indictors and types, not to explanations of cooperation and 
compliance.  
 
Figure 2: Cooperation Shifts by South Africa and Kenya 
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organizations to construct a timeline of how South African officials have described the Court 
over time and the steps they took to comply with the Rome Statute. This preliminary work 
suggested a high support for the Court. To study the path to non-compliance, I completed an in-
depth case analysis through process tracing with the help of primary, secondary, and elite 
interview data to assess whether other factors than the ones theorized in existing research had 
impacted the executive’s decision.23 Fieldwork in South Africa that allowed for semi-structured 
interviews with experts on South African foreign policy and a workshop with the Deputy 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development helped to shed light on the events. 
These two case studies present a rather bleak picture of compliance. However, I do not 
wish to present this non-cooperation as a homogenous African phenomenon. There is no 
continental consensus on the ICC in Africa: Many African countries continue to support the 
Court, several attempts at mass exit failed, and despite all the AU exit efforts and rhetoric only 
Burundi is actually following through with exit as of May 2017. However, I show that the AU 
represents an important node in the resistance network. The Conclusion contrasts the AU’s 
involvement in these cases against sitting heads of state briefly with other court cases in which 
the trial completion record has been better. 
The International Criminal Court: State Cooperation, Jurisdiction, and Controversies 
ICC and State Cooperation 
The treaty establishing the ICC, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
was adopted in Rome on 17 July 1998 by 120 states. It entered into force on 1 July 2002 after 
having been ratified by 60 states. The 63-page document sets out the institutional design of the 
Court, its jurisdiction, crimes covered, funding, etc. and contains detailed provisions pertaining 
                                                
23 George and Bennett 2005; Levy 2008. 
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to state cooperation and the distinct obligations of states parties and non-member states. Pursuant 
to Article 86, “[s]tates Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate 
fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.” States can assist the Court in various ways including identifying and locating witnesses, 
evidence gathering, questioning persons, examining sites and exhuming graves, conducting 
searches and seizures, or protecting victims and witnesses and preserving evidence, as well as the 
identification, tracing, and freezing of assets and instruments of crime, such as weapons or 
vehicles. 
Legally, ratification of the Rome Statute is the official step to becoming a state party to 
the ICC. Beforehand, states sign the treaty that obliges them, in good faith, to refrain from 
actions that go against the purpose or spirit of the treaty; however, they are not legally bound by 
it. After ratification or accession, a state’s full cooperation ability hinges on the adaption of 
domestic law. For instance, the crimes covered under the statute must be criminalized 
domestically. To do that, domestic penal codes may have to be changed to ensure that domestic 
law enforcement can actually arrest a suspect or that a state actually possesses legal authority to 
transfer arrested individuals to the Court.24 Hence, a country’s domestic implementation is a 
crucial step to a state’s compliance with its legal obligations under the Statute. 
 
Jurisdiction and Triggers 
The ICC has jurisdiction over three international crimes: crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and genocide—which the Rome Statute deems “the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole.”25 Articles 6 through 8 specify the three crimes. In addition, 
                                                
24 Schiff 2008: 153. 
25 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 5(1). 
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countries wanted to include aggression as a crime but failed to reach a consensus on its definition 
in 1998. It was only in 2010 during the Review Conference in Kampala when states parties 
adopted amendments to the statute defining aggression and deciding on the conditions for the 
exercise of jurisdiction. Hence, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression until at least 30 states parties have ratified or accepted the amendments and two-thirds 
of all states parties decide to activate the jurisdiction at any time after 1 January 2017.  
The Court currently has ten situations. Table 4 presents these in reverse chronological 
order. After the ICC opens an investigation into a country for a specific situation, the OTP can 
bring specific charges against responsible persons in that situation.  
 
Table 4: Overview of ICC Situations and Triggers 
Situation Country Date ICC opened 
investigation 
Trigger 
Georgia January 2016 proprio motu 
Central African Republic II September 2014 State self-referral 
Mali January 2013 State self-referral 
Côte d’Ivoire October 2013 proprio motu 
Libya March 2011 UNSC referral 
Kenya March 2010 proprio motu 
Darfur/Sudan June 2005 UNSC referral 
Central African Republic May 2007 State self-referral 
Uganda July 2004 State self-referral 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
June 2004 State self-referral 
 
Cases can reach the ICC in three different ways. First, a state party can refer a situation 
within its own state to the Court. Five of the ICC’s ten current situations have reached the Court 
this way. A second trigger for ICC action is a referral by the UNSC. While ICC jurisdiction 
relies on nationality and territory, a non-member state’s situation can be referred to the Court by 
the UNSC through a binding resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In that case, the 
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country, by virtue of being a UN member state, has to comply with the ICC’s investigation. The 
Council referred the situations in Sudan and Libya to the Court in 2005 and 2011. The third 
trigger is for the ICC Chief Prosecutor to act on her own initiative (proprio motu). This has 
happened three times so far: Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Georgia. 
 
Controversies: Counter-Movement, Head of State Immunity, and ICC Effects 
To set the stage for the following chapters, I want to highlight three important 
controversies surrounding the ICC. A first controversy relates to the countermovement to the 
Court, which provides the backdrop to this dissertation and which is detailed in the coming 
chapters. Spurred by the ICC’s issuance of arrest warrants against sitting heads of state, several 
African countries, led by Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, and non-member states such as Rwanda and 
Ethiopia started issuing ICC-critical statements. Several arguments have been made. First, heads 
of state should be immune. The argument holds that in customary IL sitting heads of state enjoy 
immunity, and that by legally obliging states to arrest sitting leaders, these states are forced to act 
contrary to customary IL. The second argument relates to the Court’s decision-making. Critics 
posit that the ICC is not independent but instead acts as an extended arm of its funders, mainly 
Western European states. Third, much criticism against the ICC is actually criticism of the 
Court’s ties to the UNSC. Different sets of states have criticized how the UNSC failed to refer 
some cases to the Court, most prominently Syria in recent years, how it failed to act on repeated 
non-compliance with arrest warrants, and it fails to defer ongoing cases for one year. This 
linkage between the Court, a judicial organ supposed to apply neutral rules across cases, and a 
political organ such as the UNSC has important implications for the perception of the Court’s 
work and states’ cooperation with it. 
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A common critique of the Court has been its decision to not investigate the actions of 
Western governments, such as the actions of UK troops in Iraq, but focusing its energy on cases 
arising in Africa.26 This inconsistent application of legal standards, i.e. selective prosecution, has 
cost the Court dearly in the public perception of its legitimacy. For instance, Ethiopian foreign 
minister Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus is quoted as saying in 2013 that “[t]he Court has 
transformed itself into a political instrument targeting Africa and Africans”27 and that it was 
“condescending” toward Africa.28 Other leaders who often engage in this rhetoric are Uganda’s 
President Yoweri Museveni and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe as well as those charged by the 
Court, Kenyan President Kenyatta and al-Bashir. Often this has been depicted as the common 
African position against the Court: “Unfortunately this view has gained traction over the past few 
years and, through concerted and self-interested political machinations by the ICC’s opponents 
on the continent, has been marshalled into an institutional position against the court at the level 
of the AU.”29 Thus, it is important to note the enormous variation of African views vis-à-vis the 
ICC. ICC officials often point out the good cooperation they receive from most African states 
despite the media’s (and this dissertation’s) attention on cases of non-cooperation:  
Well, my impression is that most of our African states parties respond very 
well to our cooperation requests and indeed are very cooperative. And the loud 
criticism that you hear very often from Africa mainly originates from a small 
number of African states, a number of African leaders, many of which are 
actually not states parties to the Rome Statute. There is a very small number of 
states parties among those that are critics of the ICC. On the whole, our 
African constituency remains very supportive of the court just that that support 
is not often heard publicly that much. Much of the criticism is based on what 
we would see as a distortion or misunderstanding of facts or a one-sided view 
of the reality.30  
 
                                                
26 Schabas 2014; Bosco 2014: 123. 
27 Taylor 2015.  
28 Hickey 2013. 
29 du Plessis and Gevers 2011: 2.  
30 Interview 004. The sentiment was also expressed in Interview 001. 
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In addition to ties to the UNSC and lack of independence, the Court has been criticized 
for its handling of cases against heads of state. It has long been a part of customary IL that senior 
government officials enjoy immunity, and for the longest time state officials were deemed 
immune even for the gravest breaches of IL (impunity model). However, this has changed in 
recent decades as leading officials have increasingly been brought to justice, a process Sikkink 
has called the ‘justice cascade.’31 However, legal debate continues on whether this immunity 
exists for international crimes such as those covered in the Rome Statute and whether it exists for 
heads of state of third parties—states that have not committed to the Rome Statute. This legal 
controversy goes beyond the confines of this dissertation.32 Suffice it to say that some argue that 
al-Bashir remains immune from prosecution because he is a sitting head of state of a third party. 
In addition, and with this legal argument in mind, the AU has argued for head of state 
immunity and has passed a non-cooperation policy. This non-cooperation policy has been used 
as legal justification for non-arrests of al-Bashir across several African countries. On the one 
hand, AU decisions are not explicitly deemed ‘binding’ in the AU’s Constitutive Act. However, 
one can argue that these decisions are indeed binding. First, Article 23 spells out the 
consequences for failing to abide by AU decisions, hence suggesting that the AU indeed intends 
these decisions to be binding. Second, under the implied powers doctrine, one can argue that the 
broad objectives of the AU imply that “the organisation cannot fulfil its purpose absent the 
ability to make binding decisions in respect of its member states.”33 Thus, African countries were 
under two competing legal obligations—to arrest al-Bashir via the ICC arrest warrant and to not 
                                                
31 Sikkink 2011. 
32 For a legal discussion on whether heads of state are immune from prosecution for international crimes in foreign 
domestic courts, see Akande and Shah 2010; Wardle (2011) argues that sitting heads of state continue to enjoy 
immunity. 
33 du Plessis and Gevers 2011. 
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arrest him as per the AU decision. This provided them with the legal ‘out’ for the preferred 
political decision to not arrest a fellow African leader. 
It is important to highlight that I do not wish to portray the AU as an enemy of the ICC. I 
argue that with regard to immunity of sitting heads of state, some African countries and the AU 
have taken positions counter to the ICC. However, this does not necessarily translate into other 
areas. I emphasize in Chapter 3 that the AU has not taken a more general position on the ICC 
outside of the Court’s cases against sitting heads of state. In fact, the AU cooperates with the 
ICC to some extent in other regards. According to an ICC official, the AU support has been 
reluctantly forthcoming in cases against AU peacekeepers:  
We had difficulty for many years to get the AU to distinguish between the 
Bashir/Darfur government file and the other ones. While we don’t agree with 
their opposition to this file, we try to say ‘irrespective of your opposition on 
Bashir and the rest, this case is about an attack on AU peacekeepers, surely 
you have an interest in cooperating.’ So finally, recently they have started to 
cooperate a little bit on this and they provided us a few items, both Registry 
and OTP, Registry was dealing on behalf of defense, which was publicly 
known, so we have some cooperation, a little bit from AU.34 
 
Chapter Outline 
The following chapter will delve more deeply into the theoretical underpinnings of this 
dissertation. I will present the two literatures from which I draw and to which I seek to 
contribute—transitional justice norms and compliance with international law—and discuss the 
cooperation framework that I propose in greater detail. The first empirical chapter, Chapter 3, 
presents states’ expressions of support for and critique of the Court at the UN as well as the 
development of the AU’s stance on the Court. The chapter shows that rhetoric about the Court 
has remained overwhelmingly positive and that instead of faulting the Court, many states fault 
                                                
34 Interview 006. 
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one another’s lack of state cooperation with arrest warrants as one reason for the ICC’s meager 
trial record. The chapter also shows that the AU has become increasingly critical of the ICC 
since 2009 and that criticism has been restricted to the court cases against sitting heads of state. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to the case studies on two countries’ engagement with the 
Court over time with the goal to explain their ultimate compliance decisions. First, I analyze the 
rationales behind South Africa’s non-arrest of al-Bashir in June 2015, arguing that the decision 
needs to be understood in light of a loyalty conflict between the country’s commitment to the AU 
and the ICC. In addition, I briefly contrast the South Africa case with other African countries that 
failed to arrest al-Bashir, suggesting that the AU’s non-cooperation policy played an important 
role in hampering progress in the al-Bashir court case. In Chapter 5, I shift to Kenya’s selective 
cooperation record with the Court, showing how the country turned to the AU to diminish the 
ICC’s legitimacy and to stymy progress on the ICC’s Kenyan court cases. 
In Chapter 6, I summarize the main findings and discuss their implications for broader 
theoretical discussions and the future of the ICC and transitional justice. I contrast the findings of 
the South Africa and Kenya case studies with other ICC cases in which cooperation has been 
more forthcoming. These brief analyses provide a window into future avenues for research and 
they attest to the leverage of the interest alignment argument so that state cooperation has been 
more forthcoming in ICC cases against rebel leaders. While this presents the cases under analysis 
in this dissertation as more anomalous, they show the political obstacles the ICC can encounter 
when running contrary to states’ interests.  
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Chapter 2: Compliance, Norms, and Cooperation Types 
The dissertation investigates the extent to which two African states have cooperated with 
the International Criminal Court (ICC, or the Court) and the reasons behind cooperation and non-
cooperation. This chapter situates the dissertation’s findings and arguments and its contributions 
within the International Relations (IR) literature. The first section outlines my arguments that tie 
together the three empirical chapters. Then, I present in more detail the framework I developed 
to analyze cooperation with the ICC. The third section presents the two literatures from which I 
draw and to which I contribute: the norms literature with a substantive focus on accountability 
and transitional justice norms, and the literature on compliance with international law (IL). 
Afterwards, I present three alternative explanations that I found to be less compelling in 
explaining the two case studies. The last section highlights the dissertation’s contributions to 
these literatures, thus drawing more concrete connections between my arguments and the main 
contentions of previous scholarship.  
Arguments 
Based on the empirical analyses in the following chapters I make five distinct yet related 
arguments about the multifaceted ways in which states have sought to strengthen and weaken the 
Court, the central role of African Union (AU), the salience of domestic politics for compliance, 
and the value added of analyzing cooperation behavior over time. First, I develop a framework to 
describe and analyze state cooperation with the ICC. I argue that we have to consider the full 
spectrum in which states can strengthen and weaken an institution and its associated norm. In the 
ICC context, just as compliance with legal obligations helps to strengthen the Court and the 
accountability norm, diplomacy and statements attesting to the ICC’s positive effects and work 
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can help bolster the Court’s image. I consider both legal and non-legal ways—those that are 
proscribed in the Rome Statute and those that go beyond it—through which states have sought to 
support or weaken the Court. Thus, merely looking at whether states have ratified does not tell us 
about their level of ‘buy in’ to the underlying norm and organization. The following section 
expands on this cooperation framework.  
Second, the dissertation attests to the important role of the AU in understanding African 
states’ cooperation with the ICC. Cooperation between states and the ICC is not merely a two-
actor relationship but the AU acts an important mediator. In the Sudan and Kenya cases, the AU 
has taken up its members’ wishes to rally other African states to support common positions at the 
UN Security Council (UNSC) to defer cases against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, Kenyan 
President Uhuru Kenyatta, and Kenyan Deputy President William Ruto. Moreover, the AU 
Assembly passed non-cooperation decisions that directly counteract ICC arrest warrants for al-
Bashir. In turn, African states that have hosted al-Bashir have used this decision as a legal 
justification for their non-arrests. The dissertation traces the AU’s actions over time and 
chronicles the counter-movement and norm resistance from several African states and the AU as 
the venue and forum for that resistance.  
Third, and in line with previous compliance research, I argue that domestic politics help 
explain cooperation decisions. When the interests of the ICC and the government in charge of 
making cooperation decisions are aligned, cooperation is forthcoming. This has been the case in 
the early years of the Court’s existence when both South Africa and Kenya supported the Court 
by ratifying the Rome Statute, implementing it domestically, and supporting the Court through 
diplomacy and statements. However, this changed when the Court started charging heads of state 
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and leading state officials in Sudan and in Kenya in 2009 and 2010, after which cooperation with 
the Court by these two countries declined and we see increasing efforts to weaken the Court. 
Fourth, in addition to interest alignment, reputation concerns help explain cooperation 
decisions. While this factor also plays out domestically, I argue that we have to take seriously 
states’ multiple reputations in various forums. The South Africa and Kenya chapters show that 
states may signal their commitment to various peer groups. The ICC and associated Western 
states and the accountability norm represent but one of possible groups in which states may seek 
a ‘good’ reputation. When studying reputation, scholars have to consider not just the reputation 
concerns associated with the ICC ‘peer group’ and Western states but also those associated with 
alternative social groups. In the ICC context, the AU stands out as an important intermediary 
actor and South Africa and Kenya’s prioritization of the AU and its fellow African peer group 
can outweigh its concerns for a good reputation among Western states. Moreover, while 
reputation concerns are usually theorized to foster compliance, they can also hamper compliance. 
When a state is forced to choose between its regional reputation and its global reputation, it may 
choose the former and decide to defy IL. 
Five, I argue that tracing these legal and non-legal means of engagement over time 
contributes to our understanding of institutional and normative development. I trace the 
engagement between the respective South African government and the Kenyan government with 
the ICC over time to ultimately explain the non-arrest of al-Bashir in South Africa and Kenya’s 
selective cooperation in the Kenyatta case. This approach contrasts with many studies that 
analyze compliance through statistical analysis of post-ratification human rights records. This 
research takes seriously that compliance encompasses a range of actions: signing, ratification, 
passing domestic legislation. But in the case of the ICC compliance actions also include 
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complying with court requests, such as requests for arrest and surrender, that a country is 
demanded to execute years or even decades after joining the Court. Hence, we need to study 
compliance actions beyond the initial moment of ratification. The ICC represents a usefull 
institution to study when we are interested in the temporal dimension of compliance as states are 
called on to perform specific compliance actions after years or decades have passed and different 
administrations lead the country. This unit of analysis then extends on compliance studies that 
look at treaty ratification as the signature moment.  
A Framework to Analyze Cooperation with the ICC 
Means of Engagement 
Tracing the South African and Kenyan governments’ engagement with the ICC over time 
allowed me to notice changes in support and resistance. Based on these longitudinal analyses, I 
created Table 5 inductively. The table displays the various ways in which states engage with the 
Court.  
 
Table 5: Overview of Means of Engagement 
 Institution and Norm Strengthening Institution and Norm Weakening 
legal Compliance with treaty obligations  
• Ratification 
• Domestic implementation 
• compliance with court requests 
Non-compliance with treaty obligations 
• failure to implement Rome 
Statute 
• non-compliance with court 
requests 
• admissibility challenge 
Non-
legal 
Diplomacy and statements pro Court  
• encouraging other states to commit 
to the ICC 
• reinforcing value of ICC and 
accountability norm 
Diplomacy and statements against the 
Court  
• discouraging other states to 
commit to the ICC 
• advocating for exit 
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‘Legal actions’ refer to mandatory state actions that originate in the Rome Statute, i.e. 
actions mostly referred to as legal compliance. This includes ratification of the Rome Statute and 
domestic implementation of the treaty as well as compliance/non-compliance with court requests 
such as those for arrest and surrender, summonses to appear, or for providing records to the court. 
If states fail to execute court requests, the Court’s judicial chambers can make a finding to that 
effect and refer the non-compliant state to the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) or the UNSC. I 
also include admissibility challenges as legal means, i.e. instances when states argue that the 
Court lacks jurisdiction,35 because they are meant to draw the situation away from the Court and 
into domestic jurisdiction but they occur within the Rome Statute framework.36 Labeling these 
means of engagement ‘legal’ does not mean that political considerations do not affect the 
likelihood with which governments will ratify or implement a treaty domestically. Rather, ‘legal’ 
connotes that these measures are proscribed in the treaty whereas non-legal means of 
engagement occur voluntarily and do not originate in the treaty itself. 
With ‘non-legal means of engagement,’ I refer to voluntary cooperation through means of 
engagement that do not originate in the Rome Statute, so are not required by the treaty. This can 
happen when the government reaches outside of the ICC system by engaging other political 
actors either in support of the Court or against it, such as international organizations. In addition, 
states can take on voluntary commitments such as signing witness relocation agreements with the 
ICC. It also includes statements of support for the Court that reiterate the importance of the 
Court as they are seen as strengthening the institution’s legitimacy. Norms scholarship has long 
                                                
35 Article 17(1) regulates the relationship between the Court and national legal systems. A case can be ruled 
inadmissible when it is being dealt with appropriately by domestic justice systems, when the state that has 
jurisdiction has already prosecuted the same person for the same conduct, and when the state has decided not to 
prosecute the case unless that decision stems from “the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to 
prosecute.” 
36 Admissibility has only been challenged in the Kenya, Sudan, and Libya situations. The paucity of these challenges 
likely stems from the fact that a majority of ICC situations come to the Court via self-referrals by states so they 
are subsequently less likely to challenge the ICC’s jurisdiction if they actively sought them beforehand. 
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highlighted speech as an indicator for norm acceptance (I elaborate on this point below). Using 
speech as one form of cooperation builds on the idea of concordance as an indicator for norm 
robustness. Concordance refers to the extent to which rules are accepted “in diplomatic 
discussions and treaties (that is, the degree of intersubjective agreement).”37 Concordance then 
seeks to capture the extent to which states agree that the norm and rules are acceptable. In 
contrast, repeated and harshly critical statements point to institutional problems of legitimacy 
and effectiveness. While the Rome Statute does not require states parties to issue Court-
supportive statements, these statements enhance knowledge of the Court and are venues where 
states may offer support or criticisms of the ICC. Including this type of cooperation also 
resonates with practitioners as ICC officials interpret cooperation to go beyond judicial 
compliance to also include political support to create what they call an ‘enabling environment:’38 
And that is where the question of political support comes in because 
political statements, whether in bilateral, multilateral and regional settings, 
they affect other states’ calculations. If states show clearly that they attach 
great importance to full cooperation and any state that does not fully cooperate 
would be seen as not doing the right thing, then that would raise the threshold 
for any state not to cooperate.39 
Cooperation Types and Chronological Variation 
The longitudinal analyses of South Africa and Kenya’s cooperation behavior also 
revealed that the actions described in the various cells are not mutually exclusive. That means 
that states can simultaneously engage in compliance as well as in diplomacy against the Court. 
This occurred when Kenyatta and Ruto appeared before the ICC in compliance with the 
summons to appear while at the same time lobbying against the Court at the AU and fostering an 
anti-ICC narrative in African institutions. This cooperation behavior contrasts with the early 
                                                
37 Legro 1997: 35. 
38 Interviews 002, 001, and 004. 
39 Interview 004. 
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years of Kenya’s engagement with the Court when the country voiced strong support for the ICC, 
passed domestic implementation legislation, and refused to sign a Bilateral Immunity Agreement 
(BIA) with the US.  
Based on these insights about simultaneous cooperation and non-cooperation, Table 6 
presents the types of cooperators with the Court. Depending on the extent to which states support 
the Court through diplomacy and statements (non-legal means) and compliance with the Rome 
Statute’s legal obligations (legal means), states can be separated into four categories: model 
cooperators (high legal and non-legal cooperation), cheap talkers (low legal cooperation but pro-
ICC statements), pro-forma cooperators (legal cooperation but low voluntary cooperation), and 
non-cooperators (low legal and non-legal cooperation).  
 
Table 6: Overview of Means of Engagement and Cooperation Types 
 Compliance with Rome 
Statute 
Non-Compliance with Rome 
Statute 
Pro-Court diplomacy and 
statements 
Model Cooperators Cheap Talkers 
Anti-Court diplomacy 
and statements 
Pro-Forma Cooperators Non-Cooperators 
 
‘Model Cooperators’ are those that comply with their Rome Statute obligations and 
engage in pro-Court diplomacy and issue pro-Court statements. They are models for what an 
international organization would want from its member states. ‘Cheap talkers’ issue pro-Court 
statements and may engage in low-cost pro-Court diplomacy but when it comes to executing 
arrest warrants, they fail to comply. In contrast, ‘pro-forma cooperators’ comply with their legal 
obligations and may execute court requests but in other forums and in bilateral relations are 
engaging in institution-weakening efforts through anti-court diplomacy. Non-cooperators lie at 
 37 
the extreme ends of negative discourse, diplomacy, and compliance. They engage in active 
institution weakening through diplomacy and discredit the Court while also failing to execute 
court requests.  
For analytical purposes, these categories are presented as separate in Table 6. However, 
they more accurately represent ends of a continuum. On the one hand, mandatory compliance is 
more clean-cut. Whether a state ratifies and implements the Rome Statute is officially 
documented. We can also trace through litigation to what extent states have executed court 
requests, and if a government arrests someone on their territory, this becomes public. Thus, 
compliance and non-compliance with the Rome Statute is rather clear. On the other hand, overall 
compliance is harder to determine because a state may execute some requests and not others or 
may only execute them partially or in a delayed fashion. This complicates an overall assessment 
even of a seemingly clear-cut behavior. 
In contrast, non-legal engagement is even more fluid between the cells. A state may issue 
pro-Court statements but engage in no pro-Court diplomacy and vice versa (albeit less likely). In 
turn, to what extent a state engages in one or the other can vary. Taking these considerations into 
account, Figure 3 presents the cases and different time periods with the categories displayed as 
continuums.  
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Figure 3: Shifts in Cooperation Behavior over Time 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the ‘movement’ over time from South Africa and Kenya from ‘model 
cooperators’ to ‘non-cooperators.’ South Africa shifted its position over the years. South Africa 
can be placed at the higher end of the left upper quadrant due to its intensive regional lobbying 
for the ICC and implementation in Southern Africa and its early and strong implementation of 
the Rome Statute. However, in 2015, South Africa became a non-cooperator when it failed to 
arrest al-Bashir and issued critical statements about the Court and joined in several Court-critical 
arguments previously put forth by Court critics. While the executive refused to arrest al-Bashir 
when he visited South Africa, the country did not engage in outright anti-Court diplomacy and 
statements right away. Kenya’s cooperation behavior shifted from a model cooperator to a mix 
of pro-forma and non-cooperator. That is why Kenya is placed to the left in the lower right 
quadrant. On the one hand, its compliance record can be called selective in that some requests 
were complied with while others were delayed or disregarded. Hence, the country ‘hovers’ 
Non-Compliance 
with Rome Statute 
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around the compliance/non-compliance axis. On the other hand, it engaged in intensive anti-
Court lobbying at the AU, thus justifying its placement on the lower end of the y-axis. 
 
Comparing the Framework to Other Works on Cooperation with Tribunals and the ICC 
The framework was built inductively because no comprehensive framework existed when 
I started the research. However, three previous works on state cooperation with international 
courts by Peskin, Bosco, and Hillebrecht and Straus stand out. Drawing on Peskin’s work on 
state cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),40 this dissertation also chronicles 
‘virtual trials,’ two forms of political drama outside of the courtroom itself: 1. “the political 
struggles and negotiations between tribunal, state, and powerful international community actors 
that occur prior to as well as during the courtroom trials” and 2. “the political struggles and 
negotiations within states.”41 As for relationships between the court, states, and the international 
community (international level), these are “virtual trials of their own that determine a state’s 
response to tribunal demands for cooperation” and they are “essential in establishing the level of 
cooperation the tribunals will ultimately receive from states and, consequently, the nature and 
outcome of the actual courtroom trials of individuals.”42 Hence, while international courts are 
meant to be insulated to some extent from power and politics, the idea of the virtual trial 
encapsulates the power struggles between states, tribunals, and other actors. One way in which 
states seek to delegitimize the court if it is acting contrary to their wishes is to engage in counter-
shaming “by magnifying its shortcomings and mistakes.”43  
                                                
40 Peskin 2008. 
41 Ibid., 6. 
42 Ibid., 9. 
43 Ibid., 11. 
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Peskin’s work is highly relevant to this dissertation. As he does, I investigate the 
interactions between a court—the ICC—and the states and I also consider the state’s internal 
dynamics to help explain cooperation with the Court. Both Peskin’s accounts and mine share an 
interest in the political dynamics behind state cooperation with international criminal courts at 
the international and domestic levels. Moreover, he identified the same set of actors that are 
relevant for the ICC context: the court, the respective states but also external actors, the AU and 
the UNSC in my cases. I include his notion of counter-shaming in the non-legal means of 
engagement, specifically anti-Court statements. 
However, important differences exist. First, Peskin’s work is more motivated by how the 
ICTY and ICTR were able to differently use their soft power to incentivize state cooperation. 
While the ICTY was more successful in “completing trials, maintaining professionalism in court 
operations, and obtaining frequent and favorable international press coverage,” the ICTR was 
troubled by “a series of administrative scandals, the slow pace of trials, and negative media 
coverage that have undermined its reputation as well as its capacity to persuade international 
actors to intervene on its behalf when the Rwandan government withholds cooperation.”44 In 
contrast, my focus is on seeking to explain state cooperation and I do not assess the Court’s 
extent of and use of soft power. Second, my research complicates the ‘virtual trial’ metaphor 
because the AU counteracted the ICC’s work and helped African states escape their obligations. 
This departs significantly from the ICTY where the European Union was a powerful pro-ICTY 
compliance actor that was able to use the institutional leverage of future EU membership for 
cooperation with the tribunal. Instead, in my research, the AU furnished African states with 
political arguments and legal counter-arguments against the ICC. 
                                                
44 Ibid., 7. 
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Bosco analyzed the behavior of major powers toward the ICC. He distinguished between 
marginalization (active and passive), control, and acceptance. States who feel most threatened by 
the ICC’s work “may actively work against the institution, seeking to limit its reach and 
delegitimize it through formal and informal means” and discourage other states from joining.45 
When states engage in passive marginalization, they do not actively undermine the Court but 
merely “consciously avoid deploying their resources to support the institution.” Control, in 
contrast, means that states try to “keep the court within its mandate” and to ensure that it “does 
not interfere with important state political or diplomatic interests.”46 This can be done through 
political or economic influence such as through the UNSC or by threatening exit from the court. 
Control differs from marginalization because control-oriented states do not want to undermine 
the Court’s work as it may at some point serve their interests. A last form of cooperation 
behavior is acceptance when states embrace the Court for various reasons; this would be 
equivalent to the ‘model cooperators’ in my framework. Possible reasons include rationalist 
arguments that the states deem the benefits of its support for the Court to outweigh the costs of 
support, that being a state party to the ICC makes their commitment more credible, or that they 
are influenced by a normative belief in the accountability norm.  
Bosco’s characterizations are a useful starting point as these major powers’ behaviors can 
theoretically be applied to the states under analysis here. Marginalization can occur from all ICC 
states parties and is similar to the behaviors exhibited by ‘non-cooperators’ in my framework as 
they either actively use legal or non-legal means to engage in institution weakening. Acceptance 
corresponds to the behaviors exhibited by ‘model cooperators.’ Control is harder to do by the 
smaller and weaker states that I investigate. They cannot exercise control via their permanent 
                                                
45 Bosco 2014: 12. 
46 Ibid., 14. 
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seats on the UNSC. However, they may engage in control through other means such as 
threatening exit, using political leverage elsewhere, or reminding the Court of its original 
mandate. This type of control can be seen in the AU’s efforts to resist the accountability for 
heads of state norm and efforts to resist the Court’s focus on Africa as running counter to its 
original mandate to deliver impartial justice. Hence, my framework is able to incorporate 
Bosco’s strategies but further disaggregates the specific behaviors within each strategy. 
The most similar to the framework I present is the analysis by Hillebrecht and Straus. 
They identified four categories of a cooperation continuum based on the frequency with which 
states execute court requests.47 Rather than clear-cut categories, they range along a spectrum 
from full cooperation to non-cooperation. A state engages in full cooperation when it “fulfills the 
vast majority of the ICC’s requests, whether they be procedural, jurisdictional, or practical.”48 
Second, qualified cooperation occurs when “the state cooperates up until a certain point but has a 
set of non-negotiable issues on which it will not yield. Often these are of a practical or 
jurisdictional nature.” A third option is pro forma cooperation, which occurs when the state 
“does the minimum to approximate cooperation and poses technical challenges to cooperation.”49 
States do this by couching their behavior within the ICC’s language and processes while “often 
using legal technicalities to limit their cooperation.” Hence, when engaging in pro forma 
cooperation, states “typically cooperate on procedural matters but seek to block the Court from 
exercising full jurisdictional authority.” At the other end of the spectrum is non-cooperation, 
which occurs when “the state opts against cooperation and outwardly contests the ICC’s work.”50 
                                                
47 Hillebrecht and Straus 2017. 
48 Ibid., 174. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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This framework clearly overlaps with my framework, especially in its consideration of 
legal means of cooperation. Hence, their categories would be situated along my horizontal 
compliance continuum. Moreover, both accounts share an attention to the various facets of 
cooperation. Hillebrecht and Straus distinguish between different types of court requests because 
“states rarely cooperate or comply with each and every one of the Court’s demands.”51 However, 
in an important departure, my framework incorporates the multitude of actions states take toward 
the ICC by also including non-legal means of engagement, i.e. my vertical axis. This adds an 
important dimension to how we think about what constitutes ‘good’ cooperation with the Court. 
If we call Kenya a pro-forma cooperator purely based on compliance with court requests we 
skew its cooperation record by not taking into account the extensive efforts to delegitimize the 
Court domestically and regionally.  
Transitional Justice and Compliance with International Law 
The dissertation draws from and contributes to two sets of literatures in International 
Relations (IR): 1. transitional justice and accountability norms, 2. compliance with IL. The 
former builds on a range of scholarship since the 1990s that has been labeled ‘constructivist’ 
because the authors share an interest in identity, international norms, their emergence, and 
diffusion. While I focus on norms scholarship in general, I also discuss transitional justice and 
accountability norms as the substantive norms I am most interested in. In turn, compliance 
research on human rights emerged in the 2000s when IR and IL scholars started to investigate 
                                                
51 Ibid. 
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why states would commit to human rights treaties and why they would comply with treaties that 
prescribed their conduct toward their own citizens.52  
While I present these literatures as distinct here for analytical purposes and they are often 
separately discussed, they share a common concern about international norms as standards of 
appropriate behavior. These standards can be codified into international agreements, such as 
human rights treaties or the Rome Statute to codify the accountability norm. But norms do not 
have to be codified. So while compliance is usually looked at as honoring legal obligations, a 
state can also comply with unwritten rules and standards of appropriate behavior so that an 
alternative definition of compliance can be “any action conforming to a norm.”53 Hence, the two 
literatures are not completely distinct and indeed speak to one another. 
 
Transitional Justice: ICC as the Culmination of the Accountability Norm 
As an international criminal court, the ICC functions as an instrument of transitional 
justice. Transitional justice mechanisms aim at “confronting and dealing with the legacies of past 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law.”54 While transitional justice mechanisms 
include a range of tools—amnesty laws, truth commissions, reconciliation, as well as 
prosecutions—I focus on trials as a form of retributive justice. In the 1990s, when the ICTY, 
ICTR, and the ICC were created, many observers were optimistic about the capacity of law to 
confront mass atrocity crimes. Sikkink has famously argued that increasing efforts for 
accountability and justice in international, foreign, and domestic courts amount to a ‘justice 
cascade’ in which “there has been a shift in the legitimacy of the norm of individual criminal 
                                                
52 Of course cooperation and compliance have been concerns of IR for decades, for instance, in the regime and 
cooperation literature.  
53 Cardenas 2007: 7. 
54 Roht-Arriaza 2009: vii. 
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accountability for human rights violations and an increase in criminal prosecutions on behalf of 
the norm.”55 The ICC is widely seen as the culmination of this trend, encapsulating the ideal that 
perpetrators of the worst human rights abuses should be held accountable by independent judges, 
regardless of their position within a state. The 1990s were a ‘honeymoon phase’—marked by 
authors with “an abiding faith in the capacity of law to confront the horrors of crimes as extreme 
and unthinkable as genocide.”56 This has contributed to the inclusion of transitional justice 
mechanisms in many peace agreements so much so that “[t]his institutionalisation of transitional 
justice has strongly encouraged states to accept transitional justice as a norm or standard practice 
after conflict.”57 
Despite this normative change, scholars and practitioners have become more skeptical 
since then about the positive effects of prosecutions. They raise doubts about the proper timing 
of prosecutions, whether accountability should be sidelined until peace has been secured during a 
conflict.58 Moreover, some question the effects of prosecutions, whether they will actually deter 
criminals or even create a ‘sense of justice’ for the victims, especially when the trials are held far 
away from the conflict location.59  
Hence, transitional justice mechanisms have ‘diffused’ as norms over the past decades 
and scholars have been analyzing their spread and effects. As much as the content-specific 
literature on prosecutions was optimistic in the 1990s, the same holds true for the norms 
literature. Norms, defined as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a 
given identity,”60 help to distinguish communities and shape the members’ behavior by 
                                                
55 Sikkink 2011: 5. 
56 Akhavan 2003: 721; see also Akhavan 2013. 
57 Subotic 2015: 363.  
58 To name a few: Kersten 2016; Clark 2011; Oette 2010; Gegout 2013; Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003/04; Vinjamuri 
2010. 
59 To name a few: Hillebrecht 2016; Appel 2016; Jo and Simmons 2016. 
60 Katzenstein 1996: 5. 
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demarcating appropriate from inappropriate behavior.61 Early scholarship on norms was 
concerned with the extent to which norms mattered in international relations and several works 
investigated norms seen as ‘progressive’ or ‘positive’ such as human rights norms.62 This 
scholarship thus unintentionally created the impression among some that norms tend to be 
unidirectional, i.e. more and more countries would ultimately adopt them. In a current ‘second 
wave’ of norm diffusion literature, scholars have unearthed the non-linear and sometimes curvy 
or reversed ways in which international norms gain traction in specific locales.63 State or non-
state actors can actively fight norms and resist them domestically or locally. 
This norms research has also examined transitional justice norms. While scholars and 
practitioners agree that transitional justice mechanisms have increasingly become a staple of 
peace negotiations and post-conflict settings, some evidence shows that they are not being 
directly translated locally and that they can be undermined in local contexts. While important 
analytical distinctions exist between the concepts, the process of clashing and adopting 
international and local norms has variably been referred to as norm subsidiarity,64 
hybridization,65 resistance,66 divergence,67 and norm collision.68 Norm subsidiarity refers to “the 
process whereby local actors develop new rules, offer new understandings of global rules or 
reaffirm global rules in the regional context” so that local actors are not merely passive norm 
takers but can be active norm rejecters and⁄or norm makers.69 This indicates an important shift 
from the concept of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ as key actors in propelling norm development so much 
                                                
61 Gillies 2010: 107. 
62 To name a few: Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Katzenstein 1996. 
63 Bloomfield and Scott 2017: 4; Subotic 2015: 361. 
64 Acharya 2011; see also Acharya (2004) on localization. 
65 Moore 2012.  
66 Freyburg and Richter 2010.  
67 Subotic 2015.  
68 Cloward 2016. 
69 Acharya 2011: 96-98; see also Harman and Brown 2013. 
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so that Bloomfield and Scott’s edited volume recently suggested conceptualizing norm resisters 
as distinct actors, so-called norm ‘antipreneurs.’70  
For Subotic, for example, normative divergence is a form of norm localization that refers 
to “the implementation of international norms and institutions in the manner inconsistent with 
the original international normative intent.”71 She argues that an international norm, here for 
transitional justice mechanisms of justice, truth, and reconciliation, “splits into a variety of 
locally meaningful, but mutually contradictory directions. In norm divergence, domestic political 
actors interpret the same international norm in mutually inconsistent, but politically useful 
ways.”72 When norms mean different things to different domestic elites and groups, no clear 
domestic pro-norm constituency emerged to advocate for them. This is an important caveat to 
research on the compliance-promoting role of domestic groups: Even when domestic groups are 
present and interested in promoting compliance, competing views about the norm and its 
expectations can hamper domestic groups in their efforts. 
But how do we know that norms emerge or change? One way is to look for concrete state 
actions, such as signing agreements, implementing new laws, or creating new domestic 
institutions (this is institutionalization as an important part in the norm life cycle). In addition to 
these behaviors, scholars also highlight speech and discourse as an indicator: “[n]orm emergence 
is a largely discursive affair: if a norm emerges within a given community, its constituent actors 
will in their communications recognize its desirability and employ it to justify their actions.”73 
As states adapt and/or resist international norms and socialization efforts, they do not just refuse 
to implement, they also use statements and language to explain their actions: “Beyond simply 
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complying with or violating a norm; states contest, resist, and respond to international norms in a 
range of ways.”74 Rhetorical adaptation is a “central form of resistance to international norms,” 
because it “draws on a norm’s content to resist pressures for compliance or minimize perceptions 
of violation.”75 Similarly, Peskin argued that counter-shaming, through statements and speech, is 
a key feature through which states resist the efforts of international courts. It delegitimizes the 
international court “by magnifying its shortcomings and mistakes.”76 
This extensive research on norms suggests that we can understand resistance to the ICC 
in Africa through the lens of norms research. Norms and the institutions, which embody these 
norms, can be locally resisted and incompletely adopted. The normative intent of the Rome 
Statute is that accountability is achieved regardless of official capacity. However, this intent is 
undermined and diverged from as some states, such as South Africa and Kenya, failed to uphold 
their legal obligations. They diverge not only from their legal obligation to the ICC but also from 
the accountability norm. They have expressed their discontent with the ICC and head of state 
accountability in various forums, most importantly the AU and the UN, through concrete actions 
as well as statements. I argue that we can understand these efforts as ‘norm interpretation.’ Norm 
interpretation happens when “one or more aspects of a norm’s definition are tweaked or 
contested. It is an attempt to narrow or limit the interpretation of a norm or the conditions under 
which a norm applies, in order to exclude an action that might otherwise be seen as a violation of 
that norm.”77 These states acknowledge the general accountability norm but they claim that a 
sub-norm, accountability for heads of state, is unacceptable. For them, heads of state are immune 
and that is the norm from which they should not stray.  
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Compliance with International Law 
The study of compliance with IL and human rights treaties has gained increasing 
attention in IR since the early 2000s. Ever since Hathaway argued that compliance with human 
rights treaties is not widespread and that treaties may lead to worse human rights practices,78 
myriad studies have been published on when and why states comply with treaties.79 Much 
research affirms that “compliance is not an all-or-nothing affair and that the effects of human 
rights regimes, when and where they exist, are conditional on other institutions and actors.”80  
When studying compliance—a state of conformity between a state’s actual practice or 
written domestic law to treaty stipulations81—international lawyers and IR scholars tend to focus 
on different things. Lawyers often see compliance in binary terms (compliance or non-
compliance) based on whether a state adheres to the terms of the treaty. In contrast, IR scholars 
have mostly examined the effects of treaties as an indicator for a state’s substantive compliance 
with a treaty, measuring inter alia the development of human rights practices post-ratification.82 
For instance, in his critique of Simmons’ work, Posner argues that her measure of compliance—
decline in human rights abuses—does not measure compliance but rather causal effects.83 
However, some IR scholars are also studying indicators of procedural compliance, such as states’ 
compliance with a treaty’s reporting mechanism. According to Hathaway, compliance has 
several dimensions: compliance with procedural obligations, compliance with substantive 
obligations outlined in the treaty, and compliance with the spirit of the treaty.84 Thus, compliance 
is not binary but rather a continuum “based on the degree to which behavior deviates from the 
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legal requirements of the treaties.”85 I take this insight seriously and consider instances when a 
state may engage in compliance and non-compliance simultaneously. 
Studies vary widely in how they operationalize commitment and compliance. While 
commitment is captured by signature and ratification of treaties, compliance research often looks 
at treaty effects as compliance with the spirit of a treaty or compliance with specific treaty 
stipulations such as reporting requirements. Much compliance research looks at treaty effects, an 
understandable focus considering that the ultimate goal of human rights treaties is to improve 
human rights on the ground. Many studies have focused on the UN’s International Covenant for 
Civil and Political Rights and the Convention Against Torture with the independent variable 
being ratification and the dependent variable being human rights practices, measured through 
data from the Political Terror Scale or the CIRI index.86 
Apart from treaty effects, some studies analyze compliance with reporting mechanisms. 
For instance, Creamer and Simmons look at how seriously governments take their reporting 
obligation to the Commission Against Torture by analyzing the regularity and quality of 
reports.87 They find that report submission is heavily dependent on what neighboring countries 
are doing and on a government’s human rights commitment and institutional capacity as 
measured by the presence of national Human Rights Institutions. In addition, the quality of 
reports increases when countries have democratic institutions and have recently transitioned to 
democracy. 
Both IL and IR scholars have studied the contributing factors of compliance and non-
compliance, focusing on different levels of analysis and underlying decision-making logics 
(logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness). While these theories’ main concepts are 
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presented as distinct factors below, I expect these factors to interact and to work 
simultaneously.88 While this complicates the assessment of which causal factor is driving the 
outcome, detailed case studies help to assess the explanatory power of each factor. 
I focus here particularly on compliance research, but I occasionally include relevant 
arguments from research on commitment to treaties. On the one hand, commitment and 
compliance are related as we can expect that some reasons for commitment and compliance 
overlap. For instance, a country that genuinely wants to improve human rights based on a 
normative belief that human rights shall be protected is propelled to commit to and comply with 
a treaty for this very reason. Similarly, a country may want to signal to peers that it values human 
rights, thus seeing treaty commitment as a low-cost means to achieve this goal. Since human 
rights treaties have little enforcement mechanisms, this commitment rationale translates into 
compliance rationales as governments who committed but never intended to comply with the 
treaty face little consequences for non-compliance. On the other hand, compliance warrants 
distinct attention as it refers to post-commitment and involves a broader range of actions by the 
state. The treaty might call on the state to establish a domestic mechanism to address a specific 
human rights violation, to submit regular reports to treaty bodies that monitor state actions, or 
pass domestic laws in line with the treaty.  
Most scholarship assumes that the absence of compliance factors leads to non-
compliance, so that for instance, the absence of domestic pro-compliance groups makes a 
country less likely to comply with treaty obligations. Recently Berlin convincingly argued that 
compliance and non-compliance should be considered separately since the causal pathways to 
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each may differ, and non-compliance has its own causes.89 He finds that while corruption and 
non-compliance groups help explain non-compliance with arrest warrants issued by the ICTR, 
liberal norms and aid dependency explain compliance with them. My research confirms that 
distinct factors might explain compliance and non-compliance, arguing that non-compliance 
pressure by the AU created loyalty conflicts in individual African ICC member states that chose 
compliance with AU decisions over compliance with ICC arrest warrants. In Table 7, I group 
common explanatory factors according to their outcome—compliance and non-compliance—and 
level of analysis. 
 
Table 7: Overview of Existing Compliance Explanations 
 
Explaining Compliance and Non-Compliance 
Three sets of compliance theories reside on the international level. One prominent 
explanation is material pressure, whereby states respond to outside pressure by powerful states or 
‘dependence networks.’90 A rationalist argument at heart, it holds that external pressure induces 
states into compliance as they deem the benefits of compliance to be higher than the benefits of 
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 Compliance Non-compliance 
International 
level 
International pressures and 
dependence networks 
Enforcement 
Legitimacy of rule and institution  
(lack of compliance factors) 
 
Domestic level  Compliance constituencies 
Democratic values and institutions  
Eliminating domestic opponents 
Reputation concerns 
(lack of compliance factors) 
Non-compliance constituencies 
Lack of state capacity 
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non-compliance. For instance, powerful states can use their foreign aid strategically and demand 
compliance of aid recipients under the threat of withholding further financial support. This 
conditionality, in the form of carrots and sticks, can be used through tying aid, sanctions, or 
membership to compliance. For instance, Serbia’s and Croatia’s compliance with the ICTY 
relied on threats of withholding aid and EU membership.91 Serbian leaders were publicly and 
privately encouraged to cooperate with the ICTY to ensure access to Western institutions and 
aid.92 Similarly, pressure by the EU and the US influenced new Eastern European states’ 
commitment to various UN human rights treaties in the early 1990s. Rather than being driven by 
a normative belief in human rights, elites accepted UN oversight “to offset global human rights 
pressures without paying the electoral costs associated with true democratic reform.”93  
Furthermore, scholarship has often traced compliance with international treaties to 
effective sanctioning and monitoring mechanisms. This enforcement school relies on the 
assumption that states calculate costs and benefits. Consequently, a state chooses non-
compliance when it confers higher benefits on the state than compliance. In turn, increasing the 
costs of non-compliance, such as strong enforcement measures, states can be induced into 
obeying94: “Establishing institutionalized monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms can alter the 
cost-benefit calculations of states as the likelihood of being detected and punished increases the 
anticipated costs of noncompliance.”95 For instance, when the detection of ICTY suspects’ 
whereabouts increased, their arrest became more likely.96 
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While the enforcement school is institution-centric by focusing on treaty stipulations and 
the likelihood of non-compliance detection, the premise has implications for a state’s propensity 
to comply. Powerful states can more easily resist external pressure “because they have more 
alternatives to cooperation with a particular partner and can more easily pay for reputational or 
material damages.”97 While both material pressure and enforcement theories rely on rationalist 
logic of action, the referent from which the compliance pressure comes is different. With 
material pressure theories, states will respond to direct inducements by other states or 
international organizations. In the enforcement school, the compliance pressure is exerted by the 
international legal norm itself, i.e. the treaty stipulations for non-compliance. The Rome Statute 
stipulates for instance that states found to be non-compliant will be referred to the ASP and 
UNSC. It is possible that this potential punishment alone prompts a state to comply with a court 
request. However, past experience with the lack of follow-up on non-compliance through the 
ASP and the UNSC makes it unlikely that enforcement pressures through the Rome Statute are 
powerful enough to induce compliance. 
In addition to dependence networks and enforcement, scholars suggest that states comply 
with treaty obligations when these are perceived to have been created and are applied in a 
legitimate fashion.98 Franck argued that compliance hinges on the perceived legitimacy and 
fairness of a rule, the rule-making process, and the rule’s application. Once perceived as 
legitimate, a rule or institution exerts a pull toward compliance. When a social system is seen as 
legitimate or valid, “nonbelievers cannot simply ignore the rules and institutions that they do not 
view as legitimate. That enough others do believe in their legitimacy means that nonbelievers 
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must consider them when estimating the likely effects of different courses of action.”99 Hurd 
defines legitimacy as “an actor’s normative belief that a rule or institution ought to be 
obeyed”;100 for Christian Reus-Smit it is about “social recognition” that an actor’s “identity, 
interests, practices, norms, or procedures are rightful.”101 
On the one hand, legitimacy has a normative dimension; it is about a perception of 
rightfulness, that something ought to be done a certain way. This normative dimension of 
legitimacy refers to “whether a claim of authority is well founded-whether it is justified in some 
objective sense. An institution […] is normatively legitimate if there are good reasons in support 
of its claims to authority, and illegitimate if not.”102 On the other hand, legitimacy is not created 
unilaterally; it is inter-subjective and defined by others’ perceptions. This is often referred to as 
the sociological dimension of legitimacy: “Authority has popular legitimacy if the subjects to 
whom it is addressed accept it as justified. The more positive the public’s attitudes about an 
institution’s right to govern, the greater its popular legitimacy.”103 Struett argues that the court’s 
legitimacy “depends ultimately on its capacity to persuade observers that the exercise of its 
powers to investigate, prosecute, and punish violations of international criminal law (ICL) is 
consistent with the application of rules that are universal in nature.”104 Thus, one can argue that 
ICC has normative legitimacy because its existence and authority in questions of international 
criminal law are not questioned but rather its exercise of that mandate and so its popular 
legitimacy has suffered from the counter-movement. 
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Four additional sets of explanations for compliance reside on the domestic level of 
analysis. Scholars increasingly highlight the important role of domestic politics for 
compliance.105 Simmons argued that international treaties impact domestic agendas, litigation, 
and mobilization. These venues then enable domestic actors, so-called compliance constituencies, 
to capitalize on treaty ratification by bringing suits demanding the government’s compliance or 
mobilizing support for compliance among the population. International courts can thus impact 
domestic politics by “giving symbolic, legal, and political resources to compliance constituencies, 
ever-changing groups of actors that for a variety of reasons may prefer policies that cohere with 
international law.”106 Civil society groups, be they present international NGOs or smaller 
domestic groups, play the key role in enforcement here. Consequently, countries with strong civil 
societies will pressure their government to comply over time. For instance, NGOs can, “under 
certain circumstances, enhance levels of compliance with the decisions of UN treaty bodies by 
using individual cases at the UN as focal points for domestic rights claims and revealing 
incidences of noncompliance” as well as socializing and training the larger public.107 Hence, 
even when governments make initially insincere commitments to IL, domestic NGOs can over 
time use this to render the country compliant.  
Another set of explanations focus on regime type where scholarship has consistently 
highlighted the importance of liberal norms or a democratic form of government for 
compliance.108 One line of research suggests that democracies are more likely to comply with 
international treaties due to ‘value congruence,’ which means that they hold values dear—such 
as the rule or law and civil rights—that make them more inclined to obey IL even in the absence 
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of strong enforcement.109 Institutionally, democracies also feature strong respect for domestic 
courts,110 the rule of law,111 and pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept), hence making 
them more likely to obey the orders of similar international courts. Some states refused to sign 
Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIA) with the United States because they valued the ICC, the 
accountability norm for which it stands, and the principle of treaty commitment.112 The logic 
behind the democracy argument lies in the public expectation that treaty commitment creates. As 
concerns for upcoming election results influence the calculation of leaders, they are expected to 
follow through on treaty commitments to avoid public discontent and ‘audience costs.’113 Even 
established democracies that may lack a desire to signal their commitment to human rights 
comply with the rulings of human rights tribunals begrudgingly, “arguing that their hands are 
tied by the government’s long-standing commitments to international law, human rights, and 
democracy.”114 
A third relevant domestic explanation for compliance concerns the domestic leaders’ 
cost-benefit analysis. The prosecutorial record of the ICC shows that a majority of arrest 
warrants have been for rebel leaders and the domestic opponents of the sitting government. 
Hence, scholars investigating the ICC’s effects increasingly highlight the domestic calculus of 
leaders: “[R]uling elites in states that refer their situations to the Court can ensure their impunity 
as long as their crimes are no graver than the crimes of their opponents.”115 In these cases, state 
cooperation with the Court is less costly because the Court and the ruling government share a 
common adversary, and cooperation with the Court means the arrest and transfer of a domestic 
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rival: the interests of the ICC and the sitting government are aligned. Hillebrecht and Straus have 
dubbed this argument ‘legal lasso’ in which “states’ cooperation with the ICC is contingent on 
the ability of incumbents to use cooperation for their domestic political gain.”116 Likewise, with 
other treaty commitments, leaders in Central and Eastern Europe committed to individual 
petition mechanisms to “off set global human rights pressures without paying the electoral costs 
associated with true democratic reform” which can be seen as a “cheap signal used by 
governments to delay true reforms.”117 
Another explanation for compliance is reputation, i.e. what a state is known for. In the 
rationalist school of reputation, often focused on a reputation for resolve,118 reputation matters 
for future cooperation and agreements because it impacts other actors’ expectations about a 
state’s willingness to comply or show resolve.119 Thus, when a state fails to comply it may 
become known for this behavior and thus other states are less likely to enter into agreements with 
that state because they expect future non-compliance. While earlier scholars addressed 
reputation,120 Guzman has provided a reputational theory of compliance with IL.121 For Guzman, 
reputation is one of the three ‘Rs’ of compliance, and it is uniquely powerful to explain 
compliance with human rights treaties because reciprocity and retaliation are less likely.122 But 
reputation has also been found to motivate compliance in other issue areas. With regard to 
lending decisions between private investors and foreign governments, Tomz argued that 
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“governments uphold their international commitments to avoid being classified as unreliable 
types and excluded from potentially beneficial agreements.”123 
Most importantly, I draw on Tomz’s theory’s emphasis on the importance of prior history 
of a government to build a reputation. This implies that when governments make decisions about 
cooperating with a state, they draw on information about prior compliance of a state. Once a 
reputation is built, this reputation can be destroyed because expectations for compliance have 
been shattered. However, prior low reputations for compliance can also be improved by refusing 
expectations of non-compliance: “A government alters those beliefs (its reputation) by defying 
expectations: acting contrary to its perceived type, given the circumstances. Likewise, a 
government preserves its reputation by behaving as anticipated, thereby validating beliefs 
observers hold about the government’s characteristics.”124 Guzman used the example of South 
Africa’s desire to change its image from global pariah to good world citizen so that the country 
committed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1991 to improve its reputation: “doing so 
allowed it to more fully rejoin the community of nations and reap the benefits of cooperation 
with other states.”125 Gillies applied reputation theory to norm emergence, arguing that 
reputational concerns by Western governments, international institutions, and corporations 
incentivized them to adopt best practices on oil sector transparency.126 
In addition to this rationalist perspective on reputation, constructivist scholars have 
attributed importance to reputation. Rather than being purely incentive-driven, i.e. seeking 
reputation for the sake of future benefits, behavior here is affected by the social status and 
identity that a certain commitment signals to others. Finnemore and Sikkink argued that states 
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embrace norms if they are “insecure about their international status or reputation,” suggesting 
that states will join agreements when it makes them ‘look good.’127 Similarly, states adopt legal 
sex quotas also “to improve their standing” in the international system because it signals that 
they are a ‘modern’ rather than a ‘traditional’ state.128 Hence, this strand of literature situates 
compliance and norm adoption within states’ desire to project a certain identity or signal its 
commitment to a social group. 
In addition to the mere absence of the compliance factors presented above, non-
compliance may be caused by additional factors. Lack of capacity features as a powerful 
domestic-level explanation for non-compliance. Chayes and Chayes argued that non-compliance 
stems from capacity constraints and unclear rules, and their approach has since been known as 
the ‘management school’ of compliance.129 Some research on compliance with environmental 
agreements suggests limited capacity and resources limits adoption.130 While many human rights 
provisions do not involve capacity concerns as governments are often asked to merely refrain 
from certain actions, capacity constraints come into play with the Rome Statute because court 
requests ask ICC states parties to provide records or arrest suspects. These concrete domestic 
actions require some level of technical expertise or law enforcement capacity,131 and thus, state 
fragility can impede human rights development in a state.132 For instance, limited state capacity 
in the form of over-stretched and thinly-staffed justice systems has slowed the implementation of 
the Rome Statute in Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.133 Capacity could also 
diminish compliance when record keeping or interviewing witnesses is hindered due to limited 
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staff and state resources. This speaks to the importance of bureaucratic capacity and quality, 
meaning the state’s ability to “collect and manage information,” as one indictor for state 
capacity.134 Risse’s edited volume on limited statehood critically examined the assumption often 
made in global governance analyses of perfect statehood. Rather, outside of the developed 
countries of the West, we can find many areas, which “lack the capacity to implement and 
enforce central decisions and a monopoly on the use of force.”135 Thus, areas of limited 
statehood face additional hurdles in compliance with IL. 
One last non-compliance domestic factor I wish to highlight are domestic actors that wish 
to prevent compliance, so-called pro-violation constituencies or non-compliance constituencies. 
In his study of compliance with the ICTR, Berlin found that the Catholic Church played a pivotal 
role preventing Italy’s compliance when the tribunal sought to arrest a Rwandan Catholic priest 
for his alleged involvement in the Rwandan genocide.136 Similarly, pro-violation constituencies 
can advocate for non-compliance with IL in times of emergencies and national security crises.137 
 
Interest Alignment and Reputation Concerns 
This previous section on compliance factors is useful for examining state cooperation 
with the ICC. This research suggests paying attention to the international partners with which 
these countries had important economic, political, and military ties. In addition, human rights 
scholars increasingly point to domestic politics as an explanation for compliance. This can 
involve the cost-benefit calculations of domestic leaders, their assessments of whether 
                                                
134 According to Hendrix (2010), studies on state capacity and its relationship to civil war use three types of 
indicators for state capacity: military capacity, bureaucratic/administrative capacity, and quality and coherence 
of political institutions. 
135 Risse 2011: 2. 
136 Berlin 2016. 
137 Cardenas 2007. 
 62 
compliance will help or hurt their reputation with desired partners and peer groups, and the 
extent to which domestic civil society and democratic institutions hold elites accountable to their 
treaty obligations. Table 8 presents the compliance explanations I advance in the case studies. 
 
Table 8: Compliance Explanations in the Case Studies 
 Compliance Non-Compliance Alternative 
Explanations 
South 
Africa 
Global reputation 
concerns 
Interest misalignment 
Regional reputation 
concerns and foreign 
policy priorities 
 
Lack of state capacity 
Domestic civil society 
Enforcement  
Legitimacy  
Kenya Reputation concerns 
Dependence networks 
Domestic support for ICC 
Interest misalignment 
Absence of international 
accountability pressure 
Domestic mandate against 
ICC 
Lack of state capacity 
Domestic civil society 
Enforcement 
Legitimacy  
 
In line with existing research I argue that interest misalignment helps explain non-
compliance with the Rome Statute. When the interests of the government making cooperation 
decisions and the ICC differ, cooperation is not forthcoming. In both the South Africa and Kenya 
case studies, the governments had different interests than the Court. This contrasts with earlier 
years when both countries cooperated with the Court. In addition to interest misalignment, 
reputation concerns matter in both case studies. Reputation can both foster compliance and non-
compliance. When South Africa decided to not arrest al-Bashir its decision was impacted by the 
AU’s non-cooperation policy and choosing that alternative legal commitment allowed the 
country to bolster or at least not damage its reputation in Africa. The argument seems to run 
counter to what happened in Kenya. Here, it is puzzling that the government showed some 
compliance with the ICC. I argue that the Kenyan government engaged in pro forma cooperation 
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because it was elected on promises of cooperation with the Court and because outright non-
compliance could have tarnished its reputation for compliance with IL.  
 
Alternative Explanations 
Three theoretical explanations are less powerful in the case studies. I do not wish to 
suggest that they are never useful in analyzing compliance with the Rome Statute or IL. But in 
the cases I examine, they do not explain convincingly why non-compliance happened so I treat 
them as alternative explanations. While I describe their limited utility in each chapter in more 
detail, I briefly address them here to distinguish my own argument more clearly. 
With regard to capacity, one could argue that South Africa and Kenya, two countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, qualify as low-capacity countries, maybe even areas of limited statehood. 
However, I argue that compliance with the Rome Statute in these two countries is not affected by 
limited capacity or statehood. While South Africa and Kenya may be subject to some governance 
problems—be they territorial or in specific policy sectors—their compliance with the Rome 
Statute was in the hands of the executive and in both cases deserved a lot of diplomatic attention 
and resources. In addition, we see swift action by domestic courts and the use of domestic legal 
systems to challenge the ICC.  
A second argument that is less convincing is enforcement. As Hathaway remarked, 
human rights is a unique issue area: It “stands out as an area of international law in which 
countries have little incentive to police noncompliance with treaties or norms.”138 Likewise, 
Guzman argued that reciprocity and retaliation as ways to enforce IL usually do not work in 
human rights issues because states do not retaliate when another state fails to comply with a 
human rights treaty. Likewise, the ICC has no way to enforce its warrants, and no actor has tied 
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arrest of an ICC suspect to development aid or future membership in an organization—
something that was powerful compliance inducement with the ICTY. These external actors can 
act as ‘surrogate enforcers’ of cooperation obligations in that they can “significantly limit or 
expand the political space in which a targeted state acts to undermine a tribunal.”139 The UNSC 
and the ASP play this role on paper with the ICC as they can act on state’s non-compliance but 
this has never happened so far. 
Third, one could argue that African states do not cooperate with the Court because the 
Court is illegitimate. At face value this seems to be a promising explanation given that many 
African countries question the Court’s work because it has focused primarily on prosecuting 
Africans. However, I do not consider this explanation very powerful. First, African countries 
were deeply involved in creating the Court with all its provisions, including lack of immunity for 
heads of state. Moreover, several African states have themselves invited ICC action in their 
countries rather than ICC action being imposed on them. Third, as Chapter 3 shows, questioning 
the ICC’s legitimacy has only become fashionable since it went after sitting heads of state. I do 
not wish to deny that the ICC’s prosecution focus on Africa has not damaged it but more often 
than not, legitimacy is used as a strategic argument to depict the Court as anti-African. 
Contributions to the Literature 
Transitional Justice Literature 
By shedding light on the role of the AU as an intermediary compliance actor and as a 
forum for regional resistance to the ICC, my research highlights the constraints under which 
prosecutions against alleged war criminals occur. The two cases under analysis here are arguably 
the two most negative ones when it comes to state cooperation since they involve sitting heads of 
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states or senior state officials. In these cases, the AU acted as a formidable norm antipreneur, 
directly counteracting the ICC. When regional pressures work against international courts like 
this, transitional justice can be hard to realize, with victims being left without any redress. This 
research then joins skeptical studies140 that provide a more pessimistic hue to the ‘justice 
cascade’: The resistance and backlash to the ICC’s accountability for heads of state norm from 
some African states challenges the unidirectional approach described by Sikkink toward more 
human rights prosecutions and accountability. While we might see trials and prosecutions at the 
ICC, Sikkink’s account fails to consider how they can be undermined once they are started and 
when the suspects are in positions of power. 
Thus, this research should lead us to pause and rethink the high expectations we have of 
transitional justice mechanisms, particularly of retributive justice through the ICC. Scholarship 
has established that international norms and institutions rely on robust bottom-up support from 
states to function properly. My research squarely shares this skeptical outlook: This dissertation 
chronicles in detail the various ways in which some African states, especially Kenya, have led 
the movement against the Court, have engaged in counter-shaming and delegitimizing the Court, 
and have used the AU as a receptive forum for a neocolonial narrative. In its wake, former model 
cooperators, such as South Africa, have become more critical of the Court and have refused to 
honor their legal obligations to arrest an ICC suspect. This countermovement and lack of 
compliance has contributed to cases being hibernated and dropped at the Court, thus severely 
curtailing the effective functioning of the Court in the pursuit of accountability. 
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Compliance Literature 
In this dissertation I propose a framework to analyze how states engage with the ICC. 
The framework draws from both the norms and compliance literatures and thus incorporates a 
broad range of engagement tactics. The framework allows scholars to disaggregate states’ 
cooperation behavior toward the ICC into legally prescribed forms of cooperation, such as 
compliance with court requests, as well as non-legal means of engagement such as diplomacy 
and statements in support of the Court. The framework also takes seriously that compliance and 
support for the Court are not static but change over time. What characterizes a country’s stance 
toward the Court today may be different in several months or years as new leaders come to 
power. Moreover, the framework recognizes that states may engage in cooperation and non-
cooperation simultaneously. For instance, while the Kenyan government was openly complying 
with the Rome Statute by attending hearings in The Hague and handing over some records for 
evidence, it was simultaneously shoring up anti-Court rhetoric and action at the AU.  
The framework can thus be used for theory testing in future research on state cooperation 
with the ICC. While the framework was created based on the dissertation’s two case studies, I 
would argue that it could be applied to other international organizations. While the non-legal 
means of engagement are fairly neutral and similarly at stake with other organizations, the legal 
means of engagement would vary with each organization and the obligations in its founding 
treaty. Rather than compliance with court requests, legal cooperation would then mean 
submitting regular reports to a UN oversight committee or creating a domestic human rights 
institution. Based on a country’s compliance with these obligations and its voluntary cooperation, 
it could be placed in one of the quadrants and the country’s change in cooperation behavior could 
be traced chronologically. 
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With regard to concrete compliance factors, the case studies contribute to an increasing 
domestic politics focus, or second image theory. First, some explanations that have so far been 
associated with compliance, such as democracy, reputation-seeking behavior, and international 
pressure, can also contribute to non-compliance with IL. For instance, in case of al-Bashir’s non-
arrest in South Africa, ICC compliance was directly opposed by compliance with an AU decision. 
Strengthening its regional reputation by not arresting al-Bashir and acting in line with AU policy, 
allowed South Africa to forego the negative consequences and reputation costs of acting contrary 
to the regional organization. Likewise, in Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto both 
campaigned on an anti-ICC platform in their joint election campaign for President and Deputy 
President of Kenya in 2013. While promising to continue to cooperate with the Court, they also 
fostered a neocolonial narrative about the ICC. After being elected on that platform, despite the 
charges against them at an international court, their electoral strategy against the ICC legitimized 
their selective cooperation behavior. In this case, the leaders’ democratic mandate did not 
incentivize them to comply with IL. Thus, the same factors that we associate with compliance 
may actually work against compliance.  
Second, the South Africa and Kenya chapters also lend support to the reputation 
literatures. Both rationalist and constructivist perspectives of reputation are hard to distinguish in 
empirical cases because they produce similar behaviors.141 In this dissertation, I argue that Kenya 
and South Africa have at different points in time complied and not complied with the Rome 
Statute out of reputation concerns. This supports the claim that rather than one single reputation, 
states can have different reputations in different global and regional arenas. The case studies 
suggest that, against the background of increasing tension between the AU and the ICC, both 
countries attached more significance to their reputation within their regional peer group 
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(represented by the AU) than the global community. Compliance with the rules of each 
organization was tied to loyalty to an associated community: the Rome Statute with the West and 
the AU Constitutive Act and AU Assembly decisions with the African continent. The AU 
provided an alternative forum for reputation-building so that non-compliance with the Rome 
Statute is unlikely to negatively affect South Africa’s reputation in Africa, likely bolstering it. 
This contrasts with reputation studies that assume one ‘single reputation’ across partners and 
issue areas.142 Only with this ‘single reputation’ assumption in place can a theory predict that a 
state would update its expectations about another state’s future reliability. So even if states 
reassess their estimates about another state’s reputation for compliance after a defection or 
several defections, it is likely that they do so only for a subset of agreements that “(1) are 
affected by the same or similar sources of fluctuating compliance costs (or benefits) and (2) are 
valued the same or less by the defecting state.”143  
The central role of the AU in understanding the state-ICC cooperation nexus and its role 
as a forum for resistance against the Court and the norm of head of state accountability 
contributes to studies of the ‘actorness’ of regional organizations. While actorness has long been 
seen as the sole attribute of the European Union, understood as a sui generis international 
organization that is “incomparable to other political entities,” actorness has more recently been 
claimed for cross-comparisons of regional organizations.144 My research does not claim that the 
AU is a powerful actor in itself and across all issue areas. After all, the AU Assembly decisions 
on which the AU’s behavior toward the ICC is based, are consensus-driven and shaped by the 
motions of African states rather than AU bureaucrats. However, the AU has provided a forum 
where ICC-critical African states have successfully fostered a neocolonial narrative and have 
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passed decisions that directly counteract the ICC or seek to limit its effectiveness.145 In this way, 
with regard to its ICC posture, the AU can be said to possess actorness since it was successful in 
using its capabilities to challenge another international organization. It has a common identity 
based on sovereignty and liberation from colonialism and it leveraged that identity in contrast to 
the ICC to resist the charges against sitting heads of state.146 This actorness also speaks to 
African agency in the international system: “Like most governments in the global South, they 
are dictated to by external actors in certain circumstances and on some issues but in 
certain situations they influence these external governments and institutions.”147 This account 
contrasts with some norm diffusion scholarship that presents norm-takers as passive recipients 
and contributes scholarship on the regional organization’s role in global governance:148 “The 
mediating role of regional institutions deserves closer inspection in studies of norm diffusion, 
even in cases like this where the regional grouping is weak in relation to its individual member-
states.”149 
The case studies in this dissertation trace cooperation behavior over time. This process 
tracing at the country-level contrasts with many large-N compliance studies. I do not mean to 
suggest that we do not learn valuable lessons about compliance from these studies. What these 
case studies contribute, however, is an understanding of the micro-processes involving the 
struggle over cooperation, the ‘virtual trial,’ that remain hidden in statistical analyses. Thus, the 
dissertation contributes to cross-national comparisons of compliance. What creates compliance 
or non-compliance years after commitment has unique theoretical value and points us to 
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potentially new ways of explaining compliance. A focus on concrete compliance behavior down 
the road adds not only data points to our understandings but also sheds light on whether other 
considerations by the current government might impact compliance. Studying compliance 
actions, in the case of South Africa 16 years after ratification of the Rome Statute, casts doubts 
on assuming that what explained ratification then also explains compliance actions today. Thus, 
studying compliance incidents after ratification might illuminate further causes for compliance 
and non-compliance. Other governments might calculate costs and benefits differently, might be 
differently influenced by international peers or regional organizations, and might be differently 
subject to civil society groups and litigation.150  
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Chapter 3: Expressing Support and Critique for the ICC  
The International Criminal Court (ICC, or the Court) appears to be in deep trouble given 
that three African countries announced their intents to withdraw from the ICC in 2016. While 
two (South Africa and Gambia) have since then withdrawn from the withdrawal, the announced 
exits sent shockwaves through the international justice community about the impending collapse 
of the Court. This chapter shows that not all is doomed: Support for the Court, as expressed 
through public statements of loyalty, remains high and does so across regions. While states do 
raise critiques of the Court at the UN, when examined more closely, these critiques more often 
than not relate to state-to-state criticism over the lack of cooperation as well as the UN Security 
Council’s (UNSC) influence over the ICC’s docket, budget, and lack of follow-up. Moreover, 
states encourage universal ratification of the Rome Statute and stress the positive effects of the 
Court. While Africa constitutes the most critical region, many African states continue to support 
the Court and more references expressing loyalty were issued in 2016 than in 2007. This 
suggests that the Court is seen as a robust young institution and that states recognize the 
institutional constraints under which it operates, particularly the Court’s ties to the UNSC. 
The analysis of country statements at the UN is contrasted with decisions issued by the 
African Union (AU) Assembly, the AU’s main decision-making body that is comprised of 
African heads of state. Overall, AU decisions are much more critical of the Court, its judges and 
the Chief Prosecutor. Some contrasts stand out: First, the AU praised instances of non-
cooperation with the Court, i.e. instances when AU member states have not arrested ICC suspect 
at large, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir during visits to their country. At the UN, these non-
arrests drew strong criticism from other states as undermining the accountability mechanisms set 
up through the ICC. Second, in the debate of justice versus peace, AU decisions highlighted the 
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prioritization of peace. On several occasions, the African countries chastised the Court for the 
negative effects indictments and judicial decisions have on peace negotiations on the ground. 
Third, immunity of heads of state loomed large as a critical issue at the AU, which is not 
surprising given that some of the individuals charged by the Court are government officials and 
thus have a seat at the table at the AU, most importantly al-Bashir but also current Kenyan 
President Uhuru Kenyatta and his Deputy President William Ruto. The AU repeatedly called on 
the ICC and the UNSC to consider their constitutional duties as heads of state as somewhat 
mitigating circumstances for their trials. 
The chapter’s findings deserve attention as they illustrate the climate surrounding the 
Court, or what court officials like to call the ICC’s ‘enabling environment.’151 The Court as a 
judicial institution rests on the enforcement pillar but it does not control that pillar. That pillar is 
dependent on the states and especially the Court’s states parties. The analyses below point to 
important challenges faced by the Court, including its ties to the UNSC, the lack of state 
cooperation, and its troubled relationship with many African states.  
The next section describes in more detail the methodology for this content analysis. I then 
present first empirical results, charting expressions of voice, exit, and loyalty rhetoric. I then 
delve more deeply into common points of support and critique, and each section includes a 
regional overview to better chart geographical variation. The chapter’s second main part presents 
the main criticisms raised by the AU Assembly over time. 
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Methodology 
These statements represent the ‘discourse’ about the court—the way state leaders and 
officials talk about the Court—and they tell us about the expectations that states have of the 
Court and the reasons for continued support for or critique of the Court. I argue that this is part of 
states’ voluntary, non-legal cooperation with the ICC that contributes to institution and norm 
strengthening. 
To analyze what states like and dislike about the Court, I created a dataset of more than 
600 ICC-related statements made at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) from 2002, the entry 
into force of the Rome Statute and beginning of the Court’s operation, until 2016. A total of 605 
statements by 106 countries were coded. In addition, regional blocs presented collective 
statements, such as the European Union (EU: 15 statements), the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM: 13 statements), and the AU (7 statements). However, individual states from within 
these regional groupings are free to and frequently made use of individual statements to express 
their support for or concerns with the Court. For representative statements, I chose statements in 
the UNGA surrounding the annual introduction of the ICC report by its Chief Prosecutor. This 
report updates UN member states on the Court’s activities of the past year and states are invited 
to comment. The debates are accessible online. The debates surrounding this report allow for a 
better comparison across time than debates at the UNSC surrounding the use of force and 
potential referrals to the ICC, which are very context-specific. 
The statements were coded and analyzed with the qualitative data software NVivo 
according to country, regional grouping, and topics. The unit of analysis is references that either 
express support, critiques, or threaten exit. Hence, a statement by Japan can contain several 
references, some critical and some supportive of the Court. These references vary in length from 
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sentences to entire paragraphs if they are devoted to a specific theme. Coding longer phrases 
allows for more nuanced analysis that may become obscured when doing automated word 
searches. For instance, an expression of support for the Court is the calling on other states to join 
the Rome Statute, which was coded under the loyalty sub-category of “universality.” An 
example by CARICOM reads: “She urged States that had not yet done so to ratify or accede to 
the Statute, to adopt the necessary implementing legislation and to ratify and implement the 
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court, which would 
ensure that the latter was in a position to conduct its work properly.”152  
For each country I added their region as an attribute to analyze regional variation, using 
the ICC’s regional groupings: Africa, Asia Pacific, Western European and Other (including 
Western European states as well as Canada and Australia), Eastern European, and Latin 
American and Caribbean States. These regional counts include all countries in that region, 
regardless of whether they are states parties or not. This was done to achieve the broadest 
possible views about the Court. The drawback of this coding choice is of course that the counts 
do not just represent the views of states parties. To mitigate this concern, I point out the different 
views of vocal non-member states when appropriate, particularly in the voice section. 
It is important to point out that some regions were more vocal than others, i.e. the times 
they issued statements on the ICC is higher. Thus, their number of references is higher simply 
because they spoke up more often. Table 9 compares the total number of statements made per 
region and the number of ICC states parties in that region. While the percentages are similar for 
Asia Pacific and Latin America, they differ more for Western Europe and Other, Africa, and 
Eastern Europe, suggesting that Western states are slightly overrepresented in the statements 
while Africa and Eastern Europe are slightly underrepresented. 
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Table 9: Number of Country Statements per Region (% of 605) 
 Asia 
Pacific 
Africa Western Europe 
and Other 
Eastern 
Europe 
Latin 
America 
# of Country 
statements 
85 (14%) 147 
(24.3%) 
170 (28.1%) 60 (9.9%) 143 (23.6%) 
# of ICC States 
Parties 
19 
(15.3%) 
34 
(27.4%) 
25 (20.2%) 18 (14.5%) 28 (22.6%) 
 
With regard to subject matter, I coded expressions of support as loyalty, concerns or 
critiques as voice and threats to exit as exit. Loyalty is defined as expressions of support for the 
Court, i.e. positive statements about the Rome Statute system. Concerns or critiques related to 
the ICC were coded as voice. Within loyalty and voice many subcategories emerged depending 
on what was the object of loyalty or voice, i.e. what exactly was being referred to in a positive or 
negative way. In contrast, voice related to many different themes, such as resources and funding, 
the work of the UNSC, the work of the ICC Chief Prosecutor, or state-to-state critiques for the 
refusal to execute ICC arrest warrants.  
It is important to point out that within the categories of voice and loyalty coding was not 
mutually exclusive. That means that a statement critical of the UNSC and its refusal to provide 
financial assistance to the Court was coded at the voice subcategories of UNSC and finances, 
such as the following example by Costa Rica: “[I]t is necessary to recall that any referral from 
the Council to the Court, significant as it may be, also implies unforeseen obligations. It would 
be fair, therefore, if the resulting costs were to be compensated by the United Nations — 
something that has not occurred to date. We trust that reasonable arrangements will be arrived at 
in this area as well.”153 However, double coding of one reference as both loyalty and voice was 
deemed theoretically impossible.  
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In addition to the UN discourse, based on a textual analysis of AU Assembly decisions, I 
created a timeline of ICC-related decisions passed by the AU Assembly to chart when and why 
the regional organization became critical of the ICC. To allow for a better comparison between 
the statements countries made at the UN and AU Assembly decisions I coded the same themes, 
i.e. voice and loyalty. 16 AU decisions between 2009 and 2017 directly addressed the ICC and 
its cases.  
It is important to note the differences between speeches at the UN and AU decisions. The 
AU is a pan-African organization that represents the common views of the African continent. 
The AU Assembly is the summit meeting of AU heads of state that meets twice per year. They 
pass non-binding decisions but these decisions are meant to direct the policy of member states 
and express the common values and goals of the organization and its constituent members. These 
decisions are consensus decisions and usually no reservations are entered into to signal that one 
or more member states disagree openly with a decision. The AU decisions were chosen because 
they are all readily available online whereas speeches and meeting minutes from the summit 
meetings are not. This means that these decisions are likely to express the smallest common 
denominator of the continent. To mitigate these concerns about taking the decisions as 
representations of the ‘African’ view on the ICC, I triangulated the decisions with news articles 
about the summits to learn more about potential disagreements behind the scenes.  
Talking about the ICC at the UN 
The following sub-sections present the main themes that emerged from the content 
analysis. I first discuss the main three categories of exit, voice, and loyalty and compare them 
across regions. Then, I present findings from within the loyalty and voice categories. After 
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discussing more general findings, each section contains representative quotes from country 
statements to illustrate rhetoric at the UN and regional variation for the important categories. 
 
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 
All three categories of exit, voice, and loyalty account for 1,742 references, i.e. 1,742 
times did countries use rhetoric to signal their intentions to exit, critique, or support the ICC. 
Expressions of loyalty received the most mentions with 1,112 references, amounting to 63.8% 
(see Figure 4). Countries referred critically to the Court or the Rome Statute system 626 times, 
which accounts for 35.9% of all references. Thus, the fact that loyalty accounts for almost twice 
as many references as voice suggests high support for the Court. Four references were made with 
regard to exit in 2015 and 2016, together accounting for only 0.002% of references.  
 
Figure 4: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Rhetoric 
 
Figure 5 shows the extent to which different regions expressed exit, voice, and loyalty. 
Based on the total number of statements, Western Europe and Other is the region with the most 
positive mentions of the Court, totaling 339 loyalty statements and only 86 voice statements. So 
of a total 425 statements, almost 80% of these were positive and only 20% were voice. A 
majority of statements by countries in Latin America, Asia Pacific, and Eastern Europe were also 
0.002% 
1,112 
references 
= 63.8% 
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references 
= 35.9% 
Exit Loyalty Voice 
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expressions of loyalty even though their total number of statements is much smaller than 
Western Europe. Of the 136 statements made by Eastern European states, 103 were coded as 
loyalty (76%) and 33 as voice (24%). In Asia-Pacific, of a total of 173 statements, 129 were 
loyalty (74.5%) and 44 were voice (25.4%). So in these three regions, together accounting for 62 
states (50%) of 124 ICC states parties, the shares of loyalty for the Court ranged between 74% 
and 80%.  
 
Figure 5: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty per Region 
 
The share of loyalty of all statements is smaller in other world regions. Latin American 
countries expressed loyalty 291 times and voice 193 times, accounting for 60% and almost 40% 
respectively of the combined 484 statements. Africa is the most critical region and in fact the 
only region where voice surpasses expressions of loyalty. With 524 statements, the region has 
been the most vocal region of all. 270 statements were coded as voice (51.5%) and 250 as loyalty 
(47.7%) to the Court or the norms for which it stands. It was also the only region with four exit 
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statements, accounting for 0.7% of mentions. Figure 6 illustrates the regions’ respective shares of 
exit, voice, and loyalty statements as percentages of their total statements.  
 
Figure 6: Percentages of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty per Region 
 
Figure 7 displays the African region’s changes over time. I chose 2007 and 2016 as ‘most 
different’ points in time considering that 2007 is before the post-election violence in Kenya in 
which the Court then became involved and it is before Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir is 
officially charged by the ICC. 2007 also precedes the most critical statements by the AU against 
the Court which started in 2009. 2016 was chosen as the contrast year given that a main Court 
supporter, South Africa, failed to arrest al-Bashir in 2015. The comparison highlights the stark 
increase in voice between the two years and the addition of exit rhetoric. While African states 
also voiced slightly more loyalty toward the Court (from 16 references in 2007 to 21 references 
in 2016), statements coded as voice increased from 4 in 2007 to 32 in 2016. 
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Figure 7: Change in Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Africa 
 
 
Loyalty: Support for the Court  
I coded 1,112 expressions of loyalty, positive statements about what the Court does or 
can do in an ideal world. Table 10 contains the eight most often coded themes under loyalty, 
which account for 798 references (71.7%) of the 1,112 statements. 
 
Table 10: Main Categories of Loyalty 
Category Number of 
References  
Percentage of 
All Voice (1,112) 
More Resources 50 4.50 
Peace and Justice 51 4.59 
Effects of ICC 73 6.56 
Complementarity  74 6.65 
Kampala Review 79 7.10 
UN Relationship 123 11.06 
Cooperation Call 171 15.38 
Universality 177 15.92 
Total 798 71.7 
 
The most frequently coded loyalty theme was universality, which means that states called 
on more states to join the ICC in order to expand the Court’s territorial jurisdiction and move 
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closer to a truly global Court that can charge individuals regardless of country. For instance, 
Japan was determined to expand the Rome Statute’s reach in Asia stating that it “renews its 
commitment to continuing to encourage our Asia Pacific friends that have not yet done so to 
ratify or to accede to the Statute.”154 New Zealand stated that “the Court should have the greatest 
possible geographical reach” to be fully effective.155 Ecuador stated it this way: “We therefore 
believe that in order to guarantee the Court’s future and its effective operation, it is essential that 
we achieve universal adherence to and full application of the Rome Statute.”156 Universality was 
deemed important because the Rome Statute’s global reach would mean that all perpetrators 
ultimately got punished, hence contributing to the ICC’s goal of ending impunity through true 
universal jurisdiction. Moreover, states linked universality to increased legitimacy of the court.  
The second most frequently coded loyalty theme was states calling on other states to 
cooperate with the Court. The vast majority of references were non-specific and simply intended 
to remind others of their obligations. For instance, Costa Rica’s stated in 2005 that “[s]tate 
cooperation is also necessary both to implement arrest warrants and to facilitate the Court’s 
functioning at The Hague. Therefore, I should like to conclude my statement by calling upon all 
States to reaffirm their commitment to the International Criminal Court.”157 Finland called “on 
all States parties to the Rome Statute to uphold their international legal obligations under the 
Statute.”158 However, sometimes countries explicitly called out peers and reminded them of their 
duties, such as Argentina: “The authorities of the Sudan, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of 
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the Congo must fully cooperate to arrest persons against whom arrest warrants have been 
issued.”159  
The category ‘UN relationship’ refers to states stressing the importance of inter-
organization cooperation and complementary values of both organizations. In 2004, both 
organizations signed a Relationship Agreement, which formulates the working relationship 
between the UN and ICC and forms the legal foundation for cooperation between them. In many 
ways the UN’s global presence and infrastructure make it an important partner for the ICC in 
terms of its personnel across global field operations, who may act as experts or witnesses.160 
States see this relationship as highly positive, with Norway remarking in 2007: “The relationship 
between the ICC and the United Nations is of great importance. Ending climates of impunity 
requires determined cooperation by interlocutors who have international peace, justice and 
security as their common goals and their common ambition. The ICC is independent, but it has 
strong legal, historical and operational ties with the United Nations.”161 Estonia stated in 2015 
that recent decisions to authorize UN peacekeepers to arrest ICC suspects were praiseworthy: 
“The Security Council has authorized the missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
Mali to cooperate with and support the Court. We encourage the Security Council to mandate 
peacekeeping missions to arrest ICC fugitives and to equip them in such a manner that the 
missions are able to fulfill their mandate.”162 So while many states were very critical of the 
UNSC’s role, they also recognized the enormous potential of the UN to help fulfill the ICC’s 
mandate. 
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The Kampala review was also seen as very positive. Before the review conference in 
2010 in Kampala, states made recommendations and expressed their hopes for the conference.  
After 2010, they remarked on the conference’s success, especially with regard to adding the 
crime of aggression to the Court’s jurisdiction. Lesotho stated that the Kampala review 
conference “was undoubtedly a success” and Sierra Leone remarked that the “historic 
achievements made in Uganda [...] form a major milestone in the development of international 
criminal justice.”163 In 2016, states praised the activation of the Kampala amendments by 
reaching the threshold of 30 ratifications. Brazil stated that the adding of the crime of aggression 
represents “a major contribution to completing the international criminal justice system. It will 
give additional meaning to the prohibition of the use of force, thus fostering a more stable, just 
and democratic world order.”164 
Other positive aspects that received states’ attention were complementarity, and states 
often highlighted the positive effects of the Court as a reason why it should be supported. Coded 
as ‘complementarity’ were statements that supported the principle according to which the Court 
only steps in when domestic authorities are found to be either unwilling or unable to prosecute 
the alleged crimes. For example, Liechtenstein said in 2011 that the “ICC is one of the most 
important tools in the fight against impunity, but it is not the only one. It is States themselves that 
play the greatest role in that respect. Fighting impunity is, in most cases, best undertaken at the 
national level, in particular since the ICC and other international mechanisms can only deal with 
a limited number of cases”165 
The effects that states see in the ICC are grand and are so far not borne out by empirical 
research, which remains divided over the potential effects of the court on deterrence and 
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strengthening the rule of law, and has at best found conditional court effects.166 But at the UN, 
states largely assert these effects. Peru said: “The Court not only prosecutes those allegedly 
responsible for the most horrendous crimes and serves as a means of prevention and deterrence, 
but also cooperates with other institutions with similar objectives. Thus, it promotes an 
international system in which respect for the rule of law prevails.”167 Echoing these hopes was 
Poland in 2014: “The International Criminal Court is central to the achievement of justice and 
accountability in the battle against those responsible for the most serious crimes, along with the 
States that harbour or otherwise endorse such actions.”168 
Figure 8 charts the eight most frequently coded loyalty subcategories across regions. The 
need for state cooperation was stressed across regions. This was particularly the case in Western 
European and Other states where calls for other states to comply with their Rome Statute 
obligations were made 57 times, followed by Latin America with 44 references and Africa with 
36 references. Universality was mentioned most frequently by Latin American states (56 
mentions) whose other priorities were calling on better state cooperation and highlighting the 
importance of a good UN-ICC relationship.  
                                                
166 While important variations exist, scholars agree that the Court’s impact on deterrence and violence prevention is 
at best conditional. For instance, Jo and Simmons (2016) argued that the ICC can deter some governments and 
rebel groups that seek legitimacy from engaging in intentional killing of civilians; see also Broache 2016; 
Cronin-Furman 2013. 
167 UN General Assembly, UN Doc A/61/PV.27: 16-17. 
168 UN General Assembly, UN Doc A/69/PV.35: 11. 
 85 
Figure 8: Most Frequently Coded Loyalty Categories per Region 
 
African states placed special emphasis on stressing the need for state cooperation (36 
references), universality (28 references), complementarity (24 references), the Kampala review 
(23 references), and the relationship to UN (22 references). Other priorities were adequate 
funding for the Court given its increasing workload as well as the mutually reinforcing 
relationship of justice and peace. When coded as loyalty, ‘peace and justice’ statements 
emphasized that both objectives should be pursued alongside one another and that one cannot be 
accomplished without the other. This contrasts with decisions by African states at the AU 
Assembly. The sections below demonstrate how AU decisions often called for delays in ICC 
court cases or the dropping of charges because peace should be prioritized. At the UN, states 
stressed the mutually reinforcing relationship between justice and peace. 
Twenty-six references were coded under loyalty as states expressed regret over recently 
announced intent or decisions to withdraw from the Court by South Africa, Burundi, and Gambia 
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was right in 1998 is still right. The world needs the ICC, and the ICC needs the support of every 
country. We would like to continue our engagement with these countries and with all our other 
partners in determining how we can all continue to act constructively in furthering the important 
work of the International Criminal Court.”169 Similarly, Australia noted: “While we recognize 
that membership in an international treaty is a sovereign decision, we take the opportunity to 
encourage those States parties that have indicated that they intend to withdraw from the Rome 
Statute to reconsider their decision.”170 
Senegal and Tanzania were the only African countries to openly call on their African 
peers to reconsider their exit decisions. Tanzania expressed its general concern that “African 
countries have come to be critical of the Court, to the point that a policy of non-compliance and 
non-cooperation with the Court is a real possibility.”171 Senegal emphasized the need to 
strengthen the relationship between the ICC and Africa especially in light of these exit decisions: 
“Senegal, while respectful of the sovereignty of all States, nevertheless hopes that a dynamic 
consensus will be found so that Africa may continue to play a major role in the fight against 
impunity within the Assembly of States Parties.”172 
This section on loyalty has revealed what states value about the Court. Most importantly, 
states emphasized the need to garner more ICC states parties to ensure a truly global Court that 
can charge suspects in all corners of the world regardless of UNSC decisions. Looking at the 
subcategories of loyalty together it became apparent that states are much more expressive of their 
hopes and support for what the Court can become rather than what the Court has been doing. 
States are eager to point out that the institution is very young and is hampered in its work by its 
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ties to the UNSC and the Statute that states agreed to. Hence, states were very supportive of the 
further development of the Court through the Kampala review conference, the effort to achieve 
universality, and the potential effects of the Court such as deterrence of future perpetrators.  
 
Voice: Critiques of the UNSC and other States 
When looking more closely at ‘voice,’ we can better assess the relative importance of 
criticisms. Table 11 presents the twelve most frequently coded voice subcategories that account 
together for 86.9% of all critical comments (544 references of 626). I included all categories that 
garnered more than 20 references between 2002 and 2016. 
Most notably, the two most frequently voiced critiques were not of the Court itself but of 
other actors: states and the UNSC. With 106 references, critique of the UNSC’s conduct 
accounts for almost 17% of all references, i.e. almost every fifth voice reference was a criticism 
of the UNSC. As the sections below demonstrate, states were very critical of the UNSC’s lack of 
funding contribution to the Court in the situations which it referred to the Court, i.e. Sudan and 
Libya, as well its inaction with regard to atrocities occurring in Syria. Moreover, states chastised 
the Council for its lack of follow-up with the referred situations and that the Council bears some 
political responsibility to use its leverage to help the ICC secure states’ cooperation. African 
states also criticized the UNSC for ignoring the AU’s deferral requests for the Sudan and Kenya 
cases. In 2010, the Zambian representative read a statement on behalf of the African ICC states 
parties, saying that African officials are concerned that “the Security Council has shown 
disrespect for the African Union by failing to respond either positively or negatively to its 
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deferral request” and that “[r]esolution of this issue is the only way to facilitate cooperation 
between the African Union and the ICC.”173  
 
Table 11: Main Categories of Voice 
Category Number of 
References  
Percentage of 
All Voice (626) 
Prosecutor 21 3.35 
Immunity 22 3.51 
Internal Procedures 27 4.31 
Cooperation with AU 28 4.47 
Aggression 29 4.63 
Darfur 31 4.95 
UNSC deferrals 43 6.87 
Africa focus 44 7.03 
Finances 47 7.51 
Politicization 67 10.7 
Lack of State cooperation 79 12.62 
UNSC conduct 106 16.93 
TOTAL  544 86.9 
 
The third and fourth most frequently mentioned references refer to politicization and 
finances. Importantly, 17 references of 106 UNSC references (16%) are linked to politicization 
and non-member states, such as Cuba and Sudan, especially emphasize these connections. States 
are concerned that the power of the UNSC to refer situations to the Court skews the situations 
that the Court is investigating. Over the years, many states for instance voice critique of the 
UNSC’s failure to refer the situation in Syria to the Court despite overwhelming support for the 
referral among most UN member states. Chile’s representative stated that “the linkage existing 
between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court, and specifically the powers 
of the Council to refer situations or suspend investigations in accordance with articles 13 and 16 
of the Rome Statute, must be based on consistent criteria that demonstrate that the decisions are 
                                                
173 UN General Assembly, UN Doc A/65/PV.39: 15. 
 89 
not arbitrary.”174 Similarly, Ecuador voiced concerns that it is “indispensable that we ensure the 
independence and autonomy of the Court, gradually eliminating any political interference that 
may stem from any of the organs of the United Nations.”175 The frustration over the use of the 
veto by the P5 in cases of mass atrocities led the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency 
Group (ACT), a “cross-regional group of 27 small and mid-sized countries”176 focused on 
improving the UNSC’s working methods, to “[a]dvocate for the voluntary suspension of the use 
of the veto in cases of atrocity crimes (that is, when the Council’s actions aim at preventing or 
ending genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity).”177 Especially since 2012, the theme 
was reiterated by states at the UN with Peru stating in 2015 that it “supports the French initiative 
and the initiative of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group regarding a code of 
conduct on Security Council resolutions to prevent mass atrocities.”178 
An even greater share of UNSC references were also linked to finances so that states 
were complaining about the UNSC’s lack of funding for the situations that it refers to the Court. 
Since UNSC referrals to the Court are made in accordance with Articles 24 and 39 of the UN 
Charter on behalf of all UN member states, many countries called on the UNSC to heed this 
obligation. 28 references of the total 106 UNSC references were linked to finances, accounting 
for 26.4%. Hence, almost every fourth ‘complaint’ about the UNSC was critical of its lack of 
funding for the Court. South Africa stated in 2011 that these UNSC referrals place a “financial 
strain” on the Court and that is it “only fair that the financial burden of that task be borne by all 
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Members of the United Nations, not only States parties to the Statute.”179 Likewise Jordan 
complained in 2012 that the UNSC has referred situations to the ICC “without putting the 
financial burden on the United Nations membership, as it rightfully should have, both in 
accordance with the Rome Statute and the Relationship Agreement between the Court and the 
United Nations,” and that ICC states parties “should not have to continue bearing the costs of the 
decisions arising from Security Council decisions.”180 Similarly, Slovenia reiterated in 2013 that 
the “financing of the costs arising from the Court’s activities triggered by Security Council 
referrals continues to be a matter of concern for us.”181 
A third point of voice is the UNSC’s lack of follow up on states’ non-compliance in 
UNSC-referred cases. This is a critical issue for ICC investigations because it was the lack of 
UNSC support for the Sudan cases and the associated lack of compliance with ICC arrest 
warrants that Bensouda cited as justification for ‘hibernating’ the Sudan cases to shift resources 
elsewhere in late 2014. Argentina remarked that “the Council cannot merely take note of the 
reports of the Prosecutor or the Court without following up on compliance with the obligation to 
cooperate with the Court or on situations on the ground” and that the country “is convinced that 
establishing some kind of follow-up mechanism for situations referred to the Court would 
substantially contribute to the Council’s responsible collaboration with it.”182 Mexico cited cases 
in which the ICC informed the Council of lacking state cooperation and found “an urgent need 
for the Security Council to immediately follow up on situations referred to the Court so as to 
promote cooperation between States and the Court.”183  
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In addition to critiques related to the UNSC, 79 references were made criticizing other 
states for failing to cooperate with the Court, i.e. not executing ICC arrest warrants. Rather than 
shaming peers by calling them out in public, states often used their statements to highlight the 
consequences of non-cooperation. While this node may seem like the flip-side to the loyalty 
category of encouraging state cooperation, it represents a different kind of reference. References 
were coded as loyalty when the reference expressed overall support for the Rome Statute or the 
Court and derived a necessity to cooperate from that legal obligation and commitment. In 
contrast, expressions of voice against other states’ lack of cooperation were references that also 
referred to the negative consequences of cooperation failure or unwillingness. As such, given 
that both types of statement were not coded simultaneously is testament to the overwhelming 
concern states have with state cooperation. For instance, Peru’s representative stated in 2006 that 
the country “regrets” that “none of the members of the Lord’s Resistance Army — who are 
accused of crimes against humanity or war crimes — has yet been arrested or surrendered to the 
Court.”184 In 2007, Mexico warned that “the absence of cooperation in this respect may affect the 
preventive role of the Court.”185 An EU representative remarked in 2012 that the outstanding 
arrest warrants “stifle[s] the ICC’s capacity to deliver justice.”186  
Figure 9 displays the twelve most frequently mentioned Voice subcategories across 
regions. The graph illustrates the weight the different regions pay to certain critiques and it 
displays stark differences. It becomes evident that Latin American countries emphasized 
especially the role of the UNSC (53 references) and the negative effects of state non-cooperation 
(36 references), followed by the lack of finances (28 references) and lack of UNSC willingness 
to defer some cases. This confirms that Latin American states are among the biggest supporters 
                                                
184 UN General Assembly, UN Doc A/61/PV.27: 16. 
185 UN General Assembly, UN Doc A/62/PV.43: 17. 
186 UN General Assembly, UN Doc A/67/PV.31: 10. 
 92 
of the Court given that their main points of voice refer to actors other than the ICC: other states 
and the role of the UNSC. 
 
Figure 9: Most Frequently Coded Voice Categories per Region 
 
The proportion of statements by Eastern European states roughly corresponded with 
those of Western states considering their overall lower number of statements. They similarly 
criticized primarily the UNSC (11 references) and the lack of state cooperation (10 references) 
with other points of critique far behind with only 1 or 2 references. Asia Pacific states criticized 
the lack of the crime of aggression as part of the ICC’s jurisdiction (7 references), finances (7 
references), and the UNSC (7 references).   
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Comparing Voice across African and Western States 
With 212 references total within these twelve subcategories African countries made the 
most critical references (38.9%), followed by Latin American states with 180 references (33%). 
Figure 10 visualizes the references across the African and Western regions. This comparison is 
instructive considering that Africa constitutes the most critical region and the only one, which 
has publicly discussed the possibility of exit. Several African states continue to criticize the role 
that Western states play at the Court, arguing that states that fund the Court have an unfair 
impact on its conduct. Important differences exist with regard to critiques of the Prosecutor, the 
Court’s Africa focus, and politicization.  
 
Figure 10: Percentages of Voice Categories in Africa and Western States 
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references to the twelve subcategories account for only 15% of the total 544 voice references. 
The region only remarked critically on the prosecutor and politicization once and the Court’s 
Africa focus twice. This contrasts starkly with the views of the African region. The African 
region especially focused its critique on the Court’s focus on Africa (38 references) and 
politicization (50 references). This is much more Court-centered than the critiques of the other 
regions, which often focused on the UNSC’s role. In contrast to Latin American and Western 
states, African states criticized the lack of state cooperation less frequently (9 references). This is 
not surprising given that critiques for absent state cooperation were indirectly directed at African 
states that failed to arrest ICC suspects when they visited their respective countries. The African 
region thus stands out for its overall more critical attitude in issuing more critical statements than 
other regions but also in that what they criticize relates to the ICC proper rather than other actors.  
Figure 11 displays the changes in this voice rhetoric between 2007 and 2016. References 
critical of politicization increased from 0 to 10 as did mentions critical of the Court’s Africa 
focus from 0 to 5. References critical of states’ lack of cooperation with the Court decreased 
from 3 to 1. Other new concerns in 2016 related to the Court’s internal procedures and its lack of 
engagement with the AU. While these absolute numbers are not very impressive, they indicate a 
shift in focus and attention between 2007 and 2016. African countries have become more critical 
of the Court and point out especially politicization and the Court’s African focus. 
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Figure 11: Change in Voice Categories in Africa 2007-2016 
 
 
Voice: Critiques of the Court 
In addition to gender and regional balance among ICC staff, the Court’s budget 
management came under critique by states, albeit less so than the UN’s unwillingness to 
contribute its fair share to the budget. For instance, Canada’s representative stressed the “need 
for fiscal discipline” in 2013,187 and Nigeria suggested in 2005 that the Court “adopt a strategy 
that is based on resources rather than on demand.”188 Mexico was especially focused on sound 
financial management. In 2007, the country noted that “the Court has an enormous responsibility 
towards States parties to the Statute for the good management of its financial resources under the 
principle of ‘one Court.’”189  
Other important categories that deserve attention due to the most pressing concerns about 
the Court’s ongoing cases are politicization and Africa focus. While politicization was 
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mentioned 67 times, 35 times were by vocal non-member states (Cuba, Sudan, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Rwanda) and Kenya. Table 12 contrasts these various voice subcategories. 
 
Table 12: Main Voice Categories 
 All references By vocal non-member states 
Politicization 67 35 
Africa focus 44 21 
Prosecutor, internal 
procedures, long trials 
56 23 
 
For instance, Eritrea exclaimed: “The unacceptable treatment of African States and their 
leaders by the ICC is aggravating the current situation rather than addressing the root cause of 
the problem”190 and likewise Rwanda said that the ICC 
has been selective in its methods of investigating and prosecuting perpetrators 
of serious international crimes in that it has so far failed to accept the glaring 
truth that similar crimes have been committed with impunity in different parts 
of the world. It is evident that political bias and control and a flawed 
methodology are being deployed in the name of international justice.191 
 
In 2009, Sudan heavily criticized Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo “who has 
always lacked professionalism and has been characterized by an eager pursuit of publicity, fame 
and the limelight. Indeed, the Prosecutor has abandoned his status as a jurist and turned into a 
political activist who visits capitals and advocates against Governments, undeterred by 
conscience or sense of professionalism.”192 Likewise, Kenya chastised the Court for being driven 
by the interests of its funders, i.e. a “proprietorship that […] is driven by those who think that 
because they fund a disproportionately larger amount of the budget for the operations and, I 
might add, digressions of the ICC, that therefore they have an inherent right to lay claim to a 
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special relationship with the ICC, including its staff, prosecutor and judges. But what we say is 
that money, like might, does not necessarily make right.”193 
Apart from Kenya, Sudan, and non-member states, most statements related to 
politicization were references of ideal situations rather than pointing out existing politicization. 
For instance, the Netherlands’ representative stressed “the importance of its independent judicial 
role” and the need to “keep it free from political considerations.”194 
With regard to the Court’s focus on Africa, 21 of 44 references were made by these vocal 
non-member states with Sudan stating in 2009: “We will say it out loud: stop politicizing justice. 
We say no to selectivity and double standards. We say no to breaches of and encroachments on 
the sovereignty of States and their sovereign choices and to targeting their leaders. We say no. 
Africa said that.”195 In fact, no common statement by African member states contained language 
that criticized the Court for its focus on Africa.196 Instead, these common AU statements 
emphasized the close relationship between the ICC and the region, stressing the continent’s 
contribution to creating the Court and constituting its largest regional block: 
All of this illustrates the high regard that the region has for the 
protection and promotion of the rule of law. African States avail 
themselves of the judicial assistance provided by the Court in cases 
that, due to their complexity and/or political sensitivity, lend 
themselves to be better dealt with by the Court. It is not true that 
Africa is against the Court and its rationale. It is true, nevertheless, 
that there is a lingering perception that relations between the ICC 
and African countries could be better.197  
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However, recognizing the strain that the continuous disagreements between the ICC, the 
UNSC, and several vocal African countries has had on the Court’s perception and work, many 
countries used their UN speeches to urge more cooperation. Tanzania remarked in a common 
African statement in 2011, that the next ICC prosecutor should “prioritize the improvement of 
relations between the Court and the African Union” and that the “future success of the Court will 
depend on improved relations with its supporters across Africa.”198 Nigeria reiterated that call in 
2014, calling on the Court to “show more respect to African leaders and to engage with the 
African Union and African States on a mutual and respectful basis, as we all share the same 
values of promoting the rule of law and fighting impunity for the most serious crimes.”199 But 
also non-African states expressed the need for more engagement, such as Argentina: “The issues 
raised by the African Union are central to the current debate concerning the International 
Criminal Court. Argentina believes that we must continue a frank dialogue among all actors 
regarding such issues and concerns, with care not to impinge on the judicial independence of the 
Court.”200  
Three of the more Court-centered voice subcategories are related to critiques of the 
prosecutor, internal procedures, and long trials. Of the 56 references to these three categories, 23 
of them were made by the vocal non-member states and Kenya. For instance, Kenya stated that 
when the Court was created, member states were “convinced that we were setting up a court with 
higher standards of practices and procedures than those found in our national jurisdictions. 
However, today we find ourselves saddled with a Court that has lower thresholds and standards 
than those found in our national courts.”201 But other member states also criticized the Court 
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specifically, reminding it of its need to be seen as independent and legitimate. Venezuela stressed 
the need for the Court to “act scrupulously and with great caution in order to safeguard the 
reputation of the International Criminal Court”202 and Mexico called “on the Court’s bodies and 
officials to think about its real needs and to propose their own measures of internal austerity, 
with consequent savings. That would encourage States parties to respond to requests on 
budgetary matters.”203 The Court’s efficiency was also important for Japan: “The fact that its 
judicial independence is sacrosanct does not render the Court immune to investigation of its 
management. We must address this issue with a view to striking a good balance between the 
need for strict financial discipline and the provision for procedural legitimacy that a criminal 
institution requires.”204 
This section on voice has revealed several aspects of how states see the Court. Most 
importantly, several subcategories were not critiques of the Court proper but rather a frustration 
over the UNSC, that body’s political nature, and its relationship to the Court. States criticized the 
UNSC for its lack of financial contribution, thus flouting its own obligations under the Rome 
Statute and the Relationship Agreement between the two institutions, as well as its lack of 
follow-up to instances of state non-cooperation with the Court. States also criticized other states 
for their lack of cooperation with the Court. In addition, roughly 50% of mentions with regard to 
politicization, the Court’s Africa focus, and Court-internal dynamics were made by several vocal 
non-member states Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Cuba, Rwanda, and state party Kenya. The 
regional breakdown revealed that the African region centered its critique more on the ICC proper 
and that its frustrations increased over time. 
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Exit: State Withdrawals 
From 2002 until 2014, no references were coded as ‘exit.’ This is surprising considering 
that threats of exit have been made in the AU as the next section demonstrates. Started by 
Kenyan calls for withdrawal from the ICC, the AU tried but failed to pass a motion for a mass 
exit by African states in 2013. The most vocal proponents for exit have been countries in which 
the ICC had started investigations: Kenya, Sudan, and increasingly Uganda. In the early years of 
the Court, Uganda had been a staunch ICC supporter and referred its own country to the Court. 
However, President Yoweri Museveni has shifted toward more critical tones since then.  
Exit rhetoric entered the UN in 2014 when Kenya stated that it would be “our historical 
duty to put the ICC to rest, thus save it from further self-inflicted misery and the international 
community tens of millions of dollars, while sparing the long-suffering victims the pangs of false 
hope and empty promises” but that the country was held back by “the noble objectives of 
international rule of law and the historical imperative of our time to fight impunity were such a 
pressing, urgent and necessary requirement for international peace and security.”205 So this 
statement by Kenya in 2014 was the first time in the surveyed period that a country considered 
exit in a speech at the UN. The issue came front and center in 2016 after South Africa, Burundi, 
and Gambia had announced their intent or decisions to withdraw from the Rome Statute. 
Burundi’s representative gave a speech to this effect, actively discouraging other nations from 
joining the Court. He justified the country’s sovereign decision to exit with a summary of many 
voice subcategories: 
We believe that African countries should reconsider their accessions to the 
Rome Statute because the International Criminal Court has recently become a 
biased instrument at the service of a category of countries, a tool with which to 
exercise political pressure and, in some cases, to effect regime change in 
developing countries, in general, and African countries, in particular. 
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Furthermore, my delegation recalls that the selectivity, the lack of objectivity 
and the tendency towards politicization which the Court has shown in its 
targeting of only African States and Heads of State, led to the convening of an 
extraordinary session of the Assembly of the African Union on 12 October 
2013. It is clear that the ICC is focusing all of its attention on Africa, while 
unacceptable situations in other parts of the world go unacknowledged. The 
substance of my comments, which are by no means exhaustive, has recently 
compelled Burundi to withdraw from the list of States parties to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court at the explicit request of the people 
of Burundi through a joint session of the two Houses of their Parliament. [...] 
Similarly, withdrawal from a treaty to which a State is party is a sovereign 
decision and should not elicit the amount of commentary from other Member 
States that it has.206 
 
This section has shown that exit did not play a role at the UN until 2014. Rather, other 
states and even two African states used their statements at the UN to encourage the exiters to 
reconsider their decisions. The exiters, in response, stressed the sovereign nature of making 
withdrawal decisions and justified their decision with the Court’s politicization and its case focus 
on Africa.  
Talking about the ICC at the African Union 
The second, more critical, venue where states express their views about the ICC is the 
AU. This section shows important differences with the UN. Since the AU comprises many of the 
most vocal critical ICC non-member states as well as critical ICC states parties Kenya and 
Uganda, the majority of statements constitute ‘voice.’ Some common voice themes emerge, 
particularly politicization, the Court’s Africa focus, and critique of the Chief Prosecutor. 
Moreover, the AU repeatedly expressed its frustration with the UN system, especially the UNSC 
and its unwillingness to take up AU requests for deferrals. There are three main differences that 
stand out in contrast to the UN: immunity of heads of state ranks high among the concerns, in the 
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peace versus justice debate, AU decisions prioritize peace over justice, and exit finds its 
expression earlier in official documents. Over time and with increasing ICC focus on leading 
political officials, the decisions become more critical. Hence, the AU served as a primary forum 
in which African states expressed their frustrations with the Court and through which they seek 
to impact the Court via the UN. The next sections will present expressions of loyalty to the 
Court’s underlying norms of accountability and complementarity and then shift toward critiques 
of the Court. 
 
Expressions of Loyalty to Accountability Norm and Complementarity 
Rather than express loyalty to the court, AU decisions express loyalty to the 
accountability norm undergirding the Court. Several AU decisions reaffirm the organization’s 
“unflinching commitment to combating impunity.”207 The AU publicly condemned violence and 
atrocities in the western Sudanese region of Darfur and demanded that perpetrators be brought to 
justice. The Assembly also supported the decision by the AU’s Peace and Security Council to set 
up an expert panel to examine the situation. This commitment to the accountability norm in 
general and in concrete African conflicts remained a staple part of the Assembly decisions over 
time.208 
While support for the accountability norm can be seen as support for the ICC, there are 
other avenues to justice and these find more support by the AU. The second most frequently 
mentioned ICC norm is complementarity. As a key principle of the court, complementarity 
means that the ICC only becomes involved in situations where countries have been found to be 
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unwilling or unable to pursue justice themselves. Hence, while the norm is an integral part of the 
Rome Statute, it gives national courts the primary right to try international crimes. In July 2009, 
the AU Assembly encouraged its member states to start domestic cooperation and capacity 
building programs to get model legislation passed and initiate police and judiciary reforms to 
strengthen their capabilities to complete trials themselves, hence bypassing potential future ICC 
action.209 This means that the AU does not express direct loyalty to the Court in its decisions but 
rather to the broader accountability norm and the complementarity principle, which allows 
national jurisdictions to address crimes first. 
 
Voice: ICC Critiques and UN Conduct 
The AU’s concern over the conduct of the Court was expressed for the first time in 2009 
after al-Bashir had been charged for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.210 The 
most momentous AU decision was the ‘non-cooperation decision’ in July 2009 when the AU 
called on its member states to not cooperate in the arrest and surrender of al-Bashir due to the 
UNSC’s refusal to defer the Bashir case for one year.211 This directly counteracts some African 
states’ other obligations under the Rome Statute. This AU decision has formed the cornerstone 
and legal justification on which states relied that subsequently refused to arrest al-Bashir during 
visits to their countries. As legal questions arise to what extent AU member states are legally 
bound by the AU decision and how that obligation relates to their obligation when the state is 
also an ICC state party, the AU passed a decision in 2010, requesting “[m]ember [s]tates to 
balance, where applicable, their obligations to the AU with their obligations to the ICC.”212 
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Voice: ICC Decisions, Conduct, and Personnel 
A main criticism related to the conduct of the ICC, especially the Office of the Prosecutor 
(OTP), for its decisions to start proceedings against sitting heads of state. The first critical 
statement occurred in February 2009 when the AU “expresse[d] its deep concern” over the 
Bashir charges and their impact on peace processes in Darfur, and called for a meeting of 
African ICC member states so they can  “exchange views on the work of the ICC in relation to 
Africa, in particular in the light of the processes initiated against African personalities.”213 
“Concern” for the conduct of the ICC Prosecutor became a recurring theme, especially toward 
Moreno-Ocampo. In July 2010, the AU decision stated that he had been “making egregiously 
unacceptable, rude and condescending statements on the case of President Omar Hassan El-
Bashir of The Sudan and other situations in Africa.”214 In 2011, the concern related to Libya and 
how the Prosecutor was handling the situation there.215 In other instances, statements expressed 
regret over ICC judges’ decisions in particular court cases, such as the one rejecting Kenya’s 
admissibility challenge.216 
A very common theme was critiques of ICC judges’ proceedings and findings of non-
compliance against African states that failed to arrest al-Bashir. In turn, this occurred alongside 
support for the African countries that hosted him and praising them for implementing the AU 
non-cooperation policy of 2009. The first mention of this is in January 2011, when the AU 
expressed its regret over the ICC decision on al-Bashir visiting Chad. The AU decided that “by 
receiving President Bashir, the Republic of Chad and the Republic of Kenya were implementing 
various AU Assembly Decisions on the warrant of arrest issued by ICC against President Bashir 
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as well as acting in pursuit of peace and stability in their respective regions.”217 A similar 
decision is issued in July 2011 reaffirming support for Kenya and Djibouti hosting al-Bashir as 
acting according to “their obligations under Article 23 of the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union and Article 98 of the Rome Statute.”218 In 2012, the same support was given to Malawi219 
and to South Africa. In January 2016, several months after South Africa hosted al-Bashir and 
experienced domestic judicial challenges against its non-arrest, the AU “commend[ed]” the 
country for complying with the AU non-cooperation decision and decided that “by receiving 
President Bashir, the Republic of South Africa was implementing various AU Assembly 
Decisions on the warrants of arrest issued by the ICC against President Bashir and that South 
Africa was consistent with its obligations under international law.”220 
This support for non-arrests contrasted sharply with the UN where states expressed only 
critique of non-cooperation in arrests and surrender. At the AU, voice is directed at the Court 
while states are applauded for their non-cooperation because they acted in loyalty to the AU 
rather than the ICC. When African states faced loyalty conflicts between the ICC and AU, their 
prioritization of the regional commitment resulted in praise from the AU and critique from states 
at the UN.  
The AU Assembly was also critical of the ICC’s trial conduct, especially the poor state of 
evidence, long trials, and the judges’ disregard to decisions by the Assembly of States Parties 
(ASP). In January 2015, the AU welcomed the withdrawal of charges against Kenyan president 
Kenyatta despite “regretting the period it took the OTP to arrive at the decision and the continued 
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prosecution through disclosure of alleged evidence available to the ICC against him.”221 Similar 
concerns were raised with regard to Kenyan Deputy President Ruto in 2016: The AU reiterated 
its call for the OTP to drop the case against him since “any continued prosecution is without 
foundation given the unambiguous absence of any incriminatory evidence capable of belief.”222 
Several AU countries tried to address the features of the Court they deemed negative 
through the ASP where states can make amendments to the Rome Statute and the rules of the 
Court. At the 12th session of the ASP in 2013, the body decided to amend the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence to include new subparagraphs to rule 134, which would allow accused persons on a 
‘case-by-case’ basis to be present at trial from a remote location through the use of video 
technology.223 Moreover, the ASP also amended Rule 68 at the request of Kenya, “to allow for 
the admission of ‘prior recorded witness testimony’ in the Court’s proceedings” which was 
subsequently used in 2015 by the OTP to introduce the pre-recorded witness testimony in the 
trial against Ruto and Sang.224 In response to these decisions, the AU expressed concern over the 
ICC Trial Chamber V(b)’s decision to summon Kenyatta “which did not take cognizance 
whatsoever of the amendments of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC adopted by 
the 12th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute held in the 
Hague, the Netherlands in November 2013.”225 The AU also commended Kenyatta for his 
leadership in making Ruto Acting President while he complied with the ICC’s summons to go to 
The Hague.226  
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Another disregard to ASP decisions caused critique from the AU Assembly in early 2016, 
when the body criticized the “obstinacy” of the ICC Prosecutor, Registrar and President of the 
ICC for continuing to “privilege the views of civil society over clearly held positions of African 
Member States parties to the Rome Statute” and the Prosecutor for her “disturbing public 
dismissive disregard of the decisions of the 14th ASP […] in relation to the pending Rule 68 
Appeal against Kenya’s Deputy President.”227 Rule 68 allows for the use of prior-recorded 
testimony as evidence and came front and center in the ICC case against Ruto and Sang as 16 
Prosecution witnesses later changed their statements or refused to cooperate. The OTP has 
argued that witnesses were subjected to a climate of fear and intimidation in Kenya. At the 14th 
ASP, the body inserted “Kenya’s requested language on the non-retroactive use of amended Rule 
68 on using pre-recorded witnesses testimony” but the language’s inclusion in the ASP’s final 
report “holds no obligations for states or the ICC.” At the time of the ASP in 2015, the 
“retroactive use of rule 68 [was] before the ICC Appeals Chamber after the prosecutor used this 
new rule to introduce pre-recorded witness testimony in the ongoing trial of Kenyan Deputy 
President William Ruto and broadcaster Joshua Sang.”228  
The section revealed the attention paid by the AU Assembly to matters at the ASP and 
using that venue to seek changes to the Court’s rules and procedures. But the AU then expressed 
frustrations when the Court and its judges disregarded ASP decisions and amendments. This 
reveals the preferences of the various actors, with African leaders and their delegations being 
able to influence the outcomes of the ASP but being unable to influence the legal reasoning and 
decisions of the ICC judges. 
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While the AU started criticizing the ICC for its focus on Africa in 2013, these critiques 
had already emerged indirectly in earlier AU decisions on universal jurisdiction. For instance, in 
July 2009, the AU expressed frustration over the abuse of universal jurisdiction by some 
European countries against African persons and called for the “immediate termination of all 
pending indictments”229 given that the immunity of state officials needs to be respected. This 
critique of universal jurisdiction was reiterated in February 2010230 and 2011231 when the 
Assembly restated that European states have to respect IL and head of state immunity. This 
critique became more centered on the ICC in later years. For instance, in May 2013, the AU 
reaffirmed its concerns about the “misuse of indictments against African leaders”232 and in 2015 
questioned the “wisdom of the continued prosecution against African Leaders.”233 
Other internal critiques related to peace over justice and personnel decisions. One 
common argument made at the AU is that peace should be pursued first or ranks higher than 
accountability and justice. This contrasts with the UN loyalty subcategory above where member 
states repeatedly stressed the mutually reinforcing relationship between justice and peace. In July 
2009, the AU stated that the decision to charge Bashir has “unfortunate consequences” on the 
Sudanese peace process.234 The same argument was advanced with regard to Libya in July 2011 
when the AU called on its member states not to cooperate in the arrest and surrender of Gaddafi 
because it complicates peace negotiations on the ground.235 In May 2013, the AU reaffirmed 
these earlier decisions.236 
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Regional balance in personnel decisions also found their way into AU decisions. Fuelled 
by frustration over Moreno-Ocampo and the lower share of Africans holding positions at the 
Court, the AU Assembly stated in January 2011 that African member states “should ensure that 
the position of the ICC Prosecutor goes to an African.”237 In 2012, the AU further expressed 
regret over the unsuccessful African proposals for judgeships238 and urged its member states to 
push for more African representation on the bench.239 
 
ICC Voice: Rome Statute and Immunity of Heads of State 
The main critique of the Court originated with the provisions in the Rome Statute about 
head of state immunity. While states signed the Rome Statute knowing that official capacity does 
not excuse a person from being investigated by the Court, the debate emerged in 2010 around the 
immunity of state officials who are third parties, i.e. Sudan and the al-Bashir arrest warrant.240 In 
the following years, the AU took several steps to express concerns about the removal of 
immunity for al-Bashir, which the organization regards as a violation of customary IL. In 
January 2012, the AU Assembly reaffirmed its understanding that “Article 98(1) was included in 
the Rome Statute […] out of recognition that the Statute is not capable of removing an immunity 
which international law grants to the officials of States that are not parties to the Rome Statute, 
and by referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC, the UN Security Council intended that the 
Rome Statute would be applicable, including Article 98.”241 The Assembly also supported a 
decision by African Justice Ministers and Attorneys General to approach the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) through the UNGA, “for seeking an advisory opinion on the question of 
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immunities, under international law, of Heads of State and senior state officials from States that 
are not Parties to the Rome Statute of ICC.”242 Moreover, the Assembly encouraged individual 
states to conclude bilateral agreements on the immunities of their senior state officials. This of 
course is a similar suggestion to the BIAs concluded by the USA in the early 2000s, which was 
then seen very critically by African states even though many concluded the BIAs for fear of 
losing essential US financial support. 
At the extraordinary AU summit on the ICC in October 2013, the Assembly went further 
in its statements and decided that “no charges shall be commenced or continued before any 
International Court or Tribunal against any serving AU Head of State or Government or anybody 
acting or entitled to act in such capacity during their term of office.”243 With regard to the 
ongoing trials against Kenyan officials, the Assembly stated that the trials against Kenyatta and 
Ruto “should be suspended until they complete their terms of office,” and in a confrontational 
approach that for the first time made Kenya’s compliance conditional on the ICC honoring the 
AU’s demands, the decision stressed that Kenyatta would not appear before the Court until AU 
concerns were addressed.244 This conditional approach was reiterated in 2015 when the AU 
Assembly requested the ICC to terminate or suspend the proceedings against Ruto “until the 
African concerns and proposals for amendments of the Rome Statute of the ICC are 
considered.”245 
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Non-ICC Voice: Inaction and Lack of Respect by the United Nations 
Apart from critiques about the Court and its immediate decisions and conduct, the AU 
also expressed frustration with the UN and its repeated failure to act according to the AU’s 
desires. Several decisions urged the UNSC to defer various cases for a year, given their adverse 
effects on the ground, leading the AU to send high-level delegations to the UNSC.246 These 
statements usually went hand in hand with calls for unity among AU member states: the 
Assembly “underscores the need for African States Parties to speak with one voice to ensure that 
the interests of Africa are safeguarded.”247 The early frustration with UN inaction is used as 
justification for the 2009 non-cooperation decision for al-Bashir’s arrest.248 The UNSC’s inaction 
upset the AU so much that South Africa proposed an amendment to Art. 16 at the ASP, which 
the AU supported.249 This amendment would allow the UN General Assembly to defer ICC cases 
for a year if the UNSC fails to make a decision on the matter for six months. However, the ASP 
failed to adopt an amendment to that effect.250 
In 2014, the AU urged the UNSC again to respond to AU statements and wishes “so as to 
avoid the sense of lack of consideration of a whole continent.”251 The frustration culminated in 
early 2016 when the AU Assembly, after years of including identical language regretting the 
UN’s inaction, expressed “its deep grieve at the failure of the UNSC to respond to the requests of 
the AU for deferral of The Sudan and Kenyan cases for the past five (5) years.”252  	
                                                
246 For instance: Assembly of the African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.221(XII); Assembly of the African Union, 
Assembly/AU/Dec.296(XV); Assembly of the African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.334(XVI); Assembly of the 
African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.366(XVII); Assembly of the African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.482(XXI). 
247 For instance: Assembly of the African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.270(XIV): para. 6.  
248 Assembly of the African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII)Rev.1: para. 10. 
249 Assembly of the African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.270(XIV): para. 5.  
250 For an extensive treatment of Article 16 and the AU’s attempts to change it, see Akande, du Plessis and Jalloh 
2010. 
251 Assembly of the African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.493.(XXII): para. 8. 
252 Assembly of the African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.590(XXVI): para. 8. 
 112 
Exit: A Push for Withdrawal But Without Consensus  
The AU has openly discussed the possibility of collective withdrawal since 2013. In May 
2013, Kenyatta attended the AU summit for the first time as Kenyan President, bringing direct 
attention to the perceived contrast between popular sovereignty (as expressed by popular election 
of him as President) and the demands of international criminal justice (as expressed through his 
case at the ICC). In subsequent months, the AU sent letters to the ICC requesting the Court to 
allow the Kenyan officials to choose which sessions of their trials they want to attend given their 
constitutional duties in Kenya and that the ICC should refer the cases back to Kenya. The ICC 
judges’ reaction that these requests cannot be accommodated prompted the AU to hold an 
unprecedented extraordinary summit on the ICC in 2013 at the request of Kenya and the East 
African group. 
In her speech to the summit, AU Commission Chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
emphasized the importance of African solutions to African problems, praised Kenyatta and Ruto 
for their cooperation with the Court despite having immunity under IL, and she called on 
member states to strengthen the proposed African Court of Justice and Human Rights so that the 
ICC became the court of last resort. However, despite previous concerns by commentators, a 
mass withdrawal of African states from the Court did not happen in 2013.253 
Over the years, as the AU has consistently discussed and provided advice for countries on 
how to withdraw, whether individually or collectively, it has become clear that there is no 
consensus on the ICC in Africa. Some countries continue to support the Court and have 
prevented continent-wide exit strategies from being adopted. Generally, many countries in 
Western Africa continue to support the Court, most importantly Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal. In 
contrast, several East African countries have led the ‘anti-ICC’ movement, especially countries 
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whose leaders have been subject to investigations such as Sudan and Kenya. This difference of 
opinion on the Court has prevented a consensus view in Africa and casts doubt on common 
media tropes and the AU’s own depiction of representing the views of Africa on ICC matters. 
In January 2014, several months after the extraordinary summit, the Assembly decided 
that the AU and its member states “reserve the right to take any further decisions or measures 
that may be necessary in order to preserve and safeguard peace, security and stability, as well as 
the dignity, sovereignty and integrity of the continent,”254 which can be read as a threat of exit as 
a potential necessary measure to safeguard the continent’s dignity. The urgency for withdrawal 
increased over time as the AU recognized the need to design a comprehensive strategy given the 
legal and political hurdles and as a major former supporter of the Court, South Africa, joined the 
critical chorus of states after al-Bashir’s visit and escape from the country in June 2015. In 
January 2016, the AU requested the creation of a Ministerial Committee charged with “the 
urgent development of a comprehensive strategy including collective withdrawal from the ICC to 
inform the next action of AU Member States that are also parties to the Rome Statute.”255  
At the AU summit in January 2017, exit was on the agenda again but no continental 
consensus was achieved. The final AU decision welcomed the announced withdrawals by three 
African states, adopted a withdrawal strategy, and called on member states to consider 
implementing the strategy’s recommendations. 256 However, several countries entered formal 
reservations: Nigeria, Senegal, and Cape Verde entered reservations to the decision, Malawi, 
Tanzania, Tunisia, and Zambia requested more time to study the strategy, and Liberia entered a 
reservation to the paragraph that adopts the strategy.257 Compared with prior ICC-critical 
                                                
254 Assembly of the African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.493.(XXII): para. 9. 
255 Assembly of the African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.590(XXVI): para. 10iv. 
256 Keppler 2017. 
257 Assembly of the African Union, Assembly/AU/Draft/Dec.1(XXVIII)Rev.2. 
 114 
decisions adopted by the AU Assembly, never had this many states entered formal reservations. 
Thus, the fact that this exit statement prompted an unprecedented number of reservations 
emphasizes the disunity among African states on the ICC. Ultimately, even the withdrawal 
strategy is “not all it is cracked up to be.”258 The strategy does not call for mass withdrawal but 
notes that “[f]urther research on the idea of collective withdrawal, a concept that has not yet been 
recognized by international law, is required.” Nigerian foreign minister Geoffrey Onyeama 
expressed his support for the Court, arguing that it had “an important role to play in holding 
leaders accountable,” and that several African countries are “agitating against” exit.259 Other 
countries that have expressed loyalty to the Court back home in their own capitals, New York, 
and The Hague, include Senegal, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, 
Ghana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, and Botswana.260 
 
Solution: A Criminal Court for Africa 
The decision to create a court that could handle cases of human rights violations was 
taken before the ICC controversy started. In July 2004, the AU Assembly decided to integrate 
the African Court on Human and People’s Rights with the Court of Justice of the African 
Union.261 One year later, it decided that a draft legal instrument for the merged court should be 
completed for consideration and that “all necessary measures for the functioning of the Human 
Rights Court be taken.”262 In January 2007, the AU expressed satisfaction with the progress on 
the courts’ merger and that the AU Commission should establish contact with the host state of 
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Tanzania to secure the “swift installation” of the court in Arusha.263 The draft protocol of the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights was adopted in July 2008 with the AU 
calling on its member states to sign and ratify the statute “as expeditiously as possible” to enable 
its entry into force and “ensure speedy operationalization” of the court.264 
But the push for the merged court with jurisdiction over international crimes intensified 
after 2010 and after the ICC’s charges against al-Bashir and Kenyatta: “More importantly, the 
events galvanised AU’s resolve to establish an African regional criminal court to basically serve 
as a substitute and operate parallel to the ICC.”265 In June 2014, the AU adopted the Malabo 
Protocol, which extends the jurisdiction of the proposed merged African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights to international crimes such as those covered by the Rome Statute.266 However, 
the Protocol’s Article 46Abis raised eyebrows as it grants immunity from prosecution to sitting 
heads of state and other senior officials. As of November 2016, only five African states (Benin, 
Congo Brazzaville, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya and Mauritania) had ratified the Malabo Protocol, 
leaving the African Court on Human and People’s Rights as the only functioning AU court.267 In 
January 2014, the AU urged that the process for the African Court to hear international crimes 
should be sped up and reiterated this call in 2015268 and 2016.269  
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Conclusion 
The findings from the content analysis show a varied picture of state rhetoric about the 
ICC. Three findings from the UN analysis deserve special attention because they relate to the 
object of voice. Most criticisms relating to finance, for instance, were not of the Court itself but 
rather of an outside organization, the UNSC. Given the UNSC’s legal responsibility to share in 
the expenses of the ICC situations it refers, this criticism does not come as a surprise. In addition, 
the UNSC drew heavy critique for its lack of follow-up on state non-cooperation. A second 
surprising finding concerning the object of voice relates to states themselves. Rather than 
faulting the Court for lack of progress in cases, states constantly reminded each other and faulted 
other states for their lack of cooperation and failure to execute arrest warrants. 
These findings underscore that the object of loyalty (i.e. the Court or the underlying norm 
of individual criminal accountability) may be different from the ones a state blames for a 
perceived decline in quality, here the UNSC and states themselves. Considering this peer-to-peer 
voice as shaming might be a worthy subject of further exploration. The fact that peer-to-peer 
critique accounted for a large share of voice highlights the extent to which states are not only 
aware of the crucial importance of state assistance to the Court but also how lack of cooperation 
might hinder the Court’s work. This shaming of other state parties points to an important 
undertheorized aspect of ICC-state relations.270  
The AU stands out as a more critical venue than the UN where loyalty rhetoric accounts 
for a majority of references. The AU rather expressed more loyalty to the accountability norm in 
general rather than the ICC proper. In contrast, AU criticisms are more Court-centered and 
expressed frustrations over judicial decisions and the Court’s chief prosecutor. The contrast 
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showed that the AU is seen as the primary venue where grievances by African states were aired 
and concrete action was sought. At the UN, other African states expressed support for the ICC 
but their views found less expression in these AU decisions where states are more reluctant to 
enter reservations to decisions. At the AU, countries support non-cooperation and non-arrests 
while at the UN exits are regretted and non-cooperation criticized. Both the UN and AU analyses 
confirm that Africa is the Court’s most critical region: it is the only region with a slight majority 
of voice references at the UN, and at the AU, the pursuit of peace is foregrounded rather than the 
mutual attainment of peace and justice as it is at the UN. 
Two caveats are in order. The nature of the AU decisions differs from the UN speeches 
so it comes as no surprise that AU decisions do not express direct praise for the Court. These 
decisions are outcome documents so they can be seen as the smallest common denominator that 
negotiators were able to find consensus on. However, the fact that the only time several African 
countries entered reservations to an AU decision on the ICC was the 2017 decision to adopt a 
withdrawal strategy, highlights the lack of unity among African states on ICC exit. Second, as a 
UN body, the UNGA could be seen as an ‘easy’ case for ICC support. Hence, expressions of 
loyalty might be overrepresented in this chapter. UNSC criticism might also be overrepresented 
given that many UNGA members have been calling for reform of the UNSC given the power 
wielded by the P5. As such then, UNGA criticism of the UNSC may also be a result of inner-UN 
dynamics or relations between veto powers and less powerful states.  
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Chapter 4: South Africa and the Non-Arrest of Omar al-Bashir  
 
This chapter analyzes the government of South Africa’s (GSA)271 non-arrest of Sudanese 
President Omar al-Bashir during his visit to the country in June 2015 to attend the African Union 
(AU) summit. From 7-15 June 2015, South Africa hosted the summit in the posh Johannesburg 
neighborhood of Sandton. This summit drew its significance from the fact that it was the closest 
a country and a state party of the International Criminal Court (ICC, or the Court) has come to 
arrest al-Bashir. The episode of his presence in Sandton, lasting less than 48 hours, featured all 
ingredients of a Hollywood thriller: a branded fugitive, contradictory reports about his 
whereabouts, a last-minute court hearing, and an alleged government conspiracy to let the 
fugitive escape. In the aftermath, some deemed al-Bashir’s ‘escape’ to be the beginning of the 
end of South Africa’s constitutional democracy, given that the executive ignored a domestic 
court order and its international obligation to arrest an ICC suspect.272 From the perspective of 
the ICC, this episode was yet another example where a state party to the Court failed to execute 
the arrest warrant for al-Bashir. 
The chapter has three objectives. First, this chapter traces chronologically the GSA’s 
engagement with the Court over time. The analysis of various legal and non-legal means of 
engagement shows that South Africa was a strong early supporter of the Court but that its 
position shifted after 2009 as the GSA supported several ICC-critical decisions by the AU 
Assembly. When al-Bashir visited South Africa in 2015, the GSA was confronted with a 
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272 Tisdall 2015; Hoffman 2015; Greeff 2015. 
 119 
significant test of its commitment to the Court: comply with the ICC’s arrest warrant and arrest a 
fellow African leader or not arrest al-Bashir and justify the non-arrest with existing AU policy. 
Second, I explain the shift in position and the non-arrest with the changing calculations 
by the GSA and their regional reputation concerns. Since 1994, South African foreign policy has 
oscillated between strengthening its global reputation as a human rights-promoting country and 
its regional reputation as a good African neighbor. These identities have sometimes conflicted 
because of normative attachments to human rights and accountability on the one hand and to 
regional solidarity and quiet diplomacy that refrains from open criticism of fellow African 
leaders on the other hand. When faced with the loyalty conflict between its ICC commitment and 
its AU commitment, the GSA ultimately failed to arrest al-Bashir to cement its regional 
reputation. I argue that this reputation includes both material and social dimensions. First, 
aligning its stance with the AU signaled the GSA’s willingness to honor regional commitments, 
which can help with future support by fellow African countries for South African positions and 
initiatives. Second, complying with the AU non-cooperation policy helped the GSA to signal its 
prioritization of its African identity and associated norms, at a time when it was also facing 
criticism from the continent for its handling of xenophobic attacks in the country. Hence, there 
was a fundamental interest misalignment between the GSA and the ICC when al-Bashir visited 
South Africa in June 2015. 
This argument about shifting foreign policy ideas and regional reputation challenges 
several common compliance theories. In contrast to recent literature convincingly highlighting 
the role of domestic compliance explanations, these domestic factors were all present in South 
Africa, including a strong pro-compliance judiciary that decided on litigation pushed by a 
domestic pro-compliance group. However, this was not enough to compel the GSA to arrest al-
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Bashir. Based on the trajectory of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy and public 
officials’ statements from June 2015, I argue that we have to consider South Africa’s regional 
and international reputations to comprehend its actions. South Africa failed to arrest al-Bashir 
trying to cement its leading position in the AU—long critical of the ICC—and for this, was 
willing to flout its obligations to the ICC. 
Third, investigating the GSA’s non-arrest as well as the non-arrests of other African 
countries that have hosted al-Bashir since 2009 reveals the important role of the AU. By passing 
its non-cooperation policy in July 2009—calling on its member states to not cooperate with the 
ICC in the arrest of al-Bashir—the AU furnished African states with an alternative legal 
obligation to the ICC arrest warrants. Regardless of the IL status held by an AU Assembly 
decision, the non-cooperation policy has proved instrumental in hampering compliance with the 
arrest warrants. All African ICC states parties that failed to arrest al-Bashir have relied on the 
policy to explain their non-arrests. This suggests that the explanations I furnish here for the 
South African non-arrest have the power to travel to other African countries. The AU decision 
created a legal ‘out’ for the visited countries that chose regional loyalty over their international 
legal obligation to the ICC. 
To further these arguments, the chapter consists of three main empirical sections. The 
next section traces the GSA’s behavior toward the Court over time to identify mandatory and 
voluntary cooperation behavior. Afterwards, I explain the non-arrest by first illustrating the 
limited explanatory value of several common explanations to then focus on regional reputation 
concerns. I trace the GSA’s foreign policy since 1994 to highlight shifting priorities. The goal of 
the section is to provide a background for the explanation that the GSA has invested increasing 
attention to solidifying its regional status as a good African citizen. Capitalizing on three 
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regional arguments drawn from the existing ICC-critical discourse placed South Africa more 
squarely within the African ‘consensus’ on the Court’s role in Africa. Third, to gain a broader 
understanding of the al-Bashir case and the non-cooperation it sparked, I analyze the 
justifications put forth by other African countries that failed to arrest him. The final section lays 
out what we can learn from the episode about compliance more generally and the non-arrest of 
al-Bashir in particular.  
South Africa’s Engagement with the ICC 
To investigate why South Africa failed to comply with the al-Bashir arrest warrant in 
2015, the next sections will chronologically trace South Africa’s cooperation behavior toward 
the Court in years leading up to the non-arrest. Table 13 presents the various legal and non-legal 
means of engagement.  
 
Table 13: Overview of South Africa's Engagement with the ICC 
Government 
actions Institution and Norm Strengthening Institution and Norm Weakening 
Legal actions 
 
Ratification and implementation of the 
Rome Statute 
 
 Non-arrest of al-Bashir 
ASP amendment proposals (UNSC 
deferrals) 
 
Non-legal 
actions 
Encouraging other states to ratify and 
implement the Rome Statute 
Refusal to sign BIA with USA 
Pro-ICC actions and rhetoric at UN 
Opposing African mass withdrawal 
from ICC 
 
Tacit support for AU Assembly 
decisions  
ANC critique of the Court 
  
Figure 12 visualizes the cooperation context in which the GSA made its non-arrest 
decision. The figure shows the important mediating role of the AU. After al-Bashir was charged 
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by the ICC, Sudan and other ICC-critical African states started lobbying the AU to pass ICC-
critical decisions. The most important decision is the non-cooperation policy, passed in July 
2009, which calls on AU member states to not cooperate in the arrest of al-Bashir. This created 
non-cooperation pressure in the African countries which al-Bashir visited, confronting them with 
loyalty conflicts in which they had to choose between their commitment to the AU and their 
commitment to the ICC. South Africa chose its commitment to the AU, thus failing to comply 
with the ICC arrest warrant but complying with the AU’s non-cooperation policy instead.  
 
Figure 12: Cooperation Context for South Africa 
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Legal and Non-Legal Means: Early Support for the Court 
The years before the ICC’s creation were characterized by strong support for the idea of 
an independent court, both in South Africa, within the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), and from most African countries. Since 1993, South Africa had been active 
in the International Law Commission, charged with drafting a treaty for an international criminal 
court. South Africa also participated in the UN Preparatory Committee for the Court’s founding 
treaty, and from 1995 to 1997 was active in SADC consultative meetings, hosting, for instance, 
conferences to adopt negotiating principles for the Rome Conference where the treaty was 
finalized.273 SADC countries formed a negotiating bloc together to pool resources and attain a 
better negotiating position rather than speaking for their respective countries only.274 For 
instance, in September 1997, legal experts from SADC countries convened in Pretoria and 
adopted principles that would later form the basis of the negotiating ‘manual’ for SADC 
countries at the Rome Conference. One principle affirmed the need for an independent 
Prosecutor, “who should be able to initiate investigations and institute prosecutions on his or her 
own initiative and without influence from states or the Security Council, subject only to 
appropriate judicial scrutiny.”275 At the Rome Conference, SADC countries sat in different 
organs so as to ensure their positions were heard in all settings.276  
After signing the Rome Statute in July 1998, South Africa took proactive steps to 
implement the treaty domestically and to sway other African countries to do so as well. For 
instance, the GSA hosted a conference in June 1999 whose end product was a model 
implementation kit to be used by SADC member states to domestically implement the treaty. In 
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2002, South Africa became the first African ICC state party to pass domestic implementation 
legislation, and it established the Priority Crimes Litigation Unit to ensure the legislation’s 
effectiveness.277 Since its passage, the law has been widely used by domestic groups to bring 
suits in South African courts, and South African courts have emphasized the country’s legal 
obligations under IL.278   
Other strong signs of support for the Court were evident at the UN. When the UN 
Security Council (UNSC) passed resolution 1422 in 2002, which gave peacekeepers from non-
ICC member states immunity from ICC prosecution for one year,279 South Africa voiced 
opposition. It argued that US fears of the ICC investigating US peacekeepers are unfounded and 
that the ICC needs to be supported for it embodies an emerging norm: “We hope the Security 
Council will actively promote this emerging norm in international law. We urge the Security 
Council to stand firm and protect the peace mission in the Balkans, while reinforcing — certainly 
not jeopardizing — the International Criminal Court and the norms of international law it has 
established.”280 Two days later, South Africa joined together with Canada, New Zealand, and 
Brazil and criticized the resolution again. The letter, signed by South Africa’s Ambassador and 
Permanent UN Representative Dumisani Shadrack Kumalo, posited that the UNSC’s “action is 
damaging international efforts to combat impunity, the system of international justice and our 
collective ability to use these systems in the pursuit of international peace and security.”281 In 
June 2003, when the controversial resolution was renewed with Resolution 1487, 
Dumisani Kumalo again criticized it.282 
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Another strong sign of support for the Court was South Africa’s refusal to sign a Bilateral 
Immunity Agreement (BIA) with the United States. In the years after the Court’s establishment, 
the USA pressured states to sign BIAs to give US nationals immunity from ICC prosecution 
against the threat that US military aid to these countries would be cut.283 This decision created a 
net loss of $8.1 million over the 2004 and 2005 fiscal years for South Africa, amounting to “the 
most significant loss in military aid funding among African ‘refusers.’”284 A Cabinet statement 
justified the government’s firm position against the BIA in July 2003 with the country’s 
“commitment to the humanitarian objectives of the ICC and the country’s international 
obligation.”285 
These events illustrate the high support for the Court in its early years. The GSA engaged 
in legal actions at home by ratifying and implementing the Rome Statute but it went further by 
engaging in pro-Court diplomacy and trying to persuade other African states to follow suit. Not 
signing a BIA with the USA resulted in concrete monetary losses for the country and thus 
signifies a significant non-legal sign of support for the Court. In these early years of the Court’s 
existence, South Africa can be called a model cooperator. However, this changed over time as 
the AU became more critical of the ICC’s charges against sitting heads of state and the ANC 
grew more critical. Figure 13 visualizes the GSA’s shift in cooperation behavior over time that I 
expand on in the following sections.  
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Figure 13: Shift in South Africa's Engagement with the ICC 
 
 
2009-2015: Support for AU Non-cooperation Decisions but Promises to Arrest al-Bashir 
South Africa’s relationship with the ICC has become more ambivalent since 2009 when 
the ICC issued its first arrest warrant for al-Bashir. From 2009 on, South Africa at least tacitly 
approved AU Assembly decisions that called on the UNSC to delay the case and consider heads 
of state immune from prosecution. In July 2009, the AU issued its non-cooperation decision, 
stipulating that “AU Member States shall not cooperate pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 
of the Rome Statute of the ICC relating to immunities, for the arrest and surrender of President 
Omar Al-Bashir of The Sudan.”286 After civil society organizations (CSOs) criticized the GSA 
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for its support for the AU decision, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation 
felt obliged to publicly reconfirm the government’s commitment to the rule of law.287 
Despite the AU’s consensus decision making in the Assembly, they often mask 
disagreements between African states behind the scenes. On the one hand, South Africa’s 
continuous support for the AU’s ICC-critical positions suggests that the country has long been 
critical of the Court. However, the AU’s attention has focused exclusively on the ICC cases 
against sitting heads of state. In no decision does the AU admonish the Court for indicting the 
people it indicted. Rather it is only the cases against al-Bashir, Kenyatta and Ruto that draw the 
ire of the AU and result in critique of the Court. Moreover, and in line with official statements at 
UN meetings, African states’ criticism of the Court’s prosecution focus also draws from the 
actions of the UNSC and its failure to defer these African cases while failing to refer other 
critical situations to the Court. Thus, the often-lamented hostility of African states toward the 
Court mainly stems from 3 of its current docket of 24 cases in ten situations and the ICC’s 
relationship to the UNSC as a political actor.  
While supporting the AU Assembly decision on non-cooperation, the GSA fell short of 
inviting al-Bashir to its territory and continued to support the Court. On the occasion of President 
Jacob Zuma’s inauguration in 2009, al-Bashir was not invited, and South Africa clarified that he 
risked arrest should he enter the country.288 In 2010, al-Bashir was invited to the opening 
ceremony of the soccer World Cup in South Africa along with other African leaders, but he 
declined the invitation.289 It would later become important, that when al-Bashir left South Africa 
in June 2015, the GSA argued that these earlier instances were South African events and thus al-
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Bashir was not invited, while the 2015 visit was an AU summit for heads of state, which gave 
him immunity.290 
In another instance of Court support, the GSA helped Nigeria and others to thwart 
Kenya’s motion to have African countries withdraw en masse from the ICC at the AU summit 
meeting in October 2013.291 This support came despite the African National Congress’s (ANC) 
position against the Court.  South Africa’s main post-Apartheid political party had strongly 
advised the GSA to side with Kenya against the Court, arguing that “the ICC is representing 
inequality before the world justice where the weak is always wrong and the strong is always 
right.” 292 The ANC issued a first critical statement about the Court’s ‘selective prosecution’ 
during its 53rd National Conference in December 2012, urging the Court “to also pursue cases of 
impunity elsewhere, while engaging in serious dialogue with the AU and African countries in 
order to review their relationship” as well as calling on the UNSC to recognize African 
institutions’ work in conflict management.293  
The years between 2009 and 2015 were thus marked by an increasingly tense relationship 
between the AU and the ICC. South Africa joined AU Assembly decisions that called on AU 
member states not to cooperate in al-Bashir’s arrest and decisions for case deferrals for the al-
Bashir and Kenyatta cases. South Africa also introduced an amendment at the Assembly of 
States Parties (ASP) to amend the Rome Statute’s Article 16 regarding referrals to the Court by 
the UNSC. The proposed amendment would make it possible for the UN General Assembly to 
defer ICC cases for a year if the UNSC does not act. This, of course, has to be understood in 
light of the AU’s continued efforts to have the cases against al-Bashir and Kenyatta deferred, 
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without the UNSC acting accordingly. The UNGA, without the veto power of permanent 
members and potentially a majority of states echoing the AU’s calls, would have been a much 
more receptive arena for deferrals. The proposed change indicates a growing frustration in the 
GSA about the failure of the UNSC to act on behalf of the AU. However, it cannot be clearly 
interpreted as a sign of discontent with the ICC. 
Considering South Africa’s longstanding support for the Court but its support of AU 
decisions paints the picture of an ambivalent supporter, a country torn between its proclaimed 
support for human rights and accountability on the one hand and its obligation and solidarity 
with fellow African countries on the other hand. Scholars have noted the country’s oscillation—
difficult at times—between its guiding principles of human rights on the one hand and its critical 
role in the African renaissance and the norms of non-interference.294  
On the one hand, the examples of South African support for the ICC can be seen as signs 
of commitment to the norm of individual criminal accountability, which the Court encapsulates. 
In this view, the non-cooperation in June 2015 comes as a surprise and signals a policy shift. On 
the other hand, these examples can be seen as costless expressions of support. It can be argued 
that South Africa claimed support for the ICC when it was costless, but when confronted with 
costly action—the arrest of another African President—the country revealed its true preferences. 
In this view, the country’s non-cooperation does not signal a departure from prior policy but 
merely puts the country in the ‘cheap talkers’ category. While this cannot be convincingly settled, 
two examples represent prior costly action: South Africa’s regional efforts in negotiating for a 
strong ICC and implementing the Rome Statute, and the country’s refusal to sign a BIA with the 
US which only six other African countries did at the expense of losing US aid.295  
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The ICC also reminded the GSA of its obligation to execute the al-Bashir arrest warrant 
days before the AU summit in June 2015. In a series of legal steps and diplomatic meetings 
between ICC officials and the South African embassy in the Netherlands, the Court clarified that 
South Africa was under an obligation to arrest, even if an AU decision mandated otherwise.296  
 
Legal Means: Non-Compliance with ICC Arrest Warrants for al-Bashir 
This preceding section suggests that the South African executive was still supportive of 
the ICC in 2015 despite the ANC’s critique of the Court and pressure to echo the AU’s position. 
The issue became front and center when African leaders met in Johannesburg in June 2015 to 
discuss pressing continental concerns. On Saturday, 13 June, rumors emerged that al-Bashir was 
seen at Sandton’s International Convention Center (ironically, the abbreviation is ICC), and 
reports of his presence were later confirmed. Amidst speculation about his presence, the CSO 
Southern Africa Litigation Center (SALC) filed an urgent application with the North Gauteng 
High Court to have the GSA arrest al-Bashir in compliance with South Africa’s international 
obligations under the Rome Statute.297 On Sunday, Gauteng High Court Judge Fabricius issued 
an interim order instructing the government to inform all South African ports of entry/exit that 
al-Bashir is to be prevented from leaving the country until another court hearing would 
determine whether he should be detained.298 
According to the GSA’s affidavit this court order was partially complied with as the 
Director of Home Affairs confirmed that he informed all ports of exit and received their 
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confirmation.299 However, after the GSA filed its response on Monday morning (15 June) before 
the second court hearing took place, al-Bashir’s plane had already left South Africa, with 
pictures of his plane leaving Waterkloof air force base appearing on social media. Hours later, 
the court ultimately ruled in favor of SALC and decided that Bashir should have been arrested. 
On behalf of the High Court, Judge Mlambo ruled that the government’s failure to arrest al-
Bashir had defied the country’s Constitution.300  
The episode had repercussions in the following weeks and months. Some deemed the 
non-arrest the beginning of the end of South Africa’s constitutional democracy, given that the 
executive ignored a domestic Court order and its international obligation to arrest an ICC suspect. 
Some news reports suggested that the GSA had held secret meetings with key ministers to 
arrange for al-Bashir’s successful ‘escape’ from the country,301 which the government denied. 302 
In its affidavit, the GSA explained that the Sudanese presidential plane was moved Sunday night 
from a commercial airport to Waterkloof air force base without the usual paperwork involved in 
moving a foreign nation’s plane to a military base, and that al-Bashir’s passport was not among 
the passports presented to immigration officials before departure.303  
When the judges considered the issue again on 24 June 2015, they invited the head of the 
National Prosecuting Agency to consider pressing criminal charges for government officials 
given the disregard of the Constitution. According to Judge President Dunstan Mlambo, “[a] 
court is the guardian of justice, the corner-stone of a democratic system based on the rule of law. 
If the State, an organ of State or a state official does not abide by court orders, the democratic 
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edifice will crumble stone-by-stone until it collapses and chaos ensues.”304 On 15 March 2016, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal affirmed the High Court’s decision.305 After assessing both sides’ 
arguments on head-of-state immunity under customary IL, the Rome Statute, the host agreement 
between South Africa and the AU, as well as South Africa’s domestic legislation, Judge 
Malcolm Wallis concluded that: 
when South Africa decided to implement its obligations under the Rome 
Statute by passing the Implementation Act it did so on the basis that all forms 
of immunity, including head of state immunity, would not constitute a bar to 
the prosecution of international crimes in this country or to South Africa 
cooperating with the ICC by way of the arrest and surrender of persons 
charged with such crimes before the ICC, where an arrest warrant had been 
issued and a request for cooperation made.306  
 
While some ANC members openly talked about withdrawing from the Court, the 
executive walked a more careful path but indicated its wish to reform the Court. Deputy Minister 
Obed Bapela said that it is ANC policy “that we remain a member of the ICC [but], given the 
recent events, we must review our position whether [our] membership is yielding its goals, or has 
the ICC been sidetracked and hijacked by forces that are anti-progress.”307 
The relationship between the ICC and South Africa as well reactions in South Africa to 
the non-arrest highlight the various domestic actors involved in compliance. Rather than one 
‘state interest,’ several interests can be identified: The South African judiciary and human rights 
groups sided with the ICC’s position that South Africa was primarily bound by its Rome Statute 
obligation to arrest al-Bashir, regardless of the AU’s non-cooperation policy. In contrast, the 
executive aligned itself with the AU and ANC position against the Court. The ANC subsequently 
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became more critical of the Court. In a discussion document published after the al-Bashir visit, 
the ANC deplored that since 2012 “the ICC has continued to attack African countries” and 
“arrogantly insists on African countries to execute ICC warrants of arrests which are not 
recognised by the African Union. South Africa was not spared by this arrogance when President 
Al-Bashir visited our country for the June 2015 Summit of the African Union to the point that 
the ANC decided on reviewing South Africa’s membership of this organisation.”308 Noting the 
Court’s divergence from its original mandate, the ANC highlighted the different obligations the 
country has vis-à-vis the AU and individual African states such as Sudan. In its most critical 
statement so far, the ANC noted: 
There is no national interest value for South Africa to continue being a member 
of the ICC. The manner that we were treated around the al-Bashir incident is 
consistent with the cheeky arrogance that Africa has experienced in its 
interaction with the ICC. Continuing to be in the ICC especially when the big 
powers who are calling the shots are themselves not members, gives it the 
legitimacy it does not deserve. The West dominates the ICC through the 
influence they command within its structures and the huge financial 
contributions they make to its budget. In return, they use the ICC as their tool 
for regime change in Africa.309 
 
These domestic repercussions are intimately tied to South Africa’s announcement in 
October 2016 that it intended to withdraw from the ICC. The GSA’s withdrawal notice 
emphasized the legal controversy surrounding head-of-state immunity and its adverse effects on 
peace efforts: South Africa’s “obligations with respect to the peaceful resolution of conflicts at 
times are incompatible with the interpretation given by the International Criminal Court of 
obligations contained in the Rome Statute.”310 Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
Michael Masutha explained that the South African ICC Act and the Rome Statute “compel South 
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Africa to arrest persons who may enjoy diplomatic immunity under customary international law 
but who are wanted by the court.”311 By withdrawing from the Court and leading the African 
exodus from the ICC, the GSA was also able to bolster its reputation and image as a continental 
leader: “Taking the lead in the call to withdraw from the ICC offers South Africa the rare 
opportunity to deepen its growing influence on the continent ahead of regional competitors such 
as Nigeria who are against the idea. In the end, it comes down to South Africa making a choice 
between building on its international soft power mileage by staying in the ICC or developing its 
soft power leverage in Africa.”312 
Since the withdrawal announcement, legal experts had questioned whether withdrawal by 
executive action is even constitutional given that the public and parliament were neither notified 
nor consulted.313 Proponents of the ICC and the international criminal justice project have 
criticized South Africa,314 fearing that the decision and similar announcements by Burundi and 
Gambia set the stage for a domino effect of African exits from the ICC.315 On 22 February 2017, 
the North Gauteng High Court decided that the withdrawal notice was indeed unconstitutional 
and thus invalid because the parliament had not been consulted. The ruling criticized the 
“unexplained haste” with which the withdrawal notice was deposited with the UN as “procedural 
irrationality” and that the executive’s decision to withdraw without prior parliamentary consent 
amounted to a breach of the separation of powers.316 The executive was instructed to revoke the 
withdrawal. On 7 March 2017, the executive officially withdrew from the withdrawal by 
notifying the UN to “revoke the Instrument of Withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the 
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International Criminal Court with immediate effect” in order to “adhere to the said 
judgement.”317 This withdrawal from the exit leaves it unclear at this point whether the GSA is 
merely seeking exit through proper channels involving parliament or whether the entire exit plan 
has been abandoned.  
When asked to explain the non-arrest at the ICC in April 2017, the GSA gave a “spirited 
defense”318 of its behavior in 2015. The GSA’s legal team argued that “[t]here is no duty under 
international law and the Rome Statute to arrest a serving head of state of a non-state-party such 
as Omar al-Bashir.”319 In contrast to the ICC’s standing argument that the UNSC resolution, 
which referred the Darfur case to the ICC, had removed al-Bashir’s immunity, Dladi argued that 
the UNSC resolution only obliged Sudan to arrest him, adding that “pushing those obligations on 
other countries was a ‘recipe for anarchy.’”320 The Court’s judges will make a decision on 
whether to issue a ruling of non-compliance against South Africa before the summer recess 
2017.321 
The previous sections have chronologically traced the GSA’s engagement with the Court. 
Since the 1990s, South Africa has been a strong supporter of the Court, engaging in Court-
supportive diplomacy in the southern African region and refusing to sign a BIA with the US. 
However, the support became more subdued after the ICC’s 2009 arrest warrant for al-Bashir 
after which the GSA supported ICC-critical AU decisions, and engaged in efforts to change 
UNSC deferral procedures through the ASP. When al-Bashir visited South Africa in 2015, the 
GSA was for the first time confronted with a direct conflict of obligations. 
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Why Did South Africa Fail to Comply with the ICC Arrest Warrants? 
I argue that when al-Bashir visited South Africa, the country faced a loyalty conflict. It 
was an instance where a commitment to a global institution was directly opposed to commitment 
to a regional organization. On the one hand, South Africa was subject to non-cooperation 
pressure from the AU to not arrest al-Bashir, in line with the 2009 AU decision. Acting in line 
with that policy allowed South Africa to avoid the regional reputation costs of arrest, potentially 
declining relationships with fellow African countries or future lack of continental support for 
South African positions and projects. 
On the other hand, this rationalist reputation explanation only gets us part of the way. 
South Africa also could have supported the ICC, arrested al-Bashir and would have been 
celebrated for that choice by the ICC, domestic groups, human rights activists, and likely 
thousands of victims in Darfur. It would have further strengthened the Western image of South 
Africa as a strong supporter of a human rights-based foreign policy that Nelson Mandela 
proclaimed in the early 1990s. Thus, these potential benefits of compliance with the ICC cannot 
tell us why South Africa would value its regional commitment over its global commitment to 
accountability and human rights.  
I argue that South Africa valued its regional reputation more than its global reputation as 
a human rights promoting country. The African continent is South Africa’s primary peer group. 
South Africa placed more emphasis on its good standing among African countries and in African 
institutions. This argument is the social dimension of reputation, where the benefits of adhering 
to an agreement, here the AU non-cooperation decision, go beyond the material benefits outlined 
in the previous paragraph. In addition to the material future benefits from the AU, South Africa’s 
compliance with AU policy also sent important signals to the continent about its commitment to 
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being a good African neighbor. Aside from reputation, choosing AU commitment over ICC 
commitment also aligns with South Africa’s foreign policy ideas, developed over the past 20 
years, which have increasingly focused on continental integration and progress. Table 14 
presents these explanations. 
 
Table 14: Overview of Compliance Explanations in South Africa 
 
Alternative Explanations 
Several compliance approaches discussed in Chapter 2—capacity, domestic pro-
compliance groups, legitimacy—merit much attention but fail to explain South Africa’s non-
arrest convincingly. In many ways, South Africa was a poster child for compliance, making its 
non-arrest both surprising and troubling to many.322 South Africa invested heavily in the Court in 
the years following its establishment and, even after the AU and several African countries 
became more vocal in their criticism, the GSA still took actions supportive of the Court. It 
featured most of the assets we associate with compliance, including a strong, independent 
judiciary, democratic institutions, domestic capacity, strong pro-compliance civil society, 
domestic implementation legislation, and a strong pro-ICC public stance by the government. 
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 Compliance Non-compliance 
International 
level 
International pressures 
Enforcement 
Legitimacy of rule and institution  
(lack of compliance factors) 
 
Domestic level  Compliance constituencies 
Democratic values and 
institutions  
(lack of compliance factors) 
Non-compliance 
constituencies 
Lack of state capacity 
Regional reputation 
concerns 
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Considering the domestic-level factors described above, South Africa represents a ‘likely’ 
case for compliance as it features the institutions and actors commonly associated therewith. 
South Africa has one of the world’s most progressive constitutions, with an extensive Bill of 
Rights and independent offices to check governmental conduct, such as the public protector. 
According to the Polity IV index, South Africa’s democracy score is 9 out of 10, indicating a 
consolidated democracy.323 Moreover, South Africa ranks among the top 10 performing 
countries in overall governance in Africa.324 However, many social and governance problems 
remain as the country continues to struggle with high inequality and corruption. For instance, the 
Constitutional Court decided in 2016 that President Zuma had failed to defend the Constitution 
when he disregarded orders to repay federal funds he had used for upgrades to his private 
estate.325 
Despite corruption, the country’s judiciary has remained staunchly independent and 
continues to defend itself from political interference. In 2015, for instance, Chief Justice 
Mogoeng Mogoeng initiated a meeting between senior judges, Zuma and cabinet ministers to 
discuss the relationship between the executive and the judiciary after ANC and Communist Party 
leaders accused the judiciary of overreach.326 South Africa also has a robust nonprofit sector, 
another indicator of a strong democracy. In 2014/2015, South Africa had 136,453 registered 
nonprofit organizations, an increase of 86 percent since 2009/2010.327 
The country also has significant domestic capacity. South Africa was the first African 
country to pass domestic legislation to implement the Rome Statute, while other African states’ 
limited capacity has hindered them from doing so. South Africa’s bureaucratic efficiency ranks 
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in the top quartile alongside the US, Canada and Australia.328 During al-Bashir’s visit in June 
2015, these pro-compliance factors worked together when the SALC sought to hold the 
government accountable to its Rome Statute treaty obligation. 
The next section provides background on South Africa’s foreign policy trajectory since 
1994. The objective of the section is to highlight the recurring tension between the country’s 
efforts to strengthen its global reputations as a human rights supporting country and an 
increasing emphasis on an Africa-centered foreign policy, a continental identity that emphasizes 
its links to the continent while being more assertive against the West. 
 
South Africa’s Foreign Policy post-1994: Solidifying the Country’s Regional Reputation 
The regional and international influence of post-apartheid South Africa has been 
complicated by its apartheid legacy as well as its economic weight and middle power status. 
Under apartheid, the country pursued destabilization policies in other African states, formed 
institutions to cement its own disproportionate economic power, and supported ‘albinocracies’ in 
the region under the Pax Pretoriana.329 In other words, South Africa saw itself and was seen by 
other African states as a European outpost on the continent, which has “left profound scars on its 
neighbours and a distrust even of a black-led government that will take decades to overcome.”330  
During apartheid, the AU’s predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, represented a 
counterweight to South Africa with “African leaders agree[ing] that South Africa and the explicit 
racism of its apartheid policy signified a threat to Africa’s overall peace and prosperity.”331  This 
apartheid legacy continues to shape the country’s historical and contemporary role on the 
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continent and is one reason why South Africa “has generally been unable to overcome the 
continental constraint of African unity, even if it wished to.”332 Consequently, the South African 
government has been wary of being seen as assertive and dominant by other African states. 
On the one hand, the country boasts all ingredients of a middle power. It is an economic 
giant in southern Africa, boasting a 9:1 trade balance with its neighbors and accounting for 80% 
of the regional economy, as well as providing high foreign direct investment into other African 
countries. Acting like an emerging regional hegemon and middle power that uses institution-
building to cement its preferred policy beliefs,333 post-apartheid South Africa has stirred 
continental debates about the proper role of Africa in international organizations, via the African 
Renaissance, the formulation of the New Partnership for African Development, the creation of 
the AU, and efforts to expand the trade and security portfolio of the SADC. These actions “all 
speak to South Africa’s ambitions to realise a hegemonic presence on the continent.”334 
However, all these initiatives have not created a strong following among other African 
states.335 The first years of post-apartheid South Africa were marked by what some call 
‘inconsistent’ foreign policy, characterized by ad hoc and unpredictable reaction to crises and a 
high degree of personalization under Mandela; all of this met with critique from African states. 
One early foreign policy crisis that tarnished the newly democratic country’s image in Africa 
was Mandela’s unsuccessful attempt to rally African support against the Abacha regime in 
Nigeria.336 After Ogoni campaigners had been hanged in Nigeria in November 1995, Mandela 
called for the imposition of oil sanctions, collective action by SADC against Nigeria, and argued 
for Nigeria’s expulsion from the Commonwealth. However, not a single southern African state 
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supported South Africa’s endeavor. Instead, South Africa “was accused by many African leaders 
of sowing seeds of division in Africa and undermining African solidarity.”337 This episode 
impacted Mbeki’s later policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ toward Zimbabwe because “Africa’s 
depiction of South Africa as a western stooge over Nigeria was a traumatic experience that the 
country’s leaders were determined never to repeat.”338 
Moreover, South Africa’s first peacekeeping mission (or intervention) in Lesotho in 
September 1998 stirred opposition from neighboring and other African states. Lesotho’s Prime 
Minister Pakalitha Mosisili had asked the leaders of Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe to send troops into Lesotho to restore peace after a contested election had resulted in 
widespread rioting and mutiny in the Lesotho Defence Force. Together with Botswana, South 
Africa sent 700 soldiers. While SADC depicted the mission as a peacekeeping mission, its 
legality remains controversial, as does the ‘humanitarian’ motive behind South Africa’s 
action.339 Likoti argued that intervention was more in line with realist imperative—South Africa 
seeking to secure water access in Lesotho, including a joint dam—as well as lacking 
authorization from the UNSC. The intervention lasted until May 1999, resulting in the 
destruction of the capital city Maseru. Its legitimacy remains “widely questioned”340 and revived 
fears of South African domination in the region.341 These examples highlight the potential 
reputation costs of a South African foreign policy that diverges from common regional positions. 
Of regional importance is also South Africa’s role in the AU, which former South 
African President Thabo Mbeki helped to create and in which South Africa sought leadership 
during the past decade. Mbeki espoused the concept of African Renaissance, signaling a deeper 
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commitment to Africa after Mandela—widely loved by the West—had been perceived by some 
as less committed to Africa.342 Mbeki thus introduced “a more Africanist hue to South African 
politics” which has “helped facilitate South Africa’s integration in Africa after a period in which, 
fairly or unfairly, it was perceived by important sectors of continental opinion as essentially a 
Western state in its political and economic outlook and a proxy for Western interests.”343 When 
the OAU was transformed into the AU in the early 2000s Mbeki played a key role “spearheading 
the continental integration process on various levels.”344 Mbeki became the AU’s first 
Chairperson, the leading advocate for the African Peer Review Mechanism, he pushed for the 
Pan-African Parliament to be located in South Africa and the NEPAD Secretariat can be found in 
Midrand, South Africa.345 This push for the AU and integration initiatives was, according to 
Welz, “watched like a hawk by fellow African leaders: he was perceived as a bully, a head of 
state who stubbornly wanted to push his conceptions through.”346  
Under Zuma, while the country remains committed to the AU, it does so with less vigor 
than under Mbeki. Since 2009, the Zuma administration has continued to focus on Africa, but 
has shown an increasing affinity for BRICS diplomacy and anti-global North rhetoric.347 Zuma’s 
vote to abolish the SADC Tribunal348 and his support for ousted Ivorian president Laurent 
Gbagbo suggest a limited interest in the promotion of good governance when that goal interferes 
with regional alliances. Zuma has also pursued a more assertive role on the continent. His efforts 
to install Dlamini-Zuma as AU Commission chairperson went against the unspoken rule that the 
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position should not be assumed by a big power. Moreover, he has readily deployed more troops 
in Africa, for instance, in a failed mission in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2013 and in 
support of the SADC’s mission in the DRC.349 
In addition to these regional interests, South Africa has also sought to assume a leading 
role as an African representative in global institutions. Its effort to gain a permanent seat on the 
UNSC was seen critically in Africa, as a break from the Ezulwini Consensus, that showed South 
Africa’s ambitions as a nation, rather than unity for the continent.350 In 2010, South Africa was 
invited to join the BRICS of emerging economies despite its relative lack of economic prowess 
compared to Brazil, Russia, India, and China. It is also the only African country to be a member 
of the G20. In the UN, the country held a seat as non-permanent member on the UNSC twice. 
During its UNSC tenures in 2007-2008 and 2011-2012, South Africa worked to expand the 
cooperation between the UN and the AU in the regional organization’s efforts to deal with 
regional threats to peace and security.351 While it voted mostly in conformity with the Council, 
South Africa often worked to water down resolutions that insisted on human rights or toward 
resolving critical issues in forums other than the UNSC, including the often-lamented opposition 
to resolutions condemning neighboring Zimbabwe and Myanmar.352 These positions surprised 
many Westerners who associated the country with its 1994 promise of a human rights based 
foreign policy. However, it is important to note that “Pretoria’s dominant geopolitical and 
ideological reference group resides in the non-West amongst emerging powers and the global 
South, including AU member states.”353 
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While South Africa’s position has been described as that of a ‘regional hegemon’ in 
southern Africa, the lack of a continental hegemon in Africa means that even wealthy states, 
such as Nigeria and South Africa, “encounter great difficulties much of the time in turning their 
size and wealth into effective diplomatic influence.”354 One legacy of colonialism and the Cold 
War has been a deep resentment against powerful states. Consequently, wealthy African states 
often struggle to get support for their positions and African states often mobilize against potential 
hegemony seekers.355  
al-Bashir’s 2015 visit occurred at a time when South Africa was facing criticism from 
other African states. Four years earlier (March 2011), South Africa had supported UNSC 
Resolution 1973 authorizing ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians in Libya, widely 
interpreted in other African capitals as South Africa voting with the West to support regime 
change on the continent.356 Then, just months before the al-Bashir visit, widespread attacks 
occurred against African migrants in South Africa, drawing the ire of African nations whose 
citizens were attacked.357 Nigeria withdrew its envoys from South Africa, and Economic 
Community of West African States chairman John Mahama remarked that “it was so unfortunate 
that the very people, whose nations sacrificed to help South Africans fight, repel and defeat 
apartheid, were now today considered aliens and hacked to death.”358 Thus, South Africa was in 
a difficult regional position in June 2015 when al-Bashir decided to attend the AU summit. 
The paragraphs above show that South Africa has taken on prominent tasks in Africa as a 
middle power. However, these actions have not always resulted in praise by fellow African states. 
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The GSA’s foreign policy has been characterized by a delicate balance between its powerful 
status on the African continent and a deep suspicion from that same region. While Mandela 
(mostly) undertook a principled foreign policy, often against the consensus of fellow African 
countries, foreign policy under Mbeki and Zuma has become more pragmatic and in line with 
continental positions. This can be seen in the declining value placed on democracy promotion in 
Africa since the Mbeki presidency, as evidenced by support for undemocratic regimes in Angola, 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe.359 This historical overview highlights several foreign policy priorities 
that the GSA has been increasingly committed to: continental peacemaking and stability, a non-
confrontational diplomacy toward autocrats and those considered pariahs by the West, and an 
anti-imperialist world order in which the global South is given equal treatment.360 These 
priorities, in line with the ANC’s foreign policy doctrine, provide the lens through which to 
understand South Africa’s non-arrest of al-Bashir in 2015. 
By highlighting their role, I do not suggest that it is only regional considerations that 
drove the GSA’s behavior. Domestically, two factors help explain the origin of these foreign 
policy priorities. Most important among the domestic constraints on foreign policy making are 
the historical alliances between the ANC and other liberation movements in Africa, which makes 
open criticism of their regimes politically controversial for South Africa. The ANC is constantly 
balancing its anti-imperialist roots based on a liberation ethos with its democratic and human 
rights ethos.361 Both identities can conflict and sometimes the former can trump the latter in 
foreign policy decision-making.362 Moreover, South Africa continues to suffer from the legacy of 
apartheid in the form of economic inequality, prompting its leaders to emphasize the benefits of 
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African economic development to address domestic needs. This continental development goal 
can also stymie a purely human rights-focused foreign policy. 
 
Interest Misalignment and Regional Reputation Concerns 
I argue that we can explain the non-arrest through the lens of South Africa’s foreign 
policy and its interest in a good reputation among fellow African countries. During al-Bashir’s 
visit, South Africa was forced to choose between loyalty to two norms and international 
organizations, each associated with different audiences. The accountability norm, associated with 
the ICC and Western states, is institutionalized through South Africa’s ICC membership and 
domestic implementation of the Rome Statute. The arrest of al-Bashir would have resulted in 
praise from these actors, ending a seven-year period in which al-Bashir has evaded 
accountability. The non-cooperation norm in the arrest of al-Bashir363 is associated with the AU 
and institutionalized in AU Assembly decisions that South Africa supported. Arresting an 
African president in line with the ‘anti-African’ ICC directive would likely have tarnished South 
Africa’s reputation and resulted in harsh opprobrium from the AU, African states and fellow 
emerging countries, many of them not ICC states parties. 
This reputation argument has a material and a social dimension. In terms of material 
reputation concerns, arresting a fellow African leader would likely have severely impacted the 
GSA’s reputation in Africa. These countries would likely have withheld support for South 
African positions and initiatives in bilateral relations and in the AU. South Africa is also tied 
economically to the states in southern Africa, especially fellow SADC members. These 
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economic ties have contributed to the GSA’s support for autocratic regimes in the region.364 
Thus, material reputation concerns about the economic repercussions from an arrest also 
impacted the South African executive’s non-arrest decision.365  
In terms of social reputation, South Africa solidified its reputation as a trustworthy 
African ‘citizen’ by complying with the AU non-cooperation policy. Since 1994, the country has 
tried to solidify leadership in the AU as well as bolster its position as ‘Africa’s leading nation’ in 
global institutions. In 2012, the GSA succeeded in having its own candidate Dlamini-Zuma 
become the AU Commission’s chairperson, making it less likely that South Africa will take 
positions different from those of the AU.366  
Thus, there was a fundamental interest misalignment between the GSA and the ICC in 
terms of signaling commitment to relevant peer groups and securing future benefits. Arresting an 
African leader in support of an international organization was not in line with South Africa’s 
interests. Not arresting al-Bashir due to reputation concerns also helps explain the country’s 
withdrawal from the ICC: Just as non-arrest signaled the country’s commitment to Africa over its 
global reputation, withdrawal let its African neighbors know “where its commitment lies. 
Knowing that it commands greater influence within the continent, Pretoria is able to use this 
opportunity to mend broken fences and address accusations and counter-accusations of 
harbouring interests that transcend those of the continent.”367  
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The South African Executive’s Political Arguments for Non-Arrest 
While the government’s main public reasons for letting al-Bashir escape were of a legal 
nature—immunity for al-Bashir as sitting head of state of a non-ICC member state, his visit to an 
AU summit rather than a South African event, and competing legal obligations between the AU 
decisions advocating for al-Bashir’s non-arrest compliance and the Rome Statute—the South 
African executive also advanced several political arguments, all of which involve regional 
politics. Statements by government officials surrounding the al-Bashir visit suggest that three 
regional considerations influenced the GSA’s decision: 1. An arrest would have negative 
implications for the GSA’s relationship with other African countries, 2. An arrest would have a 
negative impact on regional peace efforts in Sudan, and 3. An arrest would lend support to a 
Court that lacks regional legitimacy due to selective prosecution. Various African countries and 
the AU have advanced these arguments before. Thus, the South Africa executive capitalized on 
an existing discourse that questioned the Court’s operation and utility for Africa. 
Deputy Minister Obed Bapela, the head of the ANC’s international relations sub-
committee, is quoted as saying that had al-Bashir been arrested in South Africa, “[w]e would 
have been seen as lackeys of the West. We had to choose between the unity of Africa and the 
ICC and we chose Africa. We said we can deal with the ICC later.”368 Moreover, he is 
paraphrased as saying that “unity of the continent was hanging in the balance when the Southern 
Africa Litigation Centre asked the Court to force the government to arrest al-Bashir.” John 
Jeffery, Deputy Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development, echoed these statements: 
Had al-Bashir been arrested during the summit, there would have been “extreme consequences in 
the region.”369 Drawing an analogy to George W Bush’s visit to South Africa and the potential 
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move to not let him leave the country under the UN Convention Against Torture and the South 
African Prevention of Torture Act, Jeffery asked “do we think the US would have just stood idly 
by and waited?” 
A related argument against the ICC emphasizes Africa’s development over the pursuit of 
justice. In this peace versus justice debate, the proponents of the peace argument, here brought 
forth by Bapela, argue that peace agreements should take precedent over seeking accountability. 
South Africa has long been involved in peace-making efforts in Sudan, using its tenures on the 
UNSC to pull the conflict away from the UNSC and toward the AU. Jordaan argued that this 
behavior “was also intended as a challenge to the West and an effort to keep them at bay.”370 In 
line with this previous assessment, Bapela stressed that since al-Bashir is a critical figure in 
settling the Darfur conflict, “[t]he ANC believes that our country should continue to support the 
African Union’s honest and sustained efforts at finding a peaceful solution to Sudan’s conflicts 
and efforts towards its democratisation. . . . The Sudanese people therefore need him in 
Khartoum and not The Hague!”371 Africa, as a continent experiencing much conflict, cannot 
afford to foreground justice when it needs peace first to develop. This seems to be the argument 
when he said: “The debate we ought to have in this parliament and every corner of our country is 
whether the ICC has not become a stumbling block for the achievement of peace and what the 
continent must do given the imperative for peace and stability which is the basis upon which the 
continent’s renewal is to be built.” In addition to being used as a tool by Western powers to keep 
Africa marginalized, the ICC’s pursuit of justice comes at the expense of peace, needed for the 
development of states and societies in Africa. 
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Several statements by government officials reveal that the South African executive 
shared in the AU’s critique of the Court’s lack of legitimacy. John Jeffery remarked that, while 
South Africa still believes in the Court’s underlying value of prosecuting perpetrators, its current 
institutional manifestation “is not the Court we signed up for.”372 Over the years, the ICC has 
“diverted from its mandate” and has come to be “influenced by powerful non-member states.” 
Echoing this critique is also Bapela who laments: “the ICC has also fallen victim of the geo-
political calculus of the powerful, who demand that it tries some cases while rejecting its 
involvement in others.”373 
Borrowing from existing arguments about the Court’s bias against Africans and its 
instrumental value for regime weakening in Africa through its European funders, the South 
African executive took advantage of this existing legitimacy problem. While the argument is not 
new, what is important in terms of legitimation is that the claim promises to portray the country 
as norm-abiding. This is so because the country reaffirmed its commitment to the underlying 
norm of the Court—individual criminal accountability—but what harms the Court’s legitimacy 
as the ultimate actor for this norm is its unfair application. By doing this, the GSA legitimized its 
own actions through pointing out the illegitimacy of the ICC. 
The episode highlighted the important role of institutional legitimacy and the need to 
legitimatize politically controversial decisions to various audiences. For the regional audience, 
the South African executive highlighted competing legal obligations between the ICC and the 
AU—loyalty to which organization—and utilizing the Court-critical discourse that has become 
mainstream within the AU and some African countries.374 Using the AU’s arguments of the 
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Court’s racial bias against Africans and its instrumental value for regime weakening in Africa 
through its European funders, the South African executive took advantage of existing ICC-
critical discourse and sided with what is widely perceived as the common African position on the 
Court. While it is incorrect to assert that all African states oppose the ICC, it is a useful rhetorical 
trope for the AU to depict it this way, suggesting its representation of a common African position. 
South Africa expressed its solidarity with a position depicted as the continental consensus. 
 
South Africa: One Case among Many Non-Arrests 
South Africa is not the only African country facing a loyalty conflict. While the arrest 
warrants are intended to try the suspect at the ICC and the enforcement burden lies on ICC 
member states, al-Bashir has traveled widely since 2009.375 The AU’s non-cooperation policy 
has created an environment in which al-Bashir’s non-arrest has become permissible. Between 
2009, when the first ICC arrest warrant was issued for him, and 2016, the Sudanese president 
visited eight ICC states parties without arrest: Chad, Kenya, Djibouti, Malawi, Nigeria, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Africa and Uganda. Table 15 presents an 
overview of al-Bashir’s travels. 
 
Table 15: Overview of al-Bashir Visits to African Countries 
Category Countries 
African ICC states parties 
who threatened arrest or 
where trips were canceled 
Botswana (2009), Uganda (2009), Central African 
Republic (2010), South Africa (2009, 2010), Zambia 
(2010), Malawi (2012) 
African ICC states parties 
he visited without arrest 
Chad (2010, 2011, 2013, 2014), Kenya (2010), Djibouti 
(2011), Malawi (2011), Nigeria (2013), DRC (2014), South 
Africa (2015), Uganda (2016) 
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In many respects South Africa is not unique among African ICC countries that have 
hosted al-Bashir. First, they have used the same arguments as South Africa used in 2015. Nigeria, 
Chad, the DRC, and Malawi submitted observations to the Court following their hosting of al-
Bashir.376 These countries explained their actions mostly with al-Bashir’s head of state immunity 
(Malawi, DRC, Chad) and that the AU’s non-cooperation policy prevented them from arresting 
him (DRC, Chad). Moreover, in striking resemblance to South Africa, they explained their non-
arrest with the fact that he attended an AU event rather than a national event (Nigeria). Nigeria 
and the DRC also bring forth time constraints as reasons, arguing that his visit was too short to 
allow the relevant national authorities to become active and act on the arrest warrant.  
Second, like in the South Africa case, statements by government officials suggest other 
political reasons behind the non-arrest. In public statements surrounding al-Bashir’s 2011 visit to 
Malawi, Mutharika’s government indicated that Malawi does not “have any business to do with 
the arrest of President Omar.”377 Other statements by the former President indicate a general 
opposition to the Court: “Why on earth should your leaders be dragged to the Hague when your 
judges are right here” and that ICC intervention means that African judges and judicial systems 
“would be seen to be admitting failure if they continue to allow its own leaders to appear before 
an international judiciary for offenses committed on the African continent.” 378 While Kenya’s 
official replies to the Court remain either absent or classified, official statements by the Kenyan 
government suggest opposition to the Court based on political reasons. Assistant Foreign 
Minister Richard Onyonka said: “Sudan’s stability is vitally linked to Kenya’s continued peace 
and well being.”379 Arresting al-Bashir would have had detrimental effects on regional peace 
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efforts. Moreover, Kenya’s transport minister Amos Kimunya clarified that “Kenyan interests 
must come first, regional interests come second and international interests come third.”380 In 
terms of legal reasons for the non-arrest, Onyonka is paraphrased as saying that the cooperation 
obligation to the ICC is “superseded by an African Union decision to not arrest and extradite 
Bashir.” While the country never explained its actions to the Court, officials’ statements point to 
regional political reasons as well as the AU’s non-cooperation policy. 
Third, all these visits prompted the same responses from the ICC. The Court’s pre-trial 
chamber(s) were alerted by the Registry or the OTP that a visit to a state party is imminent or 
that it happened recently, prompting the chambers to remind the countries of their cooperation 
obligation and then inviting them to submit official explanations about why the arrest warrants 
were not executed. Once a country submitted these, the Chamber has mostly found them in non-
compliance and refered them to the ASP, the ICC’s legislative body, or the UNSC. After Chad 
failed to file observations with the Court and did not consult prior to the visits, the Court’s Pre-
Trial Chamber II used starker language to reprimand the country for its “consistent pattern of 
deliberately disregarding not only the Court’s decisions and orders related to its obligation to 
cooperate in the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir” as well as Security Council Resolution 
1593(2005).381  
Apart from these similarities in judicial and political justifications, the South Africa visit 
is unique in the repercussions that followed. The extent to which this visit caused a public outcry 
and criticism from abroad and domestically makes South Africa stand out. Influential 
newspapers called the actions “disgraceful”382 and signaling the end of Mandela’s legacy.383 
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Critique also came from neighboring Botswana which found South Africa’s actions 
“disappointing” and stated that the “African Union should lead by example in this regard.”384 
However, there are no reports about other AU countries openly criticizing South Africa. The US 
expressed deep concern about the events, and the EU expressed its expectation that South Africa 
would “act in accordance with UN Security Council 1593, in executing the arrest warrant against 
any ICC indictee present in the country.”385 Possible reasons for this increased attention on the 
South Africa visit are that South Africa was more widely perceived as an ICC supporter, making 
its actions more surprising and newsworthy. More generally, the visit and the inaction of the 
government seem to go against widespread international perception of South Africa as a human 
rights-and treaty-respecting country.  
Conclusion 
The chapter has advanced three claims. First, the chronological tracing of how the GSA 
has engaged with the Court has shown a shift in strong support for the Court to more modest 
support where the government supported ICC-critical AU decisions after 2009. The analysis 
showed how cooperation varies over time as the GSA’s calculations about associated reputation 
costs and benefits changes as well as the social environment in which the state operated (here the 
AU becoming more critical). Second, South Africa had all the domestic ingredients for 
compliance, yet its regional ambitions played a role in not arresting a fellow African leader. In 
justifying the non-arrest, the GSA’s arguments paralleled ICC-critical discourse that has been 
advanced by several African countries ever since the Court started issuing arrest warrants for 
sitting heads of state, including its adverse effects on peace processes and its skewed prosecution 
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record. Third, the AU’s non-cooperation policy has been instrumental in obstructing cooperation 
with the ICC and thus progress and accountability in the al-Bashir case. Several African 
countries that hosted al-Bashir and flouted their legal obligation under the Rome Statute to arrest 
him justified their decisions with similar arguments raised by the GSA in 2015.  
From a practical perspective, this analysis casts doubts on whether al-Bashir will ever be 
arrested as long as he is in office. While his travels over the past years have been severely 
curtailed by the arrest warrants and civil society pressure and suits in many countries have led 
him to cancel trips, his visits to African ICC member states have come with no legal 
consequence when he attended summits of regional organizations. However, the events in South 
Africa suggest that he will be very careful to travel there again even for international summits 
given the speed and efficiency of the legal system to demand arrest. 
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Chapter 5: Kenya’s Selective Cooperation with the International Criminal Court 
This chapter analyzes the cooperation of the government of Kenya (GOK) in the case 
against current Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta (Kenyatta case). The Kenyatta case shares 
several features with the ICC case against al-Bashir. First, both cases involve leading state 
officials and they reveal the high degree to which these cases are fraught with politicization. In 
terms of domestic discourse, these cases are depicted as affronts to the country itself, an assault 
on the sovereignty of a nation, whereas the Court’s legitimacy is challenged as a tool of Western 
imperialism. Second, in both cases, the AU became a venue through which leaders sought to 
rally support for their cause against the Court by having cases delayed and dropped. As with 
Sudanese president al-Bashir, the Kenyatta case thus represents a ‘hard case’ of cooperation 
because it involved a leading political official of a country who is charged by the Court for 
international crimes. We can expect that an accused wielding the power of the state has more 
tools of resistance at its disposal and more power and reputation to lose when charged and 
potentially deemed guilty by an international court. These two factors make it likely that 
cooperation with the Court is not forthcoming.  
Despite this expectation, the GOK’s engagement with the Court can best be described as 
selective cooperation or pro forma cooperation. With Kenya being a state party to the ICC, the 
GOK engaged in selective compliance rather than outright non-compliance as done in Sudan. 
The analysis below shows that the GOK adopted a dual strategy with the ICC by employing a 
wide array of legal and non-legal means of engagement with the Court, some supportive, others 
flagrantly obstructive. Given the extent of and resources spent on opposition to the Court, the 
GOK was unwilling to comply timely and fully, contrary to their claims about capacity 
constraints as the reason for non-compliance. Selective cooperation allowed the GOK to claim 
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that it is honoring the country’s treaty obligations while subverting them politically. I explain the 
GOK’s cooperation behavior and various strategies meant to delay and undermine cases or 
weakening the ICC with the government’s desire to not be prosecuted by an international court. 
Thus, there was a fundamental interest misalignment between the GOK and the ICC. This is a 
rational choice argument where the costs of compliance—furthering the trial of a Kenyan by 
cooperating with the court—outweigh the potential benefits of doing so. In addition to avoiding 
prosecution, non-cooperation is best explained by domestic resistance against the ICC, which the 
Jubilee Alliance successfully rallied during the 2013 election, as well as the absence of 
accountability pressure by Western countries. However, rather than refusing to cooperate with 
the Court altogether, the GOK cooperated with the ICC due to reputation concerns, its desire to 
uphold existent trade relationships with ICC-supporting countries, as well as its campaign 
promises to continue cooperation.  
This chapter contributes to the literature on state cooperation and Kenya’s engagement 
with the Court in four ways. First, the analysis disentangles the GOK’s two-pronged cooperation 
approach of legal and non-legal strategies to cooperate with the ICC while not cooperating with 
it in other ways and at other times. This contrasts with recent work by Hillebrecht and Straus 
who have argued that the GOK has stayed within the confines of the Rome Statute in its 
engagement with the Court (apart from witness intimidation).386 Rather, I argue, the GOK has 
employed several non-legal strategies beyond the Rome Statute framework that have contributed 
to the ICC’s institutional weakening in Africa. This suggests that research on cooperation with 
international organizations and courts can benefit from a disaggregation of ‘means of 
cooperation’ to better chart how states can subvert institutions while simultaneously claiming to 
be cooperating with them. 
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Second, the analysis over time reveals that cooperation varies chronologically. We can 
discern two stages in the cooperation by the GOK. Once Kenyatta and Ruto were charged by the 
Court, the Kibaki government led a diplomatic initiative to delay the cases. After Kenyatta 
became President of Kenya in 2013, cooperation declined further, thus corroborating the 
expectation that once the accused are in a position of power, cooperation is less forthcoming. 
This shows that ratification of a treaty and formal domestic implementation are not the end of the 
compliance story. Rather, charting compliance behavior over time helps us better understand the 
changing calculations by governments and normative contexts in which states make compliance 
decisions.  
Third, mirroring the events of the al-Bashir case, the analysis shows the important role of 
the African Union (AU). The regional organization needs to be considered as an intervening 
actor in the Africa-ICC compliance context. The GOK lobbied extensively at the AU and 
African governments over the years to garner support for its stance against the ICC and with the 
support of other ICC-critical states was able to position the AU as a main forum of resistance. 
The AU’s involvement helped present several African countries’ misgivings about the ICC as the 
African continental position—despite significant variation among African states—and lend 
additional institutional weight to the criticisms of the Court.  
Fourth, some widespread compliance explanations hold less explanatory power in the 
Kenya analysis. Simmons’ argument about the presence of domestic compliance groups fostering 
compliance does not explain the GOK’s actions, as these groups’ presence did not contribute to 
improved compliance. Moreover, lack of capacity was found to be irrelevant for non-compliance 
in Kenya. The extent to which state resources were used to bypass ICC actions instead suggests 
that weak states may effectively leverage their resources for non-compliance. I provide a soft 
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rational choice explanation for the selective cooperation of the Kenyatta administration: Seeking 
to avoid prosecution had to be balanced with the potential reputation costs of reneging on the 
Rome Statute outright and the derogation’s potential future effects on cooperation.  
The chapter proceeds with two main empirical sections. The first section charts Kenya’s 
engagement with the Court over time, presenting the GOK’s behavior in the mandatory and 
voluntary realms. The second section investigates the reasons behind the GOK’s selective 
cooperation behavior and the last section summarizes the findings and reflects on their 
implications for the Court and international justice.  
Kenya’s Cooperation and Engagement with the International Criminal Court 
Analyzing the GOK’s behavior toward the ICC over time complicates an understanding 
of compliance as simply binary. The GOK used legal and non-legal means to simultaneously 
undermine the Court while also presenting the image of a compliant state by engaging in 
selective cooperation. Table 16 presents the various legal and non-legal means of engagement as 
found in the Kenyatta case. The next sections show how the GOK engaged in skillful legal 
maneuvering to appear cooperative at a superficial level without providing much substantive 
cooperation so much so that Obel Hansen called the GOK “masters of manipulation.”387  
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Table 16: Overview of Kenya's Engagement with the ICC 
Government 
actions Institution and Norm Strengthening Institution and Norm Weakening 
Legal actions 
 
GOK signs, ratifies and implements 
Rome Statute 
Accused appear at ICC 
GOK signs memorandum of 
understanding with ICC 
GOK allows ICC to open office and 
conduct investigations in Kenya 
Complies with parts of records request 
 
UN deferral attempts 
Admissibility challenge 
Non-arrest Bashir  
Non-compliance with records 
requests 
Seeking absence from trial 
Obstruction of police investigation 
 
Non-legal 
actions 
GOK refuses to sign BIA with USA 
Tacit support for ICC intervention 
(“Don’t be vague, let’s go to The 
Hague”) 
 
Shuttle diplomacy at UN and AU 
Invitation and non-arrest of al-
Bashir  
ASP Rule 134 change 
Intimidation of witnesses, bribery 
Anti-ICC election campaign 
Leading AU withdrawal movement 
 
Figure 14 visualizes the cooperation context in which the GOK is making compliance 
decisions, most notably the AU and UN. Rather than analyzing cooperation merely between the 
GOK and the ICC, we have to disaggregate the international environment.  
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Figure 14: Cooperation Environment for Kenya 
 
 
The Kenyatta case shows how states may leverage other actors in their engagement with 
the ICC and how the international environment may foster or hamper cooperation with the Court. 
The GOK’s expansive lobbying campaign against the ICC and the anti-ICC rhetoric the GOK 
helped promote, have garnered support among other African states. After the ICC announced 
charges against Kenyatta and other leading Kenyan officials and nationals, the GOK under 
Kibaki started campaigning at the AU and UN for the cases’ deferral. The AU acted as a venue 
where the GOK (as well as other ICC-critical leaders) was able to air its grievances against the 
Court and seek amplification of their demands.  Gaining regional support lent further support to 
the GOK’s ICC-critical position because anti-ICC arguments could then be depicted as ‘the 
continental position.’ Regionalizing the trial against two Kenyans by reframing them as a “pan-
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UNSC 
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African problem by presenting them as the latest salvo in a long line of affronts to the 
sovereignty of all African nations” not only increased pressure on the ICC but it also “deflected 
concerns about impunity by diverting focus from the defendants to a wider political context.”388 
Hillebrecht and Straus characterized Kenya’s cooperation with the ICC as ‘pro forma 
cooperation,’ meaning that the country has generally stayed within the confines of the Rome 
Statute and played along with the Court’s proceedings while also taking every opportunity to 
exculpate the indicted.389 According to the authors, Kenya’s strategy involved “cooperation on 
a shallow level to [court requests]; second, challenging the Court’s decisions on admissibility 
and the location of the trials within the channels set up by the ICC; and third, using extra-judicial 
means to intimidate witnesses.”390 This chapter confirms the presence of these three strategies, 
but it highlights additional means, such as diplomacy at the UN and AU to bypass ICC action, 
consistent anti-Court rhetoric to delegitimize the Court cases against Kenyan officials, as well as 
leading a movement for withdrawal from the ICC by African states. This chapter thus outlines 
the full spectrum of the GOK’s actions, drawing attention to the wide array of strategies 
countries may use to undermine international judicial interventions. Taking seriously this range 
of strategies highlights how the GOK has effectively engaged in institution weakening by 
fostering anti-Court rhetoric in Kenya and at the AU and leading a continental exit movement. 
This contrasts with Hillebrecht and Strauss’ contention that the GOK stayed within the confines 
of the Rome Statute to counter the court. 
A second text that analyzes the GOK’s engagement with the ICC is by Helfer and 
Showalter.391 Both my and their account distinguish between strategies operating within the 
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confines of the Rome Statute and others outside of the treaty. However, my distinction is clearer 
than theirs in that they consider refusal to comply with court requests as a strategy outside of the 
Rome Statute along with “threatening national and regional withdrawal from the Rome Statute” 
and “using rhetoric to politicize the trials.”392 While I agree that the latter two—promoting exit 
from the treaty and using anti-Court rhetoric—constitute non-legal strategies, non-compliance 
with court requests can only be placed within the confines of the Rome Statute considering that 
the Statute’s Chapter 9 explicitly creates a legal obligation on states parties to cooperate fully 
with the Court. 
Figure 15 presents the GOK’s shift in cooperation behavior over time. Tracing the 
cooperation process over time revealed the changing interests among the GOK as the charges 
against leading Kenyan officials represent an ‘exogenous shock’ that led the Kibaki 
administration to engage in extensive diplomacy. Rhetoric and anti-Court actions increase after 
Kenyatta and Ruto ascent to the Presidency in 2013. Over time, the interest misalignment 
between the GOK and the ICC increased and cooperation declined. 
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Figure 15: Shift in Cooperation Behavior by Kenya 
 
 
Early Legal and Non-Legal Support for the Court 
Kenya’s early engagement with the young Court was largely positive as the GOK took 
legal steps to comply with the Rome Statute and refused to sign agreements that countered the 
Statute’s purpose. Kenya signed the Rome Statute in August 1999 under President Daniel arap 
Moi. Mueller argues that the GOK signed the treaty “largely due to pressure from local 
human rights groups”393 but an alternative explanation is Moi’s wish to deflect mounting 
Western criticism for his repressive political tactics.394 In March 2005, the GOK ratified the 
treaty under President Mwai Kibaki with little controversy. Debates in parliament and between 
activists largely focused on “delays in ratification and on reconciling the parts of the Kenyan 
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constitution that gave immunity to the president, something the Rome Statute prohibited,” thus 
presenting an image of a country little concerned that it would become the target of an ICC 
investigation.395 Ratification of the Rome Statute also occurred despite “constant pressure by the 
United States not to ratify the treaty and its subsequent domestication into law.”396 To implement 
the Rome Statute, Kenya drafted the International Crimes Bill in 2005 but the law only passed in 
2008, a delay that resulted from the government’s focus on other priorities and the lack of 
domestic pressure groups.397 Many domestic human rights groups did not regard implementation 
as a priority, seeing it as a “foreign driven” priority without any direct relationship to domestic 
human rights issues such as poverty, development, and terrorism.398 Kenya ultimately enacted 
the International Crimes Act of 2008 in December 2008 and it entered into force in January 2009. 
In another sign of compliance with the Rome Statute and its spirit, Kenya refused to sign 
a Bilateral Immunity Agreement (BIA) with the United States.399 Kenya opposed the BIA on 
legal and political grounds, with GOK representatives arguing that signing a BIA would amount 
to double standards given the country’s commitment to the ICC, and that non-signing was a sign 
of opposing the United States’ “intimidation and diplomatic arm-twisting” on BIAs.400 
Consequently, the US suspended some forms of military assistance to Kenya but only for a short 
time.401 In 2005, US authorities had secretly expressed frustration at Kenya’s resistance to 
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“intensive Embassy lobbying” and “all types of inducements, arm-twisting and threats to sign the 
so-called Article 98 agreement.”402  
Despite these signs of early support for the Court, Kenya declined to arrest ICC suspect 
al-Bashir during his visit in 2010. A statement by the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
justified the non-arrest with Kenya’s “legitimate and strategic interest in ensuring peace and 
stability in the sub-region and promoting peace, justice and reconciliation in the Sudan” as well 
as the UN’s inaction to defer the case as wanted by Kenya and the AU. President Kibaki 
remarked that he wished “that the international community would appreciate the delicate 
situation of Sudan and act proactively. We should not isolate the people of Sudan. Let us 
encourage them to play their rightful role in the community of nations.”403  
These brief examples suggest that Kenya was largely supportive toward the ICC until it 
became the subject of an investigation itself. Political action on the Rome Statute occurred with 
little controversy over its details, albeit not being a national priority. However, al-Bashir’s visit 
and his non-arrest suggest that Kenya did not value compliance with the ICC above solidarity 
with fellow African leaders and acting in unison with AU policy. At the time when al-Bashir 
visited the country, Kenya was already on the ICC’s radar. This suggests that the GOK’s actions 
were linked to reputation concerns about its social standing in Africa, thus acting in line with the 
AU non-cooperation policy on al-Bashir allowed it to cement its reputation among African states. 
Just months later, in the fall of 2010, the GOK would start to lobby the AU and African 
government to support its own campaign against the ICC and for the deferral of cases against 
Kenyans. 
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Tacit Support for the Court after PEV and Entrance of the Court 
This section provides a brief background to the post-election violence of 2007/2008 
(PEV) during which the events occurred that led the ICC to initiate cases against leading Kenyan 
officials. In December 2007, Kenyans were called to vote in the presidential election, and 
incumbent President Kibaki was declared the winner over Raila Odinga. Odinga had commanded 
a strong lead in the polls before the election, prompting Odinga’s supporters to claim election 
fraud when Kibaki was announced as the winner. The PEV that ensued was mainly directed 
against Kikuyus, the same ethnic group as Kibaki. Over the next two months, over 1,100 people 
were killed and 350,000 displaced. In February 2008, the parties of the two contenders entered 
into a settlement establishing a coalition government (National Accords) through mediation by 
the AU and Kofi Annan.  
The National Accords included the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry into the 
violence, later dubbed Waki Commission after its chair, Kenyan Justice Philip Waki. The 
Commission’s goal was to further investigate the PEV’s causes and suggest mechanisms for 
accountability. In its October 2008 report, the Commission suggested the establishment of a truth 
commission and a hybrid Special Tribunal to prosecute PEV perpetrators. The Commission also 
handed a sealed envelope with the names of the main alleged perpetrators and boxes of evidence 
to Annan. Moreover, the report included a self-enforcing mechanism: If the GOK failed to 
establish the recommended special tribunal by 30 January 2009, “Annan was requested to 
forward the envelope and evidence to the ICC.”404  
The Kenyan parliament failed to pass a motion to establish the tribunal several times in 
February and July 2009.405 Chants of ‘Don’t be vague, let’s go to The Hague’ expressed the fears 
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of lawmakers that the GOK pushed for the local tribunal to shield its own officials from 
prosecutions.406 Legislators opposed the measures for several reasons, including that it allowed 
for presidential pardons while others feared to be prosecuted themselves. In contrast to a special 
tribunal, which could indict more people more quickly, some preferred ICC action given the 
Court’s past record of long investigations and a tendency to prosecute only the ‘biggest fish.’407 
In late July 2009, the self-enforcing provision took hold and Annan handed the envelop to the 
ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). The support for the Waki Commission and the subsequent 
failure to establish a special tribunal can be seen as tacit support for an ICC intervention given 
that no domestic consensus was found for a special tribunal: “While there was no formal, direct 
referral of the Kenyan situation to the ICC by the state in question, there was certainly a 
deliberate assent to the Court’s involvement by the coalition government.”408  
In March 2010, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) II authorized Chief Prosecutor 
Moreno Ocampo to start an investigation into the PEV. According to interviews with local 
NGOs, the ICC’s intervention in Kenya started out with “lots of optimism” and “huge support” 
by a population who had little trust in their own judicial system.409 In December, the PTC II 
released the names of six individuals who would later become known as the ‘Ocampo Six’: 
Uhuru Kenyatta (at the time, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance), William Ruto, 
Francis Muthaura (Head of Public Service and Cabinet Secretary), Henry Kosgey (Minister for 
Industrialisation), Joshua arap Sang (radio presenter), and Muhammed Hussein Ali 
(commissioner of the Kenyan police during the PEV).  
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Legal and Non-Legal Means: Efforts to Block the ICC Cases through the UN and AU 
The support for the ICC intervention started to wane after the summons to appear for 
these six individuals were issued. A “deliberate effort” was made to undermine the 
investigation.410 From the announcement of the six suspects, we see government efforts to block 
the trials at the domestic and regional level, thus lending support for the argument that a desire to 
shield elites from prosecution helps explain the non-cooperation. Regionally, the GOK tried to 
rally support to have the cases deferred at the UN.411 To that end, former Vice President Kalonzo 
Musyoka was tasked to engage in shuttle diplomacy across Africa and in various Western 
capitals to shore up support for the deferral. In late 2010, he visited more than 10 African 
countries in two months to gather support from heads of state for a joint AU resolution 
supporting Kenya’s deferral request. 412 In addition, then Trade Minister Chirau Mwakwere 
visited Botswana, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe with the same intention.413 One interviewee 
described the Kenyan government’s approach to lobbying the AU as “bulldozing” to the point 
where some governments grew tired of the continuous focus on Kenya and that Kenya “seized” 
the AU and the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties (ASP) by pushing its agenda aggressively.414 
In March 2011, Musyoka also headed a Kenyan delegation to New York where he met 
with UNSC president Li Baodong of China. Asked about the GOK’s position on the ICC, he 
said: “All we want is [for] the UN Security Council to consider positively the Africa Union 
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resolution endorsing Kenya’s request for a 12 month deferral to allow us to complete reforms 
and embark on local trials.”415 Agriculture minister Sally Kosgei briefed Nigeria, Gabon and 
South Africa—then African UNSC members—about ongoing domestic reforms, including 
elements of the new Kenyan Constitution that would enable the country to try PEV perpetrators 
domestically. Musyoka’s press secretary, Kaplich Barsito, explained that the diplomatic 
offensive was aimed at supporting local judicial processes but also “that the ICC process has the 
potential to affect Kenya’s fragile stability and could spill to the region.”416 The lobbying efforts 
continued as Trade Minister Mwakwere visited Bosnia and Lebanon, and Kosgei and Sambili 
visited Brazil417 and Kalonzo held meetings with then AU chairman Obiang Nguema to ensure 
local justice mechanisms.418  
In January 2011, African leaders supported Kenya’s deferral efforts at the AU to “allow 
for a National Mechanism to investigate and prosecute the cases under a reformed Judiciary 
provided for in the new constitutional dispensation, in line with the principle of complementarity” 
and to “support of the ongoing peace building and national reconciliation processes, in order to 
prevent the resumption of conflict and violence.”419 In fact, the AU Assembly continued to call 
for the cases’ deferrals at the UN and expressed its regret over the ICC’s failure to accept 
Kenya’s admissibility challenge over the following years.420 Despite these diplomatic efforts, 
Kenya’s deferral motion failed to garner enough support at the UNSC because it was deemed 
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that the situation in Kenya did not constitute a threat to international peace and security.421 
Another UN deferral bid failed in November 2013.422 The GOK initiated another deferral attempt 
in 2015 to achieve delay in the ICC case against Ruto and Sang. 
The failure of these deferral attempts lent support to the narrative of marginalization the 
GOK was fostering. It can be argued that the GOK knew very well that the deferral attempts 
were fruitless because deferrals can only be made when the UNSC deems a situation a threat to 
international peace and security. It would be hard to argue that this was the case in 2011, 2013, 
and 2015. One argument for why the deferrals were pursued nonetheless is that they bolstered 
the GOK’s claim that African positions, as represented by the AU Assembly deferral decision, 
were marginalized in UN institutions: “The government used each rejection to strengthen the 
narrative that the defendants’ prosecutions were evidence of a deeper problem: 
Africa’s marginalization by the West. That narrative politicized the ICC, undermining its 
legitimacy.”423 The failure of the deferral attempts gave additional credence to the ICC’s Kenyan 
cases being pan-African problems rather than purely domestic matters. Onyango-Obbo has 
characterized Kenya’s AU lobbying campaign case for deferral as “the most pan-African posture 
any Nairobi government has ever had to take.”424 
 
Legal Means: Challenging the Admissibility of Cases at the ICC 
Apart from domestic and regional political efforts to bypass ICC intervention, Kenya also 
took steps in the legal realm. In March 2011, Justice Minister Mutula Kilonzo said “Kenya will 
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challenge the right of the ICC to try the cases”425 and Kibaki said that “Kenya will fast track laws 
to implement its new constitution, set up a supreme court and reform its judiciary to strengthen 
accountability of the courts to handle the trials of suspects.”426 Seeking to trigger the Court’s 
complementarity rule whereas the ICC does not intervene when genuine domestic proceedings 
are ongoing, Kenya launched an admissibility challenge in March 2011.427 The GOK argued that 
in light of ongoing constitutional and judicial reforms,428 including new democratic checks and 
balances,429 it was now better equipped to investigate and prosecute cases arising from the PEV. 
Setting out a timeline for the following months, the GOK promised to submit regular reports 
about the reforms’ implementation progress.  
On 30 May 2011, the ICC Chamber rejected the GOK’s admissibility challenge. First, the 
Chamber expressed doubts that Kenya would actually start proceedings against the same persons 
currently under ICC investigations for the same conduct and not just at the same level of 
hierarchy.430 Second, the Chamber dismissed the GOK’s reform timeline as lacking concrete 
evidence of ongoing investigations: “It is apparent that the Government of Kenya in its challenge 
relied mainly on judicial reform actions and promises for future investigative activities.”431 This 
failure to have the cases tried locally provided additional support for a narrative of 
marginalization by the Court—again the ICC had decided against the Kenyan government. 
Employing legal means had once again, mirroring the experience with deferral attempts, left the 
GOK at the losing end of the ICC-GOK ‘virtual trial.’ 
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Legal Means: Selective Cooperation with Court Requests 
In addition to seeking deferrals and bypassing ICC action based on national proceedings, 
the GOK delayed responding to and executing court requests. While some court requests were 
complied with, a majority of requests—those deemed most important by the OTP to prove 
Kenyatta’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—remained unexecuted.  
The GOK complied with some court requests. For instance, the accused did appear at the 
ICC in The Hague when they were supposed to. Early on in the investigations, in December 
2010, Moreno-Ocampo met with President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga to seek assurances 
that “should he issue summonses, he would face no roadblocks from the GOK. Both leaders 
agreed to cooperate.”432 Subsequently, the Ocampo Six appeared at the ICC in April 2011, in 
compliance with the summonses to appear, and in September, they also appeared for their 
respective confirmation of charges hearings. Moreover, the GOK allowed the Court to conduct 
in-country investigations and set up an office.433 In 2010, the government also signed a 
memorandum of understanding with the Court. The GOK complied with parts of a records 
request whereby it provided some of Kenyatta’s bank records, however, only relating to a period 
spanning three to four months and not the three years on which the OTP had sought records. The 
GOK also claimed it had not found any intelligence records on Kenyatta from the period 
between 1 June 2007 and 15 December 2010, hence they complied with the request.434 
 
Legal Means: Non-Compliance with Records Request 
However, much litigation attests to the difficult legal battles over the GOK’s compliance 
with court requests. The continued legal battle went so far as to the OTP demanding Kenya to be 
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deemed as non-compliant twice. Litigation in the Kenyatta case has revealed the extent to which 
the GOK has stalled for time and has pursued a selective cooperation strategy. The ICC’s Trial 
Chamber V used harsh language in May 2013 to describe the systematic effort to undermine the 
ICC: 
However, since the beginning of the OTP’s investigations in April 2010, the 
GoK has constructed an outward appearance of cooperation, while failing to 
execute fully the OTP’s most important requests. Indeed, while the GoK has 
provided some cooperation and has complied with a number of OTP requests, 
the most critical documents and records sought by the OTP remain outstanding, 
despite the OTP’s exhaustive efforts to urge the GoK to furnish these items. 
The outstanding documents and records that the OTP has requested from the 
GoK have been pending for periods that range from one to three years. The 
individual and cumulative effect of the GoK’s actions has been to undermine 
the investigation in these cases and limit the body of evidence available to the 
Chamber at trial.435 
 
Kenyatta’s role in the PEV is supposed to have turned mainly around the financing of 
activities and behind the scenes orchestrating. The OTP alleged that Kenyatta “provided large 
quantities of money to intermediaries, which was funneled down and delivered as cash to the 
perpetrators of the post-election violence in Nakuru and Naivasha, enabling them to carry out 
acts of rape and murder, and resulting in the forced displacement of thousands.”436  
To produce relevant records to substantiate these allegations, the Court sent a request for 
assistance to the GOK on 24 April 2012. The government did not react substantively to this 
request for 19 months. In June 2012, the GOK “asked for more detailed information or a 
schedule of items requested.” During a meeting in July 2012, members of the OTP and the 
Kenyan Attorney General (AG) agreed that no additional information was required from the 
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OTP to ensure compliance with the Records Request.437 Despite these assurances, nothing 
happened for 19 months. With only two months left before the start of the trial, the OTP sought 
the help of the ICC’s Trial Chamber, citing the GOK’s “intransigence” and “obfuscation.”438 
Dismissing the GOK’s assertion that it required more time to collect information from various 
sources and consent from relevant individuals, the OTP stressed that “financial records relevant 
to the alleged commission of crimes can be obtained by any national law enforcement agency 
acting in good faith without undue difficulty.”439  
The Prosecutor and leading Kenyan officials discussed the records request and stressed 
its importance during several meetings in July and October 2012 in which the GOK ensured its 
continued willingness to execute the request. However, the GOK did not meet the set deadlines 
of 30 November 2012 and 9 January 2013. In its responses to the OTP, the GOK merely 
addressed the freezing of assets part of the request but not the other requested records. In 
response to the non-execution of the records request, the OTP applied for a finding of non-
compliance, arguing that: 
[t]he information of the type sought in the Records Request is standard in 
criminal investigations with a financial dimension. It is routinely obtained 
without undue burden on state resources. A law enforcement authority acting 
in good faith could normally be expected to be in possession of such records in 
a matter of days or weeks. The GoK’s failure to do so 19 months after the 
Records Request was sent is unjustifiable, especially in the absence of proper 
explanation.440  
 
Three months later, in February 2014, the Chamber held a status conference in which the 
GOK argued that it was unable to comply with a request from the OTP and that instead a court 
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order must be issued to produce the requested records.441 Seeking to draw a distinction between 
the ICC’s judicial chambers as the proper ‘court’ and the OTP, the Kenyan AG argued that 
requests must emanate from the court and not the OTP. In response to this exchange, the 
Chamber asked the OTP on 31 March 2014 to sent a revised records request to the GOK which 
should meet the requirements of specificity, relevance, and necessity, and that it wished to 
receive regular updates about the progress of executing the revised records request.442 The 
revised request involved eight distinct areas including bank accounts, telephone numbers, motor 
vehicle records, and income tax returns.443  
At another status conference in July 2014, the Kenyan AG described the revised request 
as “a fishing expedition or something that is akin to setting up the Government of Kenya so that 
it fails and carries the can.” 444 He also asserted that during the ongoing restructuring of the 
ministry “1.3 million files to have been misfiled, misplaced or lost.”445 Moreover, Muigai 
claimed that there were no records that Kenyatta owned any land, a statement that “raised 
eyebrows in Kenya, since it is common knowledge that the Kenyatta family is one of the biggest 
landowners in the country” and that just weeks before the status conference, the central lands 
registry in Nairobi had been shut down for 10 days during which the National Land Commission 
was denied access to the registry.446  
In the periodic updates on the record request’s execution, the OTP noted in September 
that the GOK had provided some bank records, however, only relating to a period spanning three 
to four months and not the three years on which the OTP had sought records. No information had 
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been provided with regards to other records. The GOK’s explanations were based on the inability 
to find the information or said information being private. For instance, with regard to information 
about the companies in which Kenyatta had an ownership interest, the GOK’s submission argued 
that “the legal and administrative regime employed at the Companies registry . . . makes it 
impossible to do a search by using an individual’s [sic] or any other search item other than [the 
name of the company or the registration number of the company].” 447 From an overview 
provided by the NGO Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice, the only requests that were 
complied with relate to bank records (albeit only for 3-4 months period in 2008/09) and foreign 
exchange records.448 On land records, the Kenyan Ministry of Land, Housing and Urban 
Development stated that it was impossible to execute the request because the OTP would need to 
provide more concrete information, including the relevant Land Reference number, a copy of the 
identification document of the person/company seeking the search, and a copy of the registration 
map or deed plan of the property.449 The Chamber later deemed this behavior by the Kenyan 
government “unhelpful.”450 
A first sign that there was serious trouble for the OTP’s case against Kenyatta came in 
September 2014, when the OTP informed the Trial Chamber that it was unable to commence 
trial the next month, given that there was not sufficient evidence to prove Kenyatta’s guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt.451 In the five months since the revised records request was issued, the 
GOK “has produced a total of 73 pages of documentation” with the “large majority of the 
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material sought in the Revised Request remains outstanding.”452 Hence, the OTP requested a 
further adjournment of the case until the GOK executed the records request fully. 
On 3 December 2014, the Trial Chamber decided not to refer Kenya to the ASP for non-
compliance despite finding that “the approach of the Kenyan Government, as outlined above, 
falls short of the standard of good faith cooperation required under Article 93 of the Statute. The 
Chamber considers that this failure has reached the threshold of non-compliance.”453 The GOK 
had argued that it had “cooperated fully” and that in turn the OTP had “not demonstrated a 
‘cooperative approach’ in relation to the Revised Request by not providing responses to requests 
from the Kenyan Government for further information” which hindered execution of the 
request.454 While criticizing the GOK’s inconsistent execution of the records request, the 
Chamber also chastised the OTP for its lack of follow-up on the original records request and for 
subpar investigations.455 Due to the OTP’s deficient investigation, the Chamber saw itself unable 
to regard the GOK’s assertions as rebutted. The Chamber ultimately rejected the OTP’s motion 
for a non-compliance finding because even if the records were presented their usefulness 
remained speculative, and a referral to the ASP could cause more uncertainty and delay in the 
proceedings.456  
Not satisfied with the Trial Chamber’s decision, the OTP sought appeal, which was 
granted in March 2015.457 In August 2015, the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber’s 
decision and required the Chamber to make a new determination: “The Appeals Chamber finds 
that the Trial Chamber erred in the exercise of its discretion by conflating the non-compliance 
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proceedings against Kenya with the criminal proceedings against Mr Kenyatta, by failing to 
address whether judicial measures had been exhausted and by assessing the sufficiency of 
evidence and the conduct of the Prosecutor in an inconsistent manner.”458  
It took the Trial Chamber more than a year to deliver its final decision.459 In September 
2016, the Chamber decided that the GOK “has failed to comply with a cooperation request that 
has prevented the Court from exercising its functions and power under the Statute” and referred 
the matter to the ASP.460 
 
Legal Means: Non-Compliance with Freezing of Assets Court Request 
Apart from the records request, the GOK also delayed response to the request for freezing 
of assets. On 5 April 2011, the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber ordered the Registrar to prepare and 
transmit a cooperation request to Kenya to identify, trace and freeze or seize Kenyatta’s property 
and assets, and to provide regular updates on the progress in executing this request.461 The 
request was sent one year later in April 2012. It was not until February 2014 when a Registry 
Report brought the lack of compliance with the request to the judges’ attention. For three years, 
the court order had not been complied with or even been communicated about, nor had the GOK 
complied with the stipulation of regular progress reports. In its delayed response, the GOK 
challenged the request’s legality because it assumed that 1. the accused persons had already been 
found guilty of the crimes and that 2. the accused were actually in possession of the demanded 
documents.462 The OTP responded that “an interpretation of the Statute requiring the Pre-Trial 
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Chamber to wait until after a conviction ‘defies logic’” and that “the position held by the Kenyan 
Government is merely pretext and an attempt to obstruct the proceedings.”463 
In its decision, the Chamber found that “there has been a substantial unexplained delay 
on the part of the Kenyan Government in either giving effect to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s Order or 
raising any concerns which may have prevented execution of the request.”464 However, the 
Chamber’s majority suspended the order until further notice because the Prosecution had stated it 
did not have enough evidence for a conviction at that point.  
 
Legal Means: Absence from Trials 
Once Kenyatta and Ruto became President and Vice President in Kenya in March 2013, 
their defense teams also took legal and political steps to have the defendants be allowed to be 
absent from trial or participate via video to take care of their official state functions. In February 
2013, both Kenyatta and Ruto’s defense teams filed motions to have them participate via video 
link, and later in April Ruto’s team filed a similar motion requesting excusal from trial.465 In 
June 2013, Trial Chamber V(A) granted Ruto conditional excusal from trial,466 and in early 
September Kenyatta’s defense team made a similar request for what they described as a ‘Ruto 
Relief’ to excuse Kenyatta from continuous presence at trial.467 Relying on the Ruto Relief, Trial 
Chamber V(B) granted Kenyatta’s excusal “in order to permit him to discharge his functions of 
state as the executive President of Kenya; while his trial proceeds, as it must do, in this Court.”468 
Kenyatta would have to attend the most important sessions of the trial, including opening and 
                                                
463 Trial Chamber V(B), ICC-01/09-02/11-931-Conf 09-07-2014: 5 para. 7 (emphasis added). 
464 Ibid., 14, para. 26. 
465 Trial Chamber V, ICC-01/09-02/11-667; Trial Chamber V, ICC-01/09-01/11-685.  
466 Trial Chamber V(A), ICC-01/09-01/11-777. 
467 International Criminal Court, ICC-01/09-02/11-T-26-ENG. 
468 Ibid., para. 4. 
 181 
closing statements and the delivery of the judgment.469 His absence from trial was excused only 
“for purposes of accommodating the discharge of his duties as the President of Kenya.”470  
However, one week after granting Kenyatta’s conditional excusal, the Appeals Chamber 
reversed the decision. The Appeals judges decided that the Trial Chamber had “interpreted the 
scope of its discretion too broadly and thereby exceeded the limits of its discretionary power.”471 
By granting a broad excusal policy, the Trial Chamber had provided Ruto “with what amounts to 
a blanket excusal before the trial had even commenced, effectively making his absence the 
general rule and his presence an exception.”472 The ruling meant that Ruto would have to remain 
in The Hague for the remainder of his trial but he could apply for excusal on a case-by-case basis. 
Subsequently, Kenyatta’s request for excusal was rejected in November 2013. The judges held 
that Kenyatta would “as a general rule, have to be present for his trial” except in exceptional 
circumstances.473  
After this judicial repudiation—which added insult to injury after the failed UN deferral 
attempts and admissibility challenge—the GOK shifted the issue into a non-legal venue. At the 
annual meeting of the ASP in 2013, the ICC states parties amended Rule 134 of the ICC’s Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence to make recuse allowable. This rule change occurred “following 
intense lobbying” and “pressure from the African Union (AU) and the Kenyan government, 
which have arguably left no stone unturned in their efforts to shield Kenyatta from trial.”474 
However, Schwarz argues that the rule change was initiated by other states to stymie momentum 
behind African withdrawal from the Court in light of the UNSC’s repeated failures to defer the 
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cases and the AU’s decision that sitting heads of state should be immune.475 The new Rule 134 
quarter allows an accused, subject to a summons to appear, to “submit a written request to the 
Trial Chamber to be excused and to be represented by counsel only” to “fulfill extraordinary 
public duties at the highest national level.”476  
 
Non-Legal Means: Witness Interference 
Witness problems also plagued the trial against Kenyatta and his alleged co-conspirator 
Muthaura. Witness four, whose evidence was critical in initially confirming the charges against 
the two, admitted to lying and taking bribes, leading to his evidence being dropped. Witness four 
had said he was present at meetings in the State House and the Nairobi Club where Kenyatta and 
Muthaura allegedly planned violence. Later, it was revealed that the witness “had been offered 
and accepted money from individuals holding themselves out as representatives of the accused to 
withdraw his testimony and provided e-mails and records that confirmed the bribery scheme.”477 
By January 2014, the OTP had withdrawn 14 witnesses from the Kenyatta case. The 
Prosecution has described the negative impact of a “climate of fear” in Kenya that led them to 
withdraw various witnesses from the witness list: “While the Prosecution does not have evidence 
suggesting that these witnesses were subject to direct intimidation, their reluctance to testify 
appears to have been motivated, at least in part, by the anti-ICC climate in certain parts of 
Kenyan society.”478 Witnesses were concerned that testifying against Kenyatta would expose 
them and their families to retaliation by his supporters. It has also exerted a chilling effect on 
potential witnesses as some individuals refused to be included on the witness list because 
                                                
475 Schwarz 2016: 101. 
476 International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 134 quarter. 
477 Gekara 2013. 
478 Trial Chamber V(B), ICC-01/09-02/11-892-AnxA-Red: 2. 
 183 
inclusion at trial would reveal their identities to the accused. In addition to stymieing witness 
participation, there is evidence of bribery as “individuals attempted to persuade Witnesses 4, 11 
and 12 to recant their testimony and/or to withdraw their cooperation with the Prosecution. On 
some occasions, money was offered to them.”479  
Kenyan AG Muigai has declined the allegations of witness interference. According to a 
statement, the GOK “has no knowledge of who the witnesses are and it has no desire to deal with 
the witnesses whatsoever. All the Kenyan Government has done as regards witnesses is to 
facilitate cooperation between the ICC Victims and Witnesses Unit and the Kenyan Witness 
Protection Agency.”480  
 
Non-Legal Means: Delegitimizing the ICC as Campaign Strategy and Winning the Election 
The ICC became a key theme during the 2013 general election in Kenya. While this 
election is a purely domestic issue, it deserves attention here because it helped to fuel anti-ICC 
sentiment in Kenya, thus increasing Kenyatta and Ruto’s claim against the ICC in case of their 
election success. Kenyatta and Ruto used the ICC charges to depict their cases as affronts to 
Kenyan sovereignty and to the people of Kenya. The election campaign thus represented a 
crucial moment in time where an ICC state party engaged in explicit opposition to an 
international treaty and delegitimization of the Court. Moreover, winning the election can be 
seen as an additional strategy in order to be in a superior political position to defy the Court and 
its cases. In fact, Mueller argued that winning the election was the “mega strategy” against the 
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Court so that “demonizing the ICC became a way of solidifying ethnic polarization, thereby 
turning the 2013 election into another zero sum ethnic contest.”481 
Kenyatta announced that he would form a joint ticket with former minister Ruto, called 
the Jubilee Alliance. He explained the coalition with Ruto as an attempt to avoid a repeat of the 
PEV that had plagued the country five years ago. At a campaign rally in January 2013, he said: 
“Our Union with Ruto is informed by the need to preserve peace in the country and ensure that 
we do not walk the dark path we did after the presidential elections in 2007.”482 With regard to 
the ongoing ICC cases against them, Kenyatta warned competitors to steer clear of using the 
cases to rouse opposition against them and that they believed in their innocence which the Court 
would ultimately have come to unearth: “We are not scared of the ICC process for we will 
defend ourselves and emerge victorious. Even God knows that we played no role in fanning the 
violence.”483 Many credit this alliance between Kenyatta and Ruto, each seen as the leader of 
their respective ethnic groups of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin, the main perpetrators of the 2007 
violence, with the peaceful conduct of the 2013 elections.484 
The Jubilee Alliance succeeded in creating a “siege mentality by persuading the majority 
of Kikuyus and a large number of non-Kikuyus that the ICC was a threat to the country’s 
sovereignty, peace, and stability. The coalition presented Kenyatta and Ruto as best placed to 
promote and defend people’s individual and collective interests.”485 By using the ICC as a tool in 
the election, Ruto and Kenyatta “became heroes of their respective ethnic groups” which unified 
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their communities during the election season.486 They successfully convinced voters of their 
innocence, the ICC’s ineptitude and bias, and their power, once in office, to restore stability and 
peace in Kenya.  
To promote their message Ruto attended regular prayer meetings in 2011, in which also 
many parliamentarians participated. Reelection for these MPs depended on a strong anti-ICC 
stance.487 During the campaign, UhuRuto successfully reframed the ICC as an instance of 
neocolonialism and a threat to national sovereignty and stability.488 First, UhuRuto argued that 
the ICC was conducting flawed investigations in which they failed to charge those most 
responsible for the PEV and lacked detailed understanding of what actually happened. They 
questioned that no charges were levied against Odinga and Kibaki but explained that outcome 
away with the support they had received at the hands of Western states.489 The missing charges 
against Odinga were presented as another piece of evidence that the ICC was directed by its 
funding states in Europe.490 This argument served to undermine the Court’s legitimacy in the 
eyes of the Kenyan population.  Second, to renounce the Court and its biased nature, support for 
Jubilee Alliance “was promoted as a way of standing up to neocolonialism and of forging 
closer relations with African neighbors and new allies in the East; the election was cast as a 
competition between patriotic Kenyans and a patronizing West.”491 A vote cast for UhuRuto was 
depicted as a vote against foreign intervention in Kenyan affairs and a vote for closer ties with 
regional partners, equally critical of the ICC’s prosecution focus on Africa. This neocolonial 
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narrative helped to counter-shame the ICC and to draw support for the GOK’s anti-ICC cause 
among African nations and the AU.492  
The potential of winning the election meant that holding political power could be used to 
deflect the ICC or avoiding presence at trials due to state business.493 This potential avenue for 
avoiding international criminal charges led Mueller to argue that the Kenya cases are unique 
because “it was the first time any ICC defendants had run for president and deputy president as 
part of a strategy to avoid trial.”494 More importantly perhaps, winning the election despite being 
charged by the ICC meant that UhuRuto could claim that a majority of Kenyans also oppose ICC 
action, thus lending them a mandate to counter the Court. Before the election, Kenyatta linked 
the election to their cases at the ICC: “I am not saying that international justice doesn’t have a 
purpose... but if Kenyans do vote for us, it will mean that Kenyans themselves have questioned 
the process that has landed us at the International Criminal Court. But that does not mean that we 
will cease to cooperate because as I have said most importantly we understand and recognise the 
rule of law.”495 
For Western nations, the running for office by an ICC suspect proved controversial. 
When former US ambassador to Kenya, Johnnie Carson, remarked during the election campaign 
that “actions have consequences,” alleged Western involvement/maneuvering with the Court 
came front and center.496 The statement, implying that Kenyans should not vote for UhuRuto, 
contradicted earlier statements by US President Barack Obama that the US would not favor any 
candidate in the election, and created “huge fallout.” Carson’s statement proved “very influential” 
in fueling the anti-Western sentiment. Since then, Western diplomats have been reluctant to 
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make any statement with regard to the Court and the GOK’s relationship with it. Interviews 
suggest that the issue has “strained” bilateral relations with Kenya so much that there was some 
relief after the ICC cases were over.497 
 
Non-Legal Means: Diplomacy against the Court - Calling for Exit from the ICC 
In its most severe anti-ICC action, the GOK led the continent-wide movement for 
withdrawal from the ICC justified by claims that the ICC is unfairly targeting Africans and 
imposing neocolonial justice. This diplomacy against the Court contributed to weakening the 
Court’s standing in Africa. 2013 was a key moment for this exit movement, and it started with a 
domestic vote in Kenya to leave the Court on 5 September 2013.498 During the debate on the exit 
motion, Kenyan parliamentarians were very critical of the Waki Commission and the process 
that led to Kenyans being charged by the Court. Majority leader Aden Duale described these 
events as a “constitutional coup.”499 The parliamentary vote highlighted the polarization 
surrounding the ICC in Kenyan politics with the Jubilee Alliance following a nationalistic 
narrative of the ICC violating Kenyan sovereignty against the will of the people. While before 
their election, Kenyatta and Ruto were individual subjects, they now served as symbols of the 
country’s unity and sovereignty. In contrast, main opposition party Coalition for Reforms and 
Democracy (CORD) supported the ICC. The vote was likely influenced by the continued failures 
to relocate, defer, and terminate the trials. One Kenyan parliamentarian stated that the “reason 
for the Motion [to withdraw from the Rome Statute] is that despite cooperation, the ICC has not 
reciprocated with respect and even appeals are denied.”500  
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However, despite the support for Kenya’s exit from the ICC in parliament, the executive 
did not sign the bill. One argument for why the GOK, despite its extensive regional efforts for 
exit, failed to seal Kenya’s exit, is the desire to keep up ‘cooperation appearance’ or what Helfer 
and Showalter call the ‘veneer of cooperation.’ These motions to exit provided the leaders with 
domestic leverage for the exit movement, “public demonstrations of the desire of many Kenya 
legislators to withdraw from the Rome Statute,” thus helping to bolster the larger continental 
push for withdrawal.501 Kenyatta and Ruto thus appeared to be compliant, keeping with 2013 
campaign promises to further cooperate with the ICC, which “prevented the government from 
appearing indefensibly uncooperative.”502 
After the election of Kenyatta to the Presidency in March 2013, the perception problem 
existed that Kenyatta as the president was seen to be on trial while technically the individual 
Uhuru Kenyatta was on trial. But from now on, the trial against him came to be seen as a trial 
against the will of a majority of Kenyans who elected him into highest office. After the election, 
Kenyatta warned the ICC: “I speak not as an accused person, but as the President of the 
sovereign Republic of Kenya. [. . .] If you want us to continue to cooperate let me make it clear 
that when Ruto is in the Hague I will be here, and when I am in the Hague, Ruto will be here.”503 
This narrative deliberately merged Kenyatta’s responsibilities as President as a symbol of 
national unity with his trial, making the charges against him appear to be charges against the 
entire country. 
In October 2013, the AU convened an extraordinary summit on the ICC issue at Kenya’s 
request—a request supported by a two-thirds majority of AU member states.504 Kenya lobbied its 
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fellow AU countries extensively before the summit.505 In his speech, Kenyatta launched several 
critiques at the ICC that together justify exit. While he never explicitly called on fellow countries 
to withdraw, his emphasis on new forms of colonialism and marginalization and disregard of 
African positions at the Court and the UN suggest exit as the only logical solution. He also 
thanked the AU for its continued support for Kenya: “As Kenya’s President, it gives me a feeling 
of deep and lasting pride to know that I can count on the African Union to listen and help in 
trying times. Africa has always stood by our side.” 506 In contrast to the continued loyalty 
between the AU and Kenya, the ICC has proven disrespectful by ignoring the GOK’s various 
non-legal and legal attempts to delay and derail the cases: “The AU is the bastion of African 
sovereignty, and the vanguard of our unity. Yet the ICC deems it altogether unworthy of the 
minutest consideration. Presidents Kikwete, Museveni, Jonathan and Zuma have pronounced 
themselves on the court’s insensitivity, arrogance and disrespect.” 
Describing Kenya as one of the “the good-faith subscribers” to the Court and the hopes 
they had invested in an independent criminal court, these supporters have now “fallen prey to 
their high-mindedness and idealism” given the Court’s and its main funders’ support for regime 
change in Africa and suggestions for how to handle domestic government affairs. For instance, 
Kenyatta reminded the West of statements before the Kenyan presidential election, especially 
those by Carson, which constituted “a fetid insult to Kenya and Africa. African sovereignty 
means nothing to the ICC and its patrons.”507 
Kenyatta also stressed his cooperation while deploring the ICC for its lack of good faith 
cooperation and criticized the Court for its instrumentalization by Western powers: “The ICC has 
been reduced into a painfully farcical pantomime, a travesty that adds insult to the injury of 
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victims. It stopped being the home of justice the day it became the toy of declining imperial 
powers. This is the circumstance which today compels us to agree with the reasons US, China, 
Israel, India and other non-signatory States hold for abstaining from the Rome Treaty.”508 
While African states failed to agree on an en masse withdrawal from the Court at the 
October 2013 summit, the AU Assembly passed a decision announcing that “no charges shall be 
commenced or continued before any International Court or Tribunal against any serving AU 
Head of State or Government or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity during their 
term of office.”509 This statement directly counters the Rome Statute’s provision that official 
capacity shall not exempt a person from ICC prosecution. Moreover, the AU argued that the ICC 
proceedings against Ruto and Uhuru “are beginning to adversely affect the ability of the Kenyan 
leaders in discharging their constitutional responsibilities,”510 hence the summit decided that the 
trials “should be suspended until they complete their terms of office.”511 At the next AU summit 
in early 2016, Kenya proposed language for withdrawal from the Court.512  
The withdrawal movement that Kenya sparked continues to thrive but is struggling to 
overcome continental disagreements over the Court’s utility and legal strategies. In 2016, South 
Africa, Gambia, and Burundi announced their intent to withdraw from the Rome Statute. During 
its January 2017 summit, the AU encouraged member states to withdraw from the Court 
although many African states continue to support it.513 In a rebuke to Kenya’s withdrawal 
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movement, Kenyan foreign minister Amina Mohamed lost the election for AU Commission 
Chair to Chad’s Foreign Minister Moussa Faki Mahamat, who has supported the ICC.514  
 
Collapse of the Kenyatta Case 
After vacating the October 2014 trial date and receiving another adjournment request 
from the OTP, the Trial Chamber decided in December 2014 that “the Prosecution does not have 
any concrete prospect of obtaining evidence sufficient to meet the standard required for trial and 
to sustain the current charges. In the Chamber's view, such circumstances should now weigh 
compellingly in favour of not further prolonging these proceedings.”515 Given the Chamber’s 
ultimatum of a one-week notice, the OTP dropped the charges against Kenyatta two days later: 
“The evidence has not improved to such an extent that Mr Kenyatta’s alleged criminal 
responsibility can be proven beyond reasonable doubt. For this reason, and in light of the Trial 
Chamber’s rejection of the Prosecution’s request for an adjournment until the Government of 
Kenya complies with its co-operation obligations under the Rome Statute, the Prosecution 
withdraws its charges.”516 The proceedings against Kenyatta were officially terminated in March 
2015.517 
Explaining Selective Cooperation in the Kenyatta Case 
The myriad legal and non-legal ways in which the GOK tried to stymie progress on the 
Kenyatta case suggest an unwillingness to cooperate with the Court. However, rather than 
outright refusing to cooperate with the Court (as Sudan has done), Kenyan officials pursued a 
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more complex strategy. As shown above, the government complied with some court requests but 
not with others. The country operated within the legal confines of the Rome Statute, which 
allows countries to challenge the admissibility of cases and to seek delay at the UN. However, 
the GOK also operated outside of the legal realm by trying to derail the cases politically through 
engaging in diplomacy against the Court and led a continent-wide exit movement from the ICC. 
This placed the GOK between the non-cooperators and the pro forma cooperators. 
This section draws on compliance scholarship introduced in Chapter 2 to reflect on 
possible reasons for non-cooperation and cooperation. On the one hand, the GOK’s non-
cooperation behavior is best explained by three factors: the elite’s wish to avoid prosecution 
(misalignment of interest between GOK and ICC), the absence of international accountability 
pressure, and a domestic mandate against the Court. On the other hand, the government’s 
cooperation behavior can be explained by the GOK’s concerns for good trade relations, domestic 
support for compliance, and by reputation concerns. Table 17 presents these explanations in bold. 
 
Table 17: Overview of Compliance Explanations in the Kenya Case 
 
 Compliance Non-compliance 
International 
level 
International pressures and 
dependence networks 
Enforcement 
Legitimacy of rule and 
institution  
Lack of international pressure 
Dependence networks 
Domestic 
level  
Compliance constituencies 
Democratic values and 
institutions 
Eliminating domestic opponents 
Reputation concerns 
(lack of compliance factors) 
Non-compliance constituencies 
Lack of state capacity 
Avoiding prosecution/interest 
misalignment 
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State capacity and civil society pressure are two compliance theories that hold less 
explanatory power for cooperation in the Kenyatta case. Lack of capacity features as a powerful 
domestic-level explanation for non-compliance518 and it does help explain the delayed 
implementation of the Rome Statute. Implementation of the Rome Statute had not been a GOK 
priority. Instead, the GOK focused on other policy areas that were deemed more immediately 
important, especially the constitutional review process and the referendum.519 Implementation 
action then stalled after the PEV in 2007/08.  
Thus, while lack of state capacity obstructed Kenya’s implementation, the vast amount of 
resources spent on continental lobbying against the ICC and the long unexplained delays in 
responding to court requests suggest that capacity constraints did not impact the GOK’s non-
compliance with court requests. Considering the long time periods in which the GOK did not 
reply to the records request and failed to consult with the OTP on potential challenges in 
executing them, it is hard to argue that the GOK was engaging in good faith compliance rather 
than just stalling for time.520 For instance, while the GOK had initially claimed that physically 
searching around 2 million companies records would be theoretically possible, it never followed 
up on the option and later declared that this was “impossible” due to the “legal and 
administrative regime”521 and failed to pursue options other than the Companies Registry or to 
make inquiries with the Ministry of Land.522 Given this, the Chamber was not convinced that 
“the failure to execute this category of the Revised Request is simply an issue of capacity, of 
practical or administrative barriers or a result of insufficient information having been provided 
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by the Prosecution.”523 Thus, the Kenyatta case suggests that some countries, whose capacity we 
might expect to be detrimental to compliance, such as Global South countries, might actually be 
non-compliant for other reasons. Capacity might be limited in some sectors or territories of the 
state, but here, senior government officials had access to sufficient resources to delay and rally 
other governments against compliance with an international treaty. One ICC interviewee pointed 
out that the GOK had very good lawyers who would “answer a request with ten pages of counter 
questions on the request, asking to clarify.”524 So while this delayed the judicial process, it does 
not suggest a lack of capacity. 
Another alternative explanation relates to civil society. Recent studies on compliance 
have highlighted the importance of domestic civil society groups that may either push for or 
against compliance.525 While Kenyan civil society is vibrant and has “historically been known 
for their capacity to enable political and institutional reform,”526 it has not succeeded in pushing 
the GOK toward full cooperation with the ICC. Several Kenyan CSOs initially preferred ICC 
intervention even if they could have pushed for domestic justice reforms and accountability 
during Kenya’s status as a preliminary investigation at the ICC from 2008 to 2010. Demoralized 
by the failed attempts to establish a special tribunal and by a lack of trust in Kenyan institutions 
and leadership to prosecute perpetrators, several CSOs had few interactions with the government. 
Many feared that pushing for domestic reforms might deter or delay “the ICC from opening up a 
formal investigation in Kenya.”527 The current CSO sector in Kenya is highly fractured and often 
short for money as foreign assistance is being increasingly funneled through the GOK rather than 
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directly to groups.528 The NGO sector also lacked a policy entrepreneur early on that was 
pushing for implementation prior to the ICC’s intervention. During the early 2000s, when 
countries were slowly implementing the Rome Statute in their domestic legal systems, there was 
not really a “particular official, local campaign or political grouping either advocating for or 
opposing implementation” which led to the relatively late domestication of the Rome Statute in 
Kenya.529 This suggests that while Kenya features a strong civil society sector, it had little 
impact on the GOK’s compliance record. This counters the expectations suggested by 
compliance constituencies’ theories.  
 
Why Did the GOK Fail to Cooperate with the ICC? 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggested that the GOK, at first through President 
Kibaki and then through the Kenyatta administration, was driven mainly by the impulse to avoid 
prosecution of high-ranking Kenyan officials. There was a misalignment of interests between the 
GOK and the ICC. The sequencing of events as described above suggested that the Kenyan elite 
was supportive of ICC intervention at first when the country failed to set up a special tribunal. 
Choosing The Hague was deemed a better solution to calls for accountability given the ICC’s 
slow trial history and its focus on only a few perpetrators. This initial support for the ICC’s 
intervention disappeared after the Court revealed the names of the accused, including several 
high-ranking government officials. The Kibaki government then started to lobby African 
governments and UNSC members to support case deferral at the UN—to no avail. Kenyatta and 
Ruto later won the presidential elections in 2013 because they were able to effectively depict 
                                                
528 Lind and Howell 2010: 349. 
529 Ford 2008: 58. 
 196 
themselves as victims of an outside, Western-oriented court that was violating Kenyan 
sovereignty and the will of the Kenyan people. 
This argument about avoiding prosecution mirrors several scholars’ accounts. Hillebrecht 
and Straus argued that leaders make rational cost-benefit calculations when charged by the ICC: 
“Because the indictment is against the state incumbents, Kenyatta and Ruto prefer not to 
cooperate.”530 Incentives among the GOK changed from initial ICC support to refusal to 
cooperate when the elites saw themselves prosecuted at the Court. Mueller advanced a similar 
argument related to political risk, positing that changes in political risk explain the switch from 
support for the Court to selective cooperation. After signing and ratifying the Rome Statute, 
“Kenya’s changing politics and the weakness of the rule of law explain why Kenya initially was 
in favor of the ICC and signed on to the Rome Statute before political circumstances changed. 
Kenya then turned against the court and began to undermine it while minimally complying with 
its directives.”531 According to Helfer and Showalter, the GOK pursued a selective cooperation 
strategy of condemnation and cooperation because it yielded most benefits: 
First, they enhanced the defendants’ popularity in Kenya, ultimately helping to 
turn public opinion against the ICC. Second, the supposed willingness 
to cooperate likely made the government’s backlash more palatable to other 
AU member states, generating regional support that enabled Kenya to place 
more political pressure on the ICC than it could have generated on its own.532 
 
I agree with these claims but highlight additional factors. Rather than just wishing to 
avoid prosecution, the GOK was also free to not comply because Western donors refrained from 
pushing for compliance and because winning the election gave them a popular mandate for their 
                                                
530 Hillebrecht and Straus 2017: 26. 
531 Mueller 2014: 28. 
532 Helfer and Showalter 2017: 48. 
 197 
actions. These additional factors have to be considered to fully explain the GOK’s non-
cooperation with the ICC.  
Thus, an additional reason for non-compliance was the combination of little outside 
donor pressure with Kenya’s relative independence from outside aid. Contrary to the 
expectations of the dependence network theory,533 according to which key donors to Kenya that 
are also ICC supporters could have exerted pressure on the GOK to achieve more accountability, 
this donor pressure was absent. Western donors failed to put pressure on Kenya to provide 
accountability. While donors supported the creation of a special tribunal and indicated this in 
private meetings with the GOK immediately after the PEV, “they did not publicly threaten the 
government with sanctions or indicate that it would not be ‘business as usual’ if it did not 
establish the tribunal.”534 Donors had dropped the focus on accountability by 2010 and were 
reluctant to exert pressure as long as Kenyatta and Ruto promised cooperation with the ICC. 
After the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi in 2013, donors’ attention shifted to security concerns 
and mitigating diplomatic tensions: “Aside from issuing cryptic warnings about the implications 
of non-compliance, donors did not apply any real political pressure on Kenya to increase its level 
of cooperation with the ICC. Donors recognized that their comments prior to the elections 
painted them into a corner.”535 Despite this absent pressure it is doubtful if more pressure would 
have led to more cooperation because Kenya is not aid-dependent as only around 15% of the 
“country’s public expenditures are foreign-financed […].”536 This lack of aid dependence might 
help explain why even if donors had tied full and speedy ICC cooperation to continued aid, the 
GOK would have felt less constrained by these demands.  
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A third reason for non-cooperation is that Kenyatta and Ruto had a popular mandate after 
winning the 2013 elections. The majority of Kenyans who voted for them made their choice 
despite the charges at the ICC. Kenyatta and Ruto could afford to upset the Court through non-
cooperation because they were elected despite the charges and with lots of support from their 
own ethnic groups. When disaggregating survey data along ethnic lines, it becomes evident that 
Kenyans who belong to the Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic groups, the groups that Kenyatta and 
Ruto belong to, hold “majority negative perceptions of the court, while groups associated with 
opposition politicians are highly supportive of its involvement.”537 
This argument about a democratic mandate fueling non-compliance turns the ‘democracy 
theory’ of compliance on its head. Scholarship has consistently highlighted the importance of 
liberal norms or a democratic form of government for compliance due to belief in the rule of law, 
human rights, and the audience costs associated with reneging on commitments.538 In contrast, in 
the ICC’s Kenyan cases, we see the accused being emboldened by their popular mandate to deny 
compliance with an international treaty. While democratic structures usually serve as an 
incentive for compliance with treaties based on the assumption that reneging increases audience 
costs, in the Kenyatta case the election of ICC suspects emboldened them in their opposition to 
the Court.  
This section argued that three factors combined together help explain the GOK’s non-
cooperation with the ICC. Primary among them is the wish to avoid prosecution. However, I also 
highlight additional factors, which previous studies have neglected: absent pro-accountability 
pressure by the West and a popular mandate against the Court, which lend popular support for 
the GOK to resist the ICC. Kenyatta and Ruto won on an anti-ICC platform that depicted the 
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court cases as affronts to Kenyan sovereignty. Resistance against the Court thus became 
legitimated through their ascent to the presidency. 
 
Why did the GOK Cooperate? 
In contrast to the Sudan where the government refused to cooperate altogether, the GOK 
engaged in selective cooperation. Two factors help explain the GOK’s cooperation with the 
Court: global reputation concerns and a popular mandate. First, as mentioned in Chapter 2, states 
send various signals to other states by complying with an agreement or not. Non-compliance can 
lead other states to regard that state as non-trustworthy and prevent them from entering into 
future agreements or it may signal that the state regards that agreement and the associated states 
as less valuable. Hence, the GOK cooperated to not undermine regional and global trade 
relationships with ICC-supporting states, thus bolstering the country’s reputation for adherence 
to IL. In 2013, the top five exporting countries from Kenya were Uganda, the United Kingdom, 
Tanzania, the Netherlands, and the US. The top five countries to which Kenya exported were 
India, China, United Arab Emirates, Japan, and South Africa.539 Regionally, a majority of 
Kenya’s exports go to the East African Community and the Common Market for East and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) of which Kenya is a member.540 The European Union (EU) is the 
second most important export destination for Kenya’s products, including flowers and fresh 
produce. In terms of who supports the ICC, this suggests a mixed picture. All EU members are 
also member states of the ICC as well as Uganda, Tanzania, and Burundi. However, several 
African trading partners, despite being ICC members have been increasingly critical of the Court 
in recent years such as Uganda and Burundi. Several COMESA states are openly hostile toward 
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the Court and never became member states such as Sudan, Rwanda, Egypt, Ethiopia, and 
Zimbabwe. The GOK engaged in some cooperation with the Court due to its concern about its 
“long-term standing in the international system, as well as the future of its foreign policy and 
economy” which led the government to cooperate at least partly with “a Court that poses a clear 
threat to the survival of its leadership.”541 
Paradoxically, the same popular mandate argument that fueled non-compliance due to 
rising anti-ICC sentiment also helps explain cooperation in the Kenyatta case. While this might 
seem counterintuitive, Kenyatta and Ruto may have also felt a need to cooperate with Court 
superficially because a majority of Kenyans supported the cases. Survey data from 2015 
indicates that “61% of Kenyans believe that the cases are an important tool for fighting impunity 
in the country.”542 Moreover, a majority of respondents (55%) believed that the ICC is an 
impartial institution and that withdrawing from the ICC is a negative thing. 86% also supported 
Kenyatta’s attendance of Court hearings in The Hague.543 These data suggest that the public’s 
support for their leaders’ cooperation with the Court may have had an influence on Kenyatta and 
Ruto. While the opposition to the Court from their own ethnic groups suggests that their anti-ICC 
campaign platform from 2013 was effective in stirring or increasing anti-ICC sentiments, the 
appearance of doing what is widely expected and accepted might also have been weighed.  
These reflections on the presence of international pressure suggest that there was little 
pro-accountability pressure from the West after 2010 and even less after 2013 when the two 
accused became President and Deputy President of Kenya. Rather than pro-compliance pressure, 
the GOK was emboldened by rising anti-ICC sentiment in Africa and especially in the East 
Africa region, which it also helped to fuel. Outright non-compliance was discarded as an option 
                                                
541 Hillebrecht and Straus 2017: 26-27. 
542 Lekalake and Buchanan-Clarke 2015: 2. 
543 Ibid. 
 201 
because it would have been too obviously political and could have tarnished the country’s 
reputation as an IL compliant state. Instead, the GOK engaged in just enough compliance to 
credibly say that Kenya was honoring its treaty commitment to the ICC, thus allowing the GOK 
to be seen as a law-abiding state that honors international treaty obligations. 
Conclusion  
The analysis of the GOK’s cooperation behavior in the Kenyatta case revealed the 
multiple ways in which states can cooperate with the ICC. Compliance and non-compliance can 
have both non-legal and legal facets, and states may at the same time comply and not comply. 
This selective cooperation only becomes evident when we analyze cooperation over time. The 
analysis above revealed the extent to which the GOK managed to cooperate superficially while at 
the same time declining to substantively engage with a majority of Court requests. It illustrates 
the enormous potential for ICC investigations against sitting heads of state to become 
undermined when alleged perpetrators wield authority over the state apparatus and thus can more 
easily obstruct investigations. While some means of engagement—shuttle diplomacy, UN 
deferral efforts, AU support seeking—mirror the engagement of Sudan with the Court, Kenya’s 
status as a state party necessitated a more subtle approach that falls short of outright non-
cooperation. Rather than outright refusing to cooperate with the Court, Kenyatta attended 
hearings and complied with some court requests while not complying with others and fueling 
anti-ICC sentiments at home and in Africa. 
Domestic political calculations and lack of international accountability pressure help 
explain the non-cooperation side of this selective cooperation. Shielding oneself from 
prosecution provides a strong explanation given the wide array of legal and non-legal means as 
well as resources invested in fueling domestic and continental opposition to the Court. Kenya’s 
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relative independence from donor contributions and the increasing focus of donors on Kenya’s 
strategic importance as a bulwark against terrorism further help explain why the GOK might 
have been emboldened to defy the Court that many donors support. However, since many ICC 
supporters are Kenya’s trade partners and the GOK seeks to be seen as compliant to benefit from 
future agreements, the GOK chose to cooperate to some extent as well as the fact that superficial 
compliance allowed the country to portray itself as honoring international treaty obligations. In 
addition, Kenya’s non-compliance with the Rome Statute allowed the country to signal to its 
African peers that it would stay true to what the AU decided and its critical stance toward the 
Court in cases against leading state officials. Depicting the two groups as distinct—Western 
pressures for retributive justice and accountability on the one hand, and African pressures for 
local justice and head of state immunity on the other hand—made it possible for the GOK to 
depict its non-compliance as loyalty to African principles and resistance to Western impositions. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Summary of Findings 
Chapter 2 introduced the cooperation framework and situated the project within the 
transitional justice and norms scholarship as well as the scholarship on compliance with 
International Law (IL). I argued that we can distinguish between legal and non-legal means of 
engagement or cooperation behavior. The former originate in the Rome Statute and include 
mandatory obligations states have once they sign onto the Rome Statute, including ratification, 
domestic implementation, and compliance with court requests such as requests for arrest and 
surrender. Non-legal means go beyond the Rome Statute and include voluntary actions that can 
strengthen or undermine the Court, such as diplomacy and statements. Based on these legal and 
non-legal means of engagement, we can differentiate between four types of cooperators: model 
cooperators, pro-forma cooperators, cheap talkers, and non-cooperators.  
Chapter 3 investigated the ways in which states express their support through statements 
about the Court, contrasting the UN and the AU. At the UN, I found consistent cross-regional 
support for the Court. While states voice critiques of the Court, they are often related to the 
UNSC’s role in influencing the ICC cases. Moreover, we often see state-to-state criticism for 
failing to arrest ICC suspects. While Africa constitutes the most critical region, many African 
states continue to support the Court and more references expressing loyalty were issued in 2017 
than in 2007. In contrast, AU decisions explicitly applauded African member states for their non-
arrests because they were in line with AU policy. Moreover, AU decisions pushed for and 
created exceptions to accountability for leading state officials, thus directly counteracting the 
Rome Statute.  
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In Chapters 4 and 5, I analyzed the cooperation behaviors of South Africa and Kenya 
longitudinally with the Court. Using the cooperation framework introduced in Chapter 2, I 
argued that South Africa shifted from being a model cooperator to a non-cooperator when it 
decided to not arrest Sudanese President al-Bashir during his visit in June 2015. I explained the 
shift with the increasing development of an Africa-centered foreign policy and increasing 
concerns for its regional reputation. Thus, the interests of the government were not aligned with 
the interests of the ICC in June 2015. In addition, the African National Congress has become 
more ICC-critical over time and has advised the government to not break ranks with Africa on 
the ICC issue. The chapter also briefly analyzed the actions and justifications by other African 
states that hosted al-Bashir. Their actions suggest that the AU’s non-cooperation policy provided 
a welcome legal ‘out’ for states preferring to led al-Bashir visit without a diplomatic fallout. 
Chapter 5 shifted the attention to Kenya and the ICC case against current Kenyan 
President Kenyatta. I argued that we can also see a shift in Kenya’s cooperation behavior toward 
the ICC over time, from a model cooperator, albeit less openly supportive than South Africa, to a 
non-cooperator. In contrast to South Africa, however, Kenya became a more outspoken and 
active non-cooperator and did so earlier, with the start of the ICC investigations against leading 
Kenyan officials in 2010. I explained the shift with the desire to avoid prosecution, hence the 
interests of the governments differed from the interests of the ICC. This interest misalignment 
drove the GOK’s lobbying initiatives at the AU for mass exit from the Court. This intensive form 
of institution weakening was accompanied by a domestic election platform that delegitimized the 
ICC as a neocolonial imposter undermining Kenyan sovereignty. 
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Broader Theoretical and Methodological Implications of the Findings 
The chapters introduced the various ways in which states may engage with the ICC. 
Together, they suggest that state cooperation varies over time and that future analyses on 
compliance can benefit from tracing cooperation behavior longitudinally to identify and explain 
shifts. What explained South Africa’s cooperation and support for the Court in the early 2000s 
should not be assumed to hold true 15 years later. Rather than focusing only on ratification and 
implementation of international treaties as indictors and forms of compliance, I suggest to 
enlarge the ‘cooperation field’ by including diplomacy and statements that can contribute to or 
undermine an organization’s legitimacy and effectiveness. The general framework introduced 
here also has the potential to be applied to other international organizations where the specific 
legal obligations differ. While states can still support the organization through statements and 
diplomacy, they can also comply with its respective treaty obligations, such as submitting regular 
reports or establishing domestic monitoring systems. 
The AU stands out as an important intervening actor throughout the chapters. ICC-critical 
African states have used the AU for their own interests, making the AU a forum where important 
ICC-critical decisions have been passed. The AU then provided an alternative legal avenue 
whose own decisions counteract ICC arrest warrants and, despite criticism and legal debate as to 
their legally binding nature, have been used as legal justification for non-arrests by several 
African countries, including South Africa. In addition, the AU represents an alternative peer 
group, or even a primary peer group, to the ‘West,’ where African states seek to bolster their 
reputation for compliance. While reputation analyses often assume that non-compliance will 
harm a state’s reputation, this may hold true only for similar agreements with the same peer 
group. Not arresting al-Bashir allowed South Africa to bolster its regional reputation regardless 
 206 
of what the ‘West’ may think of South Africa’s reputation for compliance or human rights. Thus, 
with regards to the ICC, the AU possesses an actorness that makes it effective in influencing its 
member states’ external relations with other states and organizations.  
In the broader theoretical debates about these inter-organizational relationships, the AU 
and the ICC represent opposing actors in the case studies I examined. However, one should not 
generalize from these findings to all African states and the accountability norm writ large. As 
stated above, the case studies emanate from the two ICC situations in which sitting heads of state 
are charged, and as such they differ from the majority of court cases. Contrasting the findings to 
state and AU behavior in cases where rebels have been charged should make us pause to posit a 
fundamental norm resistance from Africa against the accountability norm. Rather, some African 
countries have used the AU for their interests against the ICC in the cases where ICC 
involvement has the potential to harm a fellow African leader. Neither the AU nor individual 
countries have admonished the Court for its decisions when rebels were charged. For instance, 
despite Ugandan President Museveni’s commonplace attacks on the ICC, Uganda agreed to have 
former LRA commander Dominic Ongwen tried at the ICC after he was arrested in the DRC in 
January 2015. In addition, many ICC states parties in Africa continue to support the Court as can 
be seen in the lack of consensus in coordinating a continent-wide withdrawal from the Court.  
Compliance in these cases can be explained by domestic-level factors. In the cases I 
investigate here, the interests are not aligned between state leaders and the ICC when it came to 
compliance with concrete court requests. When the Court charges state officials, cooperation 
becomes less likely as states may refuse to cooperate or engage in selective cooperation. These 
findings further support existing scholarship on the importance of domestic politics for 
compliance and the strategic nature of compliance. However, these domestic concerns are 
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channeled through the AU as an intermediary actor when Kenya leveraged the AU for its own 
agenda and South Africa was able to justify its non-arrest of al-Bashir with an AU decision. 
In that sense, the dissertation speaks both to second-image theories of IR as well as the 
second-image reversed tradition. On the one hand, the cases suggest that domestic considerations 
about the potential costs of compliance and concerns for regional and global reputations can 
hamper cooperation. Thus, state cooperation with an international organization such as the ICC 
can be furthered or obstructed through domestic politics. On the other hand, the ICC (and the 
AU) can also impact domestic politics. In South Africa, the charges against al-Bashir and 
increasing AU action against the ICC prompted a shift in the ANC’s and subsequently the South 
African executive’s position vis-à-vis the Court. In Kenya, the charges against Kenyatta and 
other senior government officials prompted a regional lobbying offensive as well as the alliance 
between Kenyatta and Ruto during the 2013 presidential elections. Forged by convenience, the 
Uhuruto alliance under the Jubilee Alliance banner will continue to impact domestic politics, as 
both are running mates in the August 2017 presidential election. 
Broader Policy Implications for Accountability through the ICC 
For the ICC, the cases against sitting leaders have shown the immense hurdles when 
cases go against the interests and policy of the AU. This dissertation has revealed the focus of the 
AU on cases against sitting heads of state. Considering these odds, it seems likely that the Court 
will be reluctant to initiate more cases against sitting heads of state and rather shift its attention 
to rebel leaders and smaller fish to get some ‘wins’ for the Court. As the section below illustrates, 
cooperation has been more forthcoming in court cases where the interests of the sitting 
governments and the ICC are more aligned. However, in terms of the ICC’s legitimacy, this 
strategy of focusing on rebel leaders carries enormous risks. It risks that the Court is accused of 
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one-sided justice when it charges rebel leaders but not officials during conflicts where both sides 
committed serious crimes. This has been the case in the Court’s Uganda and Côte d’Ivoire 
situations.544 
If the Court were to charge another sitting head of state, the record of the Kenyatta 
administration’s cooperation behavior provides a ‘blueprint’ for recalcitrant governments that are 
legally obligated to cooperate but wish to not incriminate themselves by cooperating ‘too much.’ 
Hence, potential future suspects that are subject to a summons to appear now have a blueprint of 
to how to engage in selective cooperation, allowing the government to uphold a veneer of 
cooperation while at the same time undermining the Court in other forums. 
The rather negative cooperation record in the case studies under analysis here also casts a 
more pessimistic light on the ICC’s potential effects if state cooperation is not forthcoming. 
While this analysis concentrates on state (non-)cooperation as an external constraint on its work 
and effectiveness, the findings suggest several things in light of academic studies about the 
Court’s potential for deterrence545 and its effects on peace processes on the ground.546 The South 
Africa case study has shown that the AU’s non-cooperation policy has helped to make al-
Bashir’s non-arrest acceptable in African countries. Rather than a deterrent effect, the arrest 
warrant against al-Bashir emboldened the Sudanese government in its dismissal and non-
cooperation with the Court. The charges against leading Kenyan officials led to heightened 
diplomacy at the AU and UN in support for delaying the cases as well as dropping them later, 
and even leading efforts for mass withdrawal from the Court. This suggests that cases against 
                                                
544 In Uganda, while the investigation’s focus was on the Lord’s Resistance Army’s and the national authorities after 
2002 in northern Uganda, only arrest warrants for five LRA commanders have been issued. In Côte d’Ivoire, 
three individuals associated with the former regime are charged but not members of the current president’s 
circle. 
545 While scholars disagree about the extent to which deterrence is possible, most scholars agree that certain 
conditions need to be met: Cronin-Furman 2013; Hillebrecht 2016; Appel 2016; Jo and Simmons 2017. 
546 Kersten 2016; Clark 2011; Oette 2010; Gegout 2013. 
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sitting governments have little accountability-furthering effects but risk increasing resistance to 
the Court and its work. For instance, Engbo Gissel argued that the extent to which the Court can 
impact peace negotiations depends on the level of ICC involvement.547 This means that the 
impact is larger when the ICC is more involved, i.e. as a court case proceeds through an 
investigation and into a trial phase. This deeper involvement by the Court and the starting of a 
trial substantially depends on whether the ICC receives state cooperation in the particular case. 
In the absence of state cooperation and the deepening of ICC involvement, the Court cannot 
affect peace processes positively or negatively. 
Interest Alignment and AU Non-Involvement in ICC Cases against Rebel Leaders 
The two detailed case studies in this dissertation are based on the similar case design 
where the outcomes differ. Since both countries involve cases against sitting heads of state, 
cooperation is less likely under these conditions because incentives to shield one’s own are 
higher and state leaders have greater resources at their disposal to make cases ‘go away’: lawyers, 
planes and diplomats to lobby other governments and international organizations, voters to 
mobilize against the Court. Thus in cases where the interests of the ICC are diametrically 
opposed to those of the state—charging and arresting versus shielding—state cooperation is 
unlikely. 
This argument, however, can only be upheld in broader comparisons with other court 
cases in which the interests of the government and the ICC are aligned. Preliminary evidence 
suggests that these situations, often stemming from self-referrals to the Court, have received 
greater cooperation from the sitting governments. This supports the interest alignment claim to 
some extent: Sitting governments were willing to refer their country to the Court, hence ‘risk’ 
                                                
547 Gissel 2015. 
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that the Court would intervene judicially in the affairs of their country, presumably because they 
were confident that the Court would charge their political opponents. This is the ‘legal lasso’ 
argument advanced by Hillebrecht and Straus: Involving the ICC and having the Court charge 
domestic political opponents allows a sitting government to ‘get rid’ of a domestic rival.548 
Indeed, the ICC has been charging rebels in most cases and has refrained from charging 
state officials of the governments that referred. Until the Kenya cases, the OTP had not charged 
individuals on both sides of a conflict. Table 18 presents an overview of the charges brought 
against individuals in each of the Court’s ongoing situations and the extent to which compliance 
has occurred. The situations in which the interests between the government and the ICC were 
aligned and cooperation occurred are shaded gray.  
 
Table 18: Overview of ICC Situations and Cooperation Types 
Situation 
Country 
Number of AW and 
SA 
Political 
Opponents 
Charged? 
Cooperation Types 
Georgia 0 N/A N/A 
Mali 1 yes Model Cooperator 
Côte d’Ivoire 3 yes Model Cooperator 
Kenya 9 some Pro forma and Non-Cooperator 
Libya 4 yes Pro forma Cooperator 
Darfur/Sudan 7 no Non-Cooperator 
DRC 6 yes Model Cooperator 
CAR (I and II) 5 yes Model Cooperator 
Uganda 5 yes Pro forma cooperators 
 
The ICC’s focus on rebel leaders has created criticism of the Court, which promised to 
bring charges against those deemed ‘most responsible’ regardless of which political side a person 
is on. The ICC maintains that it does investigate the actions of all sides and that when it fails to 
                                                
548 Hillebrecht and Straus 2017. 
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bring charges it is often due to missing evidence or that the crimes do not pass the gravity 
threshold.549 Critics, however, assert that the Court fails to bring charges against government 
members even if evidence points to crimes, because the Court relies on the government’s 
cooperation and goodwill toward the Court.550 The cases in this dissertation attest to this fact. 
Outside of the Sudan and Kenya situations, cooperation has been ‘forthcoming’ as ICC 
officials stress: “[G]enerally we have very good cooperation on the routine types of assistance, 
such as access to territories, interviewing people, provision of records, including from the large 
number of African states where we have high volumes of requests, even non state parties.”551 
While many are reluctant to categorize cooperation because that would represent a political 
statement and not “a judicial finding, an accurate statement,”552 several highlight the successful 
cooperation by the DRC and CAR but also France, the Netherlands, and Belgium had very 
successful cooperation.553 In addition, “the authorities of Ivory Coast are very good in complying 
with their duty to cooperate. So that is something that you will hear less in the media because it 
works. What you will hear is when it doesn’t work.”554 It suggests that African states differ in 
their posture when at the AU from bilateral relations with the ICC. At AU summits ICC-
supporting states may be less expressive of that support as they need to balance “how do they 
relate to their fellow African states and how they relate to the court.”555  
Five states referred their country to the Court: the DRC, Uganda, CAR twice (CAR I and 
II), and Mali. We can also add Côte d’Ivoire to the list because while the Prosecutor technically 
initiated the situation, the country signaled its willingness to cooperate and self-refer as it 
                                                
549 Interviews 002, 004, and 006. 
550 Bosco 2014.  
551 Interview 006. 
552 Interview 004. 
553 Interview 001, 007. 
554 Interview 002. 
555 Interview 001. 
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accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.556 In these cases states have been cooperating well with the 
Court and the Court has completed several trials arising out of those cases with CAR and DRC 
leading the field of cooperators.  
Uganda was the first situation at the Court and it arose out of the government’s self-
referral to the Court, seeking the ICC’s help in dealing with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
Hillebrecht and Straus categorized Uganda as engaging in qualified cooperation. At first, Uganda 
was interested in “removing and undermining a persistent armed opposition group,” the LRA.557 
In addition to removing domestic political rivals, the Ugandan government “reaped international 
reputational benefits for endorsing a then-fledgling international human rights body” while the 
ICC gained its first cases in its early years. However, after the Court issued arrest warrants for 
several LRA leaders, including Joseph Kony, Museveni grew more critical over time, charging 
the Court with negatively impacting peace processes on the ground.558 Moreover, the ICC 
investigation proved costly for Museveni, as critics depicted the ICC cases as proof of his 
inability to deal with the LRA himself.559 After years of ICC critique, Uganda nevertheless 
surrendered Ongwen to the ICC in 2015. 
Mali also stands out in terms of cooperation albeit only one arrest warrant has been 
issued so far. The Mali situation was referred to the Court by the Mali government in July 2012 
with the ICC opening an official investigation in January 2013. The arrest warrant for Ahmad Al 
Mahdi Al Faqi was issued in September 2015 “for war crimes of intentionally directing attacks 
against historic monuments and buildings dedicated to religion, including nine mausoleums and 
                                                
556 Hansen 2012b: 194.  
557 Hillebrecht and Straus 2017: 177. 
558 For more information about the ICC’s intervention in Uganda, please see Allen 2006; Clark 2011; Branch 2007; 
Nouwen and Werner 2010. 
559 Hillebrecht and Straus 2017: 178. 
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one mosque in Timbuktu, Mali.”560 Just six days later, Al Mahdi Al Faqi was surrendered to the 
Court by the authorities of Niger. Al Mahdi Al Faqi was a member of the Islamist militia group 
Ansar Dine. 
In December 2004, the government of CAR referred the situation to the Court and the 
ICC opened an official investigation in May 2007 with a focus on alleged crimes against 
humanity and war crimes committed since 1 July 2002 in an armed conflict between the Central 
African governmental authorities and allied forces and the organized armed group of General 
Bozizé’s rebels.561 Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, a Congolese citizen, served as the leader of the 
Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armée de 
Libération du Congo (ALC).562 Bemba deployed three MLC battalions to CAR in 2002 “at the 
request and in support of former CAR President Ange-Félix Patassé to counter forces loyal to” 
General François Bozizé.563 However, in 2004, Bozizé was President of CAR and thus referred 
the conflict to the ICC. He has then likely welcomed the charges against his former rival Bemba 
who was arrested near Brussels in May 2008: “A weak domestic political landscape with few 
mechanisms for accountability reduced concerns that Bozizé himself would ultimately be turned 
over to the ICC, while cooperation provided a modicum of legitimacy for Bozizé’s 
government.”564   
In the DRC, President Kabila referred the situation in his country to the Court in April 
2004 and the ICC opened an official investigation only two months later with a focus on crimes 
committed in the Eastern DRC, in the Ituri region and the North and South Kivu Provinces after 
2002. The Kabila government cooperated with the arrests warrants for Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
                                                
560 International Criminal Court, ICC-PIDS-CIS-MAL-01-08/16_Eng. 
561 International Criminal Court, ICC-PIDS-CIS-CAR-01-016/16_Eng. 
562 Ibid. 
563 Ibid. 
564 Hillebrecht and Straus 2017: 176-177. 
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and Germain Katanga who had been arrested in March 2005 for other incidents. Bosco Ntaganda 
voluntarily handed himself over at the U.S. Embassy in Rwanda asking to be transferred to ICC 
in March 2013. Lubanga was President of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC), a rebel 
group that took power in Ituri in September 2002 with the help of its military wing.565 Katanga 
was the leader of the armed rebel group Patriotic Resistance Force in Ituri, and Ntaganda was 
chief of military operations of UPC’s military wing and later a general in the national army but 
he defected. All three men thus were opponents of the Kabila government at some point: 
“Presiding over a very fragile peace and the persistent threat of conflict, particularly in the 
eastern part of the country, Kabila and his interim government wanted to keep potential spoilers 
and major opposition parties from the country.”566 
Côte d’Ivoire’s situation before the Court originates in the post-election violence in 
2010/2011 after a contested election between then-President Laurent Gbagbo and his challenger 
and current President Alassane Ouattara. The clashes that followed the contested election cost at 
least 3,000 civilians their lives and forces linked to both Gbagbo and Ouattara reportedly 
committed attacks.567 The situation was brought at the ICC after Côte d’Ivoire signaled to the 
Court that it welcomed ICC intervention. In October 2011, ICC judges authorized the OTP to 
open an investigation into crimes committed during the PEV. The OTP has brought cases against 
Laurent Gbagbo, his wife Simone Gbagbo, and Charles Blé Goudé, the leader of a pro-Gbagbo 
militia group. Blé Goudé was surrendered to the ICC in March 2014, after he had been extradited 
by Ghana to Côte d’Ivoire in January 2013. The charges against him were confirmed in 2014. 
Hillebrecht and Straus label the country’s cooperation behavior as ‘qualified’ given that the 
government cooperated fully at first and transferred Blé Goudé and Laurent Gbagbo to the ICC 
                                                
565 International Criminal Court, ICC-PIDS-CIS-DRC-01-015/16_Eng. 
566 Hillebrecht and Straus 2017: 177. 
567 Human Rights Watch 2015: 1. 
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but later challenged the Court’s jurisdiction in an admissibility challenge for Simone Gbagbo. 
The cooperation in the cases against Blé Goudé and Laurent Gbagbo as the two main political 
leaders sits well with the interest alignment: “The state thus used the international legal lasso, 
removed and potentially discredited the main opposition, and earned some international accolade 
for such action.”568 
In October 2013, Côte d’Ivoire challenged the admissibility of the Simone Gbagbo case 
by arguing that she was already being prosecuted in national courts. Pre-Trial Chamber I rejected 
this challenge in December 2014 because “Côte d'Ivoire’s domestic authorities were not taking 
tangible, concrete and progressive steps aimed at ascertaining whether Simone Gbagbo is 
criminally responsible for the same conduct that is alleged in the case before the Court.” The 
judges also reminded Ivorian authorities of their obligation to surrender Simone Gbagbo to the 
ICC.569 In March 2017, she was found not guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity in 
Côte d’Ivoire.570 However, her trial has been criticized for “fair trial concerns and a critical lack 
of evidence.”571 In Côte d’Ivoire, the ICC has only charged members of Gbagbo’s camp even 
though evidence suggests widespread human rights abuses by Ouattara’s forces: “None of 
Ouattara’s out-of-control followers, including members of the official armed forces under his 
control, have been charged or even credibly investigated,” opening up the ICC to charges of 
‘victor’s justice.’572 
It is notable that with the exception of the Libya cases, which have also been referred to 
the Court via the UNSC in 2011, no AU decision even mentions any of these ongoing court cases 
against rebel leaders. During its July 2011 summit, the AU Assembly expressed its “deep 
                                                
568 Hillebrecht and Straus 2017: 179. 
569 International Criminal Court, ICC-PIDS-CIS-CI-02-004/15_Eng. 
570 Aljazeera 2017. 
571 Human Rights Watch 2017. 
572 Corey-Boulet 2012.  
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concerns at the manner in which the [ICC] Prosecutor is handling the situation in Libya” and 
called on its member states to “not cooperate in arrest and surrender of Gaddafi because it 
complicates peace negotiations on the ground” and thus the case should be deferred.573 In the 
Libya situation, the Libyan government successfully challenged the admissibility of the case 
against Abdullah Senussi and has refused to surrender Gaddaffi’s son Saif.574 
This brief overview cannot do justice to the details of each case. However, the 
preliminary evidence gathered from interviews and this overview suggests that cooperation with 
the Court has been more forthcoming in cases against rebel leaders. In these cases interests were 
often aligned between the ICC and the sitting governments as both shared an interest in the same 
outcome: arresting the suspects and bringing them to justice. While the motivations of the ICC 
and the government might differ, the outcome of forthcoming cooperation remains the same. 
This overview then suggests that the cases I investigate in this dissertation do indeed 
underlie different cooperation dynamics and thus merit distinct scholarly attention. In addition, 
we see very limited involvement by the AU in cases against rebel leaders. This suggests that in 
these cases, the AU Assembly, as the heads of states, stand to gain from these ICC cases and 
hence their motivation to involve the AU for their cause wanes The AU’s involvement thus 
appears to be limited to cases in which ICC directly go against heads of state (Sudan, Kenya) as 
well in cases where the UNSC was involved in referring the case to the Court. 
Future Research Avenues 
Several possible research expansions flow from the restrictive focus on two case studies. 
Expanding the N to examine additional cases would add leverage to the explanations I provided. 
                                                
573 Assembly of the African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.366(XVII): para.  6. 
574 Hillebrecht and Straus 2017: 175. 
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Since both the South Africa and Kenya case studies involved court cases against sitting heads of 
state, examining the cooperation record of countries in which the Court has charged rebels 
provides a fruitful way to test and refine my arguments. Hence, in-depth case studies of the 
model cooperators from Table 18 would help round out the analyses. In these cases, one would 
also expect less variation over time unless the ICC had signaled to also initiate cases against 
government forces or the inner elite circle. Hence, potential cases would include those that 
remained model cooperators despite arrest warrants for nationals of those countries, such as in 
DRC and CAR. Hence, extending the N to include more cases from other countries where a main 
compliance factor (interest alignment) and/or the outcomes vary promises to substantiate or 
refine the arguments presented here. 
A second avenue to future research includes a closer consideration of the ICC as an actor 
in the ‘virtual trial’ between the court, state, and international community. Since the focus of this 
dissertation was more on the states and their cooperation with the ICC, the actions of the Court 
provided what states responded to. However, to fully understand the engagement between the 
two it should be considered that what the Court does could also be reactive to how states engage. 
Thus, analyzing the timing of ICC judicial decisions and arrest warrants and statements by the 
ICC Chief Prosecutor could yield important insights into state cooperation. 
Beyond the ICC, future research can further test and refine the cooperation framework I 
propose. One viable path to comparison would be to restrict the analysis to international courts. 
This could entail the international criminal tribunals (as a narrow focus on international criminal 
law) and/or human rights courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (as a broader focus on human rights). Outside of the topical 
focus, other courts could include the International Court of Justice, the Andean Tribunal of 
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Justice, or the European Court of Justice. In these cases we would expect that the legal 
obligations differ that states take on depending on the treaty in question. For instance, 
compliance does not occur with arrest warrants but rather implementing court decisions 
domestically, such as paying reparations. In contrast, non-legal means of engagement remain 
similar bur can vary depending on the court’s international profile or its standing. If a court 
enjoys a good standing among states in a region and membership in it is widespread, we would 
not expect to see extensive pro-Court diplomacy for more membership but maybe for increased 
compliance with the decisions. 
More difficult tests of the framework would include applications to IOs more generally, 
likewise in the field of human rights or across issue areas. For instance, diplomacy and 
statements attesting to the important work of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) can help 
strengthen the Council’s legitimacy. But the Council’s work can also be undermined through 
negative statements and anti-Council diplomacy. Legal cooperation with the UNHRC would 
involve that a state submits a national report for the Universal Periodic Review and whether a 
state implements the recommendations arising from the review.  
These are some of the possible ways to substantiate and further test the dissertation’s 
findings. While some involve more case studies and comparisons across ICC cases to test 
compliance explanations, others involve leaving the ICC as an actor and using the framework 
established here and applying it to other courts and/or IOs.  
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